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  • British Expeditionary Forceの司令官であるGeneral Douglas HaigとSecond Armyの司令官であるGeneral Herbert Plumerの両者は、敵を撃退するために必要があると考えていました。
  • Somme攻勢の準備を考えると、Haigは必要以上に部隊を分散させたくありませんでした。サポートは追加の砲兵部隊と20th Light Divisionの歩兵旅団に限られていました。次の反撃は、利用可能な歩兵を使い、特に砲兵に重点を置いて行われることが提案されました。追加の砲兵部隊はすぐに作業を開始し、ドイツ軍の拠点を固めるために彼らの前線と補給路を砲撃し、敵の砲弾の位置を捜索しました。
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British Expeditionary Force commander General Douglas Haig and Second Army commander General Herbert Plumer both believed it necessary to expel the Germans from the captured positions. In view of the preparations for the Somme offensive, Haig did not wish to divert more forces than were necessary. Support was limited to a number of additional artillery units and an infantry brigade from the 20th Light Division. It was suggested that the next counterattack be carried out with the infantry available, with a particularly large emphasis placed on artillery. The additional artillery units immediately went to work hampering German consolidation, by shelling their front and support lines and seeking out hostile batteries.

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  • Nakay702
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>British Expeditionary Force commander General Douglas Haig and Second Army commander General Herbert Plumer both believed it necessary to expel the Germans from the captured positions. In view of the preparations for the Somme offensive, Haig did not wish to divert more forces than were necessary. Support was limited to a number of additional artillery units and an infantry brigade from the 20th Light Division. ⇒英国遠征軍指揮官のダグラス・ヘイグ将軍と第2方面軍指揮官のハーバート・プルーマー将軍は、両者とも占領された陣地からドイツ軍を追い出すことが必要であると思っていた。ソンム攻撃に対する準備からみれば、ヘイグは必要とされるより多くの軍隊を変えたくはなかった。支援隊は、第20軽師団からの追加の砲兵部隊と歩兵連隊部隊に限られていた。 >It was suggested that the next counterattack be carried out with the infantry available, with a particularly large emphasis placed on artillery. The additional artillery units immediately went to work hampering German consolidation, by shelling their front and support lines and seeking out hostile batteries. ⇒次の反撃は、特に砲兵隊を大々的に強調して、利用可能な(だけの)歩兵連隊をもって行われることが示唆された。追加の砲兵部隊は直ちにドイツ軍の前線を砲撃し、敵対する砲兵中隊を誘い出すことによって、ドイツ軍の強化を妨げる活動に出て行った。

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