Aylmer's Plan to Attack the Dujaila Redoubt
- Aylmer devised a plan to attack the Turk-held Dujaila Redoubt, which held 25,000 experienced troops.
- Aylmer wanted to await reinforcement from Gallipoli, but Lake ordered an attack by 15 March 1916.
- Aylmer's forces, consisting of approximately 35,000 men and 62 guns, were halted around 700 meters from the Redoubt.
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Aylmer therefore devised a plan whereby his force would cross the Tigris for a straightforward attack upon the Turk-held Dujaila Redoubt, at the extreme outer edge of Es Sinn, which held some 25,000 experienced troops, many of whom had fought at Gallipoli as well as along the Tigris. Aylmer was nevertheless keen to await further reinforcement from Gallipoli. He was however over-ruled by Lake, who was wary of delaying while the floods increased in strength, and instructed to launch an attack no later than 15 March 1916. Indian troops prayingThus Aylmer ordered the bulk of his two divisions - approximately 35,000 men and 62 guns - to march overnight preparatory to storming Dujaila Redoubt while 6,500 were left behind in front of Hanna. Meanwhile Townshend was to separately attack Turk forces from behind. Originally scheduled to begin on 6 March the attack was postponed until 8 March on account of heavy rainfall. General Kemball led the main advance at 10am; but by noon he was stopped around 700 metres short of the Redoubt.
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以下のとおりお答えします。ドゥジャイラ要塞への突撃計画とその遂行（に入ったところまで）を述べています。 ＞Aylmer therefore devised a plan whereby his force would cross the Tigris for a straightforward attack upon the Turk-held Dujaila Redoubt, at the extreme outer edge of Es Sinn, which held some 25,000 experienced troops, many of whom had fought at Gallipoli as well as along the Tigris. ⇒したがってエールマーは、彼の軍隊にチグリス川を横切ってトルコ軍の保持するドゥジャイラ要塞への直接的に攻撃させる計画を考案した。取っかかりのエス・ジンの最外縁には、約25,000人の経験豊かな軍隊が駐屯しており、そのうちの多くがガリポリだけでなくチグリス川沿岸でも戦っていた。 ＞Aylmer was nevertheless keen to await further reinforcement from Gallipoli. He was however over-ruled by Lake, who was wary of delaying while the floods increased in strength, and instructed to launch an attack no later than 15 March 1916. ⇒それにもかかわらずエールマーは、ガリポリからより一層の強化隊を待ちたいと切望した。しかし、彼はレイクに却下された。彼レイクは軍隊の補強で手間どる間に洪水が増大することを心配して、1916年3月15日より遅れることなく攻撃を開始するよう指示したのである。 ＞Indian troops prayingThus Aylmer ordered the bulk of his two divisions - approximately 35,000 men and 62 guns - to march overnight preparatory to storming Dujaila Redoubt while 6,500 were left behind in front of Hanna.(*) ⇒こうしてエールマーは、6,500人の兵士をハナの前線に残しておく一方、彼の２個師団の本体 ― 約35,000人の兵士と62丁の銃 ― に対してあらかじめ夜間行軍をして、ドゥジャイラ要塞に突撃するよう命じた。(*) (＊)この段落冒頭のIndian troops prayingは関係ない語句のようですので、削除して訳します。 ＞Meanwhile Townshend was to separately attack Turk forces from behind. ⇒その間、タウンゼンドは個別に、背後からトルコ軍を攻撃することになっていた。 ＞Originally scheduled to begin on 6 March the attack was postponed until 8 March on account of heavy rainfall. General Kemball led the main advance at 10am; but by noon he was stopped around 700 metres short of the Redoubt. ⇒もともとは、3月6日から始める予定であった攻撃が、激しい降雨のため3月8日まで延期された。ケンボール将軍は、午前10時に主要な進軍を率い終ったが、正午まで要塞の約700メートル手前に（軍を）留め置かされた。
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By dusk, it became clear that the attempt had failed. British troops, attempting to manoeuvre around the Ottoman flanks, failed to reach the river, and the mouth of the Hanna Defile was still strongly held by the entrenched Ottoman troops. Aylmer called off the attack by the end of the day and ferried most of his remaining troops to the right bank of the Tigris. By this time, Aylmer's troops had gained control of the Wadi, but it was a small advance that was unworthy of the 1,600 men killed or wounded (including 40 British officers) in the attack and did little to bring relief closer to Townshend’s beleaguered forces at Kut. The provision of adequate medical capacity and supplies had not improved significantly since the appalling debacle at Sheikh Sa'ad, so again many casualties suffered without treatment or evacuation for several days.
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Comparatively, the Indian units were even more ill-equipped for modern war than the rest of troops of Britain's empire. Indian divisions had less artillery assigned to it. At the start of the war, an Indian Division had one brigade of artillery, as opposed to the three assigned to a British European division. What artillery that an Indian division did have was typically lighter, more suited for expeditions along the North-West Frontier. Its troops were deliberately kept a generation behind in infantry weaponry. During their time in France, the Indian Corps divisions had been brought up to date with the latest weaponry, including flare guns and bombs. However, when withdrawn from France, most of this equipment was left behind in France for their replacements to use. To manage the fighting of this ad-hoc unit, Aylmer had almost no staff support. His staff for the relief force, designated as Tigris Corps, consisted of one staff officer, one wounded officer, and one brigadier who had failed to finish the Quetta Staff College. In addition to this staff, his collection of brigades would be under the command of the Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC of the 7th (Meerut) Division, who was without his staff. Just after the new year, Aylmer's ordered his force to move upriver from Ali Gharbi.
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Unable to resist pressure any longer, Aylmer ordered Younghusband to advance upriver with the 19th, 28th, and 35th Indian Brigades on 3 January 1916. Aylmer remained behind at Ali Gharbi, awaiting further reinforcements already en route before moving to combine with Younghusband's force. At Ali Gharbi, Aylmer retained almost all of the Tigris Corps' cavalry, as well as 21st (Bareilly) Brigade, a collection of un-brigaded battalions that he would eventually form the 9th (Sirhind) Brigade, some artillery, as well as Corps support troops. Although ordered to advance, Younghusband was also instructed not to become heavily engaged until Aylmer arrived with the rest of the Tigris Corps. Not only did Younghusband have any cavalry, but the weather made it impossible to take advantage of the few airplanes available to the Tigris Corps. The winter rains arrived along the lower Tigris, turning the terrain into a quagmire of mud. Younghusband would later write, ""Having no cavalry, or aeroplanes, or other means of reconnoitering, and the country being as flat as a billiard table, the only way of reconnoitering the Ottomans was to march on, till we bumped into them." On 5 January 1916, Younghusband's troops were informed by local Arabs that Ottoman forces had dug-in just upriver from their position. The next day, the Younghusband's force bumped into the Ottoman positions.
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Given the strength of the Ottoman defences at the Hanna, the Anglo-Indian forces needed to find a way around them. On the left bank of the Tigris, this would mean swinging wide around the Ottoman defenses and marching at least 30 miles through the desert. Then, relying on Shatt al-Hayy for their communications, the force would break through the Ottoman lines and link up with the Kut garrison. The other option was to continue along Tigris River, but switching to the right bank. However, this would mean having to break through the Ottoman defenses at Dujaila. Unwilling to leave the Tigris, which provided the British forces with an easy line of communication to Basra, Lieutenant-General Aylmer made the decision to attempt an advance along the right bank. Like the left bank, the terrain was mostly featureless and devoid of cover. The Ottoman units, with their German advisers, had become adept at camouflaging their positions, making it hard for the British and Indian units to fix them properly. What was known was that Ottomans were in the process of constructing a redoubt at Dujaila. Since there was no way to cover a move across the river and through the Dujaila position, Aylmer and his staff put together a plan that called for a night assault by the majority of his force while a detachment would remain behind on the left bank as a diversion. However, prior to putting the plan into effect, Aylmer had to get approval of the new commander of I.E.F. D, Lieutenant-General Sir Percy Lake. After the Battle of the Hanna, General Lake had begun to lose faith in Aylmer's abilities as commander of the Tigris Corps. In order to exert greater control over the coming battle, he had replaced Aylmer's chief of staff with his own man, Major-General George Gorringe.
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Townshend, intending to copy his success at Battle of Es Sinn, ordered a night march in the closing hours of November 21, 1915, with the aim of attacking at dawn on the November 22, The attack happened on schedule but due to poor ground conditions on the west bank the British ended up attacking the much stronger east bank positions. The advance was supposed to be supported by river gunboats, however two things prevented the gun boats from becoming a factor in the battle. First, the Ottoman guns on the west bank rained fire upon them. Secondly, the Tigris was extensively mined and several river obstructions made navigation difficult.
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Aylmer’s troops were exhausted and demoralized as they continued to make their way up the Tigris toward Kut. Their progress was hampered by the region’s typical shortage of available roads and supply routes. Aylmer planned to outflank the Wadi position, capture the Hanna Defile and surround the Ottoman force. The 28th Indian Brigade of the 7th (Meerut) Division under Brigadier General George Kemball would attack the Wadi trenches frontally, while the rest of the Tigris Corps moved around the flank. However, the British troops were hampered by having no accurate maps of the area, so much of the planning was left to chance. Meanwhile, the Ottoman army, under new regional commander Halil Pasha, set up new and firmer defensive positions—with some 20,000 troops—along the banks of the smaller Wadi River, through which the British would have to pass to reach Kut.
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Not only did Lake lack faith in Aylmer's abilities, Aylmer himself had lost confidence in the abilities of his subordinates. Of his two divisional commanders, Major-General Henry D'Urban Kearny, GOC 3rd (Lahore) Division, and Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC 7th (Meerut) Division, neither were detailed to the principal commander for the planned operation. Major-General D'Urban Keary would be assigned to command one of the three columns, the other two being commanded by Major-General George Kemball, one of his brigade commanders. Aylmer made his decision claiming that Kemball was a more energetic commander. Major-General Younghusband, who had been the chief proponent of a desert march to outflank the Ottoman lines entirely, was assigned to command the diversion force on the left bank. Like the British, the Ottoman Sixth Army was also stretched to the limit of logistical support. The lack of any sort of industrial infrastructure (i.e. paved road capable of military transport or railways) made it exceedingly difficult for the Sixth Army to be rapidly reinforced. What the Ottoman army did have going in its favor was time. They had recognized that for the time, they were at the extent of their supply line from Baghdad.
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It was a day of stubborn and often heroic actions by platoons, sections and even individuals isolated from their comrades by the fragmented nature of the battle and lack of visibility. The greatest danger facing the British on 22 March was that the Third and Fifth armies might become separated. Byng did not order a retirement from the Flesquières salient, which his army had won at such cost and Haig ordered him to keep in contact with the Fifth Army, even if that required a further retreat; the day also saw the first French troops enter the battle on the southern flank. Small parties of British troops fought delaying actions, to allow those to their rear to reach new defensive positions. Some British battalions continued to resist in the Battle Zone and delay the German advance, even managing to withdraw at the last moment. At l'Épine de Dallon the 2nd Wiltshire battalion held out until 14:30 and at "Manchester Hill", the garrison of the 16th Manchesters commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfrith Elstob, fought until he was killed at 16:30 Directly to their rear was the "Stevens Redoubt", of the 2nd Battalion of the Bedfordshire Regiment, to which the survivors retired. The redoubt was reinforced by two companies of the 18th King's and attacked from all sides after the units on the flanks had been pushed back. The Bedfords were ordered to retire just as their ammunition ran out and retreated through the lines of the 20th Division, having lost half their number. The longest retreat was made in the XVIII Corps area, where the corps commander General Ivor Maxse, appeared to have misinterpreted an order from Gough for a fighting retreat if necessary, to mean that the corps should fall back to the Somme. The Germans brought heavy artillery into Artemps under the cover of the morning mist, which forced the remaining battalions of the 109th Brigade (36th Division) to retreat to join the 108th Brigade at Happencourt. The result of the misunderstanding between Gough and Maxse and different interpretations placed on telephone messages and written orders, was that the 36th Division retired to Sommette-Eaucourt on the south bank of the Canal de Saint-Quentin, to form a new line of defence. This required the Division to cross the Canal at Dury.
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Following the setbacks at the Hanna on 21 January 1916, Lieutenant-General Aylmer's Tigris Corps spent the month of February refitting and collecting reinforcements. Despite the pause, the Tigris Corps was still unable to be brought back up to full strength. The 13th (Western) Division had been dispatched as reinforcements from Egypt where it was being brought back to strength following its evacuation from Gallipoli. However, by the end of February, only the 13th Division's first battalions had reached the theatre, and only two of those had been transported up river by end of February. The British position at Kut was becoming more desperate. Food stocks were estimated to last only until the middle of April, even with the discovery of an additional store of grain in late January. Additionally, there was the concern that time was running out in another way: the weather. Based on the known weather patterns of the region, the latest that the Anglo-Indian Tigris Corps could expect favourable weather to hold was the middle of March. After that, the spring thaw would be in full swing. Combined with the coming rainy season, it would turn the areas along the banks of the Tigris into a flooded quagmire.
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The failure at Dujalia sealed Aylmer's fate. On 12 March 1916, he was relieved of command by Lake after the War Office received the report of the defeat. In his place, Gorringe would be elevated to command of the Tigris Corps. After the defeat, the annual floods began. Melted snow off the Zagros Mountains began the annual re-supply of the rivers. The flooding the Mesopotamian plain began turning it into a sea of mud, flooded nullahs and mud islands. The morale of the Tigris Corps began to drop. When word of the defeat at Dujalia was announced to 6th (Poona) Division, Indian Muslim soldiers, already conflicted about fighting their coreligionists, began to desert. For the rest of March, the Tigris Corps would await reinforcements, including the all British 13th (Western) Division. Once they were reinforced and concentrated, they would attempt once more to break the siege before Townshend's garrison ran out of food.
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