The Flawed Interpretation of the Mosaic Description

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  • The interpretation proposed by Buckland of the Mosaic description is flawed from both a geological and philological perspective.
  • The writer of the Mosaic description did not intend for the suggested interpretation to be taken seriously, as it goes against the narrative's overall context.
  • Dr. Buckland's attempt to justify the omission of certain facts in the Mosaic description does not hold up under scrutiny.
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和訳お願い致します。

But whether contemplated from a geological point of view, or whether from a philological one, that is, with reference to the value of words, the use of language, and the ordinary rules which govern writers whose object it is to make themselves understood by those to whom their works are immediately addressed, the interpretation proposed by Buckland to be given to the Mosaic description will not bear a moment's serious discussion. It is plain, from the whole tenor of the narrative, that the writer contemplated no such representation as that suggested, nor could any such idea have entered into the minds of those to whom the account was first given. Dr. Buckland endeavours to make out that we have here simply a case of leaving out facts which did not particularly concern the writer's purpose, so that he gave an account true so far as it went, though imperfect.

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  • Nakay702
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回答No.1

以下のとおりお答えします。すみませんが、原文の意味をどの程度忠実に訳文に再現できたか、(特に後半では)自信がありません。 バックランドがモーゼの記述について示した解釈はほんの一瞬たりとも真摯な議論を受けるには値しないでしょう。それを地質学の視点から見ても、文献学の視点から見ても(言えることです)。文献学から見ても、というのはすなわちこうです。自分の著作を直接さし向ける人々にそれを理解してもらうという目的を持つ著者が支配を受けるところの、言葉の意味価値、言語の使用方法、および通常の表現規則などから見ても(そう言える)、ということです。 全体的な話の要旨から、当の著者はそれが示唆するような表現を熟考しなかったことは明らかです。しかも、説明報告が最初に与えられた人たちの心に、そのような概念が了解され得べくもありませんでした。バックランド博士は、特に著者の意図に関係のない事実を晒している状況を本件のように簡単に把握されてしまうことを何とか埋め合わせようとするので、(この場合のように)不完全であるにも拘わらず、真実の説明をとんでもない遠方まで持っていってしまったのです。 以上、ご回答まで。

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