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メルケル首相の携帯電話への盗聴に関する記事です。訳して頂けませんか。よろしくお願いします。 Analysts said Thursday that although some of Europe’s outrage over NSA spying in recent months was more for domestic consumption than because of genuine surprise, the shock in Germany did stem from a sense that a line had been crossed.

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専門家が、木曜日に語ったところでは、この数カ月のNSAのスパイ行為に関するヨーロッパの憤りの幾分かは、純粋な驚きと言うよりは、どちらかと言えば、国内向けの記事であり、ドイツの驚愕も、越えてはならない一線が踏み越えられたと言う感覚から生じたものの様です。

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ありがとうございました。よく理解できました。

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