ドイツの攻撃とフランスの対応

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  • 1911年の第二次モロッコ危機の際、フランスにはイギリスの6個師団がモーブージュ周辺で活動することが予想されていた
  • 第一、第二、第三軍はアルザスとロレーヌの反対側、エピナルとヴェルダンに集結し、第五軍はモンメディからセダンとメジエールに集結する予定で、第四軍はヴェルダンの西側に待機していた
  • ベルギーからのドイツの侵攻に対しては、フランスは西にある第四軍を東に動かして南側から攻撃する予定だった
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和訳をお願いします。

A German attack from south-eastern Belgium towards Mézières and a possible offensive from Lorraine towards Verdun, Nancy and St. Dié was anticipated; the plan was an evolution from Plan XVI and made more provision for the possibility of a German offensive from the north through Belgium. The First, Second and Third armies were to concentrate between Épinal and Verdun opposite Alsace and Lorraine, the Fifth Army was to assemble from Montmédy to Sedan and Mézières and the Fourth Army was to be held back west of Verdun, ready to move east to attack the southern flank of a German invasion through Belgium or southwards against the northern flank of an attack through Lorraine. No formal provision was made for combined operations with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) but joint arrangements had been made and in 1911 during the Second Moroccan Crisis, the French had been told that six British divisions could be expected to operate around Maubeuge.

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  • Nakay702
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以下のとおりお答えします。 (一度答えたものに改善を加えて、回答とさせていただきます。) >A German attack from south-eastern Belgium towards Mézières and a possible offensive from Lorraine towards Verdun, Nancy and St. Dié was anticipated; the plan was an evolution from Plan XVI and made more provision for the possibility of a German offensive from the north through Belgium. ⇒ベルギー南東部からメジエールへ向かうドイツ軍の攻撃と、ロレーヌからヴェルダン、ナンシーおよびサン・ディエへ向かう攻撃姿勢の可能性が予想されていた。(これに対する)計画は、計画XVIの発展形であったが、さらにベルギー経由で来るドイツ軍の攻撃姿勢の可能性に対する備えもなされた。 The First, Second and Third armies were to concentrate between Épinal and Verdun opposite Alsace and Lorraine, the Fifth Army was to assemble from Montmédy to Sedan and Mézières and the Fourth Army was to be held back west of Verdun, ready to move east to attack the southern flank of a German invasion through Belgium or southwards against the northern flank of an attack through Lorraine. ⇒第一、第二および第三方面軍は、アルザスとロレーヌ(のドイツ侵入軍)に対峙すべくエピナルとヴェルダンの間に集結することになっていた。第五方面軍は、モンメディからセダンおよびメジエールにかけて集まることになっていた。そして、第四方面軍は、ベルギー経由で来るドイツ侵入軍の南側面を攻撃するために東へ移動する準備を整え、ありはまたロレーヌ経由で来る攻撃の北側面に対抗する準備を整えて、ヴェルダンの西に潜伏することになっていた。 No formal provision was made for combined operations with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) but joint arrangements had been made and in 1911 during the Second Moroccan Crisis*, the French had been told that six British divisions could be expected to operate around Maubeuge. ⇒英国遠征軍(BEF)と一緒の協同作戦のために行われる正式な対策はなかったけれども、共同の準備作業はなされたことがあった。そして、1911年の「第二次モロッコ事件」*の間、フランス軍は(英国軍のために)6個師団がモベージュ周辺で作戦行動することを期待してもらってよいと語った。 *Second Moroccan Crisis「第二次モロッコ事件」:ドイツ政府が砲艦をモロッコ南西の港湾都市アガディールに派遣したことによって生じた国際紛争で、別名Agadir Crisis「アガディール事件」ともいう。

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