Mental Evolution in Animals: A Psychological Perspective

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  • This essay focuses on the mental evolution in animals from a psychological perspective, excluding philosophical aspects.
  • The distinction between psychology and philosophy is emphasized, with the former being concerned with the science of psychology and the latter with theories of knowledge.
  • The historical method is employed to investigate mental evolution as an object and mental modifications as phenomena within the field of psychology.
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和訳お願い致します。

It being understood, then, that the present essay is restricted to a consideration of mental evolution in animals,I should like to have it also understood that it is further restricted to the psychology as distinguished from the philo sophy of the subject. In a short and independent essay, published elsewhere,* I have already stated my views con cerning the more important questions of philosophy into which the subject-matter of psychology is so apt to dip ; but here it is only needful to emphasize the fact that these two strata of thought, although assuredly in juxtaposition, are no less assuredly distinct. My present enquiry belongs only to the upper stratum, or to the science of psychology as dis tinguished from any theory of knowledge. I am in no wise concerned with " the transition from the object known to the knowing subject," and therefore I am in no wise concerned with any of the philosophical theories which have been pro pounded upon this matter. In other words, I have every where to regard mind as an object and mental modifications as phenomena; therefore I have throughout to investigate the process of Mental Evolution by what is now generally and aptly termed the historical method. I cannot too strongly impress upon the memory of those who from previous reading are able to appreciate the importance of the distinction, that I thus intend everywhere to remain within the borders of psychology, and nowhere to trespass upon the grounds of philosophy.

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  • Nakay702
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以下のとおりお答えします。白状しますと、文字面のみ訳しましたが、内容がほとんど分かりません。特に最後の部分は、何を言っているのかさっぱり理解できませんので、とんでもない誤訳かもしれませんが、その節は悪しからずお許しください。 現在のエッセイは動物の精神発達の考察に制限されることを理解していただいたので、さらにそれが、主題について哲学とは区別されるような心理学に制限されることを理解していただたく思います。他のところ*に公表された短く独立したエッセイで、私はすでに心理学の主題が非常に浸り込みがちな哲学の重要問題に関して自分の見解を述べておきました。しかしここで必要なのは、これらの考えの2つの層が、並置の形をとっているのは確かですが、まさしく別個のものであるという事実を強調することのみです。私の現在の研究は、上側の層に、あるいは、知識に関する理論とは区別されるような心理学の科学にのみ属しています。 私はまったく、「知られた客体から知る主体への推移」に関わる立場はとりません。したがってまた、この問題について提起されてきたいかなる哲学理論とも関係ない立場です。言い換えれば、私はどこにあっても、心を客体(対象)とみなし、精神的変化を現象として見なすはずです。したがって私は、一般に適切に名づけられた歴史的研究法によって、「精神発達」の過程を調査することに徹するはずです。このように私は、どこにあっても心理学の境界内に残り、かつ哲学の土俵に入り込まないようにするつもりですが、このことは前の読書から区別の重要性を評価し得る人々の記憶にあまり強く印象づけることはできません。 以上、ご回答まで。

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