第一次世界大戦におけるSventiany Offensiveの概要

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  • 第一次世界大戦中、ドイツ軍の10軍がロシア軍の10軍に対して行ったSventiany Offensiveは、ロシア防衛線を突破し、ロシア軍の背後を襲うためにドイツ騎兵師団が投入された作戦でした。
  • しかし、騎兵師団は歩兵や砲兵の支援がなかったために力を失い、ロシア軍の2軍が反撃し、Sventianyの突破口は1915年10月2日に閉じられました。
  • この作戦はドイツ軍にとって失敗であり、ロシア軍にとっては成功した反撃でした。
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次の英文を日本文に翻訳して下さい。

The Sventiany Offensive (now Švenčionys) was a military operation mostly undertaken by the Imperial German Army's 10th Army against the Imperial Russian Army's 10th Army om the Eastern Front during World War I. On 9 September 1915, the Germans broke through the Russian defences and four German cavalry divisions, reinforced from 13 September 1915 by two others, went into the breach to gain the rear of the Russian 10th Army. Later the German cavalry operations, devoid of infantry and artillery support, weakened, and on 15–16 September 1915 the newly formed Russian 2nd Army finally stopped the German attack. The Russians pushed the Germans back and eliminated the Sventiany breach on 2 October 1915. Sventiany シュヴェンチョニース?(リトアニアの都市)

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  • Nakay702
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以下のとおりお答えします。 (これより前の9つの質問が削除されていて驚きました。) >The Sventiany Offensive (now Švenčionys) was a military operation mostly undertaken by the Imperial German Army's 10th Army against the Imperial Russian Army's 10th Army om the Eastern Front during World War I. ⇒「スヴェンチャニー攻勢」(現在のシュヴェンチョニー、リトアニア)は、第一次世界大戦中に東部戦線でロシア帝国軍の第10方面軍に対して、おもにドイツ帝国軍の第10方面軍によって行われた軍事作戦であった。 >On 9 September 1915, the Germans broke through the Russian defences and four German cavalry divisions, reinforced from 13 September 1915 by two others, went into the breach to gain the rear of the Russian 10th Army. Later the German cavalry operations, devoid of infantry and artillery support, weakened, and on 15–16 September 1915 the newly formed Russian 2nd Army finally stopped the German attack. The Russians pushed the Germans back and eliminated the Sventiany breach on 2 October 1915. ⇒1915年9月9日、ドイツ軍はロシアの守備隊を突破し、1915年9月13日からドイツ軍の4個騎兵師団が、他の2個師団の補強を受けてロシア第10方面軍の後方部を獲得するために突進した。その後、歩兵隊や砲兵隊の支援を欠くドイツ騎兵隊の作戦は弱体化し、1915年9月15日-16日、新たに編成されたロシア第2方面軍が、ついにドイツ軍の攻撃を阻止した。ロシア軍はドイツ軍を押し戻し、1915年10月2日にスヴェンチャニーの突撃隊を排除した。

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