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The “Stange Bey Detachment” left Istanbul on the battleship Yavuz. The first stop was disembarked in Rize. The detachment was then reinforced with nearly two thousand Kurdish volunteers and materially assisted by the rebellious Adjarians of the country. It had been the original intention that this army should strike at Batum when it was in sufficient force by additions from oversea, but as the result of Russian resistance on land, and especially of various actions between the Ottoman and Russian Fleets, which ended in the latter gaining the control of the Black Sea, the idea was rendered impracticable and was abandoned. Enver Pasha developed his plans for Battle of Sarikamish. The Stange Bey unit and its supports were fitted to his plan as a secondary force. They were to cut the support for Russian forces at Sarikamish-Kars. The Stange Bey Detachment conduct highly visible operations to distract and pin Russian units. In his plan Stange Bey operated in the Chorok region and seized the road. On 15 December 1914, Stange Bey occupied Ardanuch. On 27 December 1914, after a desperate Russian resistance lasting seventeen days, took Ardahan, and threatened an immediate descent on Kars, which if it succeeded would cut off the retreat of the Russians west of it, that is, at Sarikamish, from Kars. The Russian Viceroy and his military advisers had grasped the situation. The Stange Bay made that Russians informed very dearly for every foot of their advance. The Russian diversion to Stange Bay unit meant to be a support element to operations to capture Sarikamish and Kars. Russians needed to be strongly reinforced. At this moment, In December 1914, General Myshlaevsky ordered withdrawal from major Russian units at the Persian Campaign at the height of the Battle of Sarikamish. Persia was denuded of Russian soldiers, and large bodies of troops were hurried forward to the front by rail from Kars, Erivan, and Julfa—almost, but not quite, too late. They would have been altogether too late if the 1st Army Corps had been able to make its contemplated descent on Kars, and the first concern of the Viceroy had been to send supports to the gallant regiment which alone had so long withstood the attack of the two divisions of this Corps before and at Ardahan. Yet larger reinforcements were dispatched to Sarikamish, and they arrived to find that though the place had been reft from Russian hands the battle was being waged with no less determined persistence and tenacity by their compatriots. Neither at Ardahan nor at Sarikamish were the Russians, even in the closing stages[dubious – discuss]. Hardly any information regarding the battle of Ardahan can be obtained beyond statements that after the place was bombarded, the Russians drove the Stange Bey Detachment group out.

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>The “Stange Bey Detachment” ~ rebellious Adjarians of the country. ⇒「スタンゲ・ベイ分遣隊」は、戦艦ヤブズ号でイスタンブールを発った。最初に停泊したリズで下船した。それから分遣隊は、およそ2000人のクルド人志願兵の強化を受け、(グルジャ南部)地方の反抗的なアジャール人によって実質的な援助を得た。 >It had been the original intention ~ impracticable and was abandoned. ⇒この方面軍が海外からの追加によって十分な軍勢を持ったときにバトゥムを襲撃すべきである、というのが当初の意図であった。しかし、陸地でのロシア軍の抵抗と、特に、オスマン帝国とロシア艦隊の間の様々な戦闘行動の結果として、後者が黒海の支配権を得たため、この考えは現実的でなくなり、放棄された。 >Enver Pasha developed ~ Stange Bey occupied Ardanuch. ⇒エンベル・パシャは「サリカミッシュの戦い」のための計画を練り上げた。スタンゲ・ベイ部隊とその支援隊が、第二軍団として彼の計画に適応した。彼らはサリカミッシュ‐カルス道でロシア軍団の支援隊を断ち切ることにした。スタンゲ・ベイ分遣隊はロシア部隊の気をそらして固定するために、派手に目だって見える作戦行動を取った。彼エンベルの計画どおりに、スタンゲ・ベイ隊はチョロク地域で活動して、その道路を掌握した。1914年12月15日、スタンゲ・ベイ隊はアルダヌチを占領した。 >On 27 December 1914, ~ at Sarikamish, from Kars. ⇒1914年12月27日、ロシア軍による絶望的な抵抗が17日間続いたが、その後アルダハンを奪取し、直ちにカルスへの襲来をかけた。もしそれが成功したら、そこから西への、つまり、カルスからサリカミッシュへのロシア軍の後退を遮断する手筈であった。 >The Russian Viceroy ~ the Battle of Sarikamish. ⇒ロシアの総督と彼の軍事顧問は、その状況を把握していた。(というのも)スタンゲ・ベイ隊は、ロシア軍に自らのあらゆる進軍の足取りを知られるようにしたのである。ロシア軍のスタンゲ・ベイ部隊への注目の移転が、サリカミッシュとカルスを占領するための作戦行動の支援要素になることを意味していた。ロシア軍は強力に強化される必要があった。1914年12月の時点で、ミシュラエフスキー将軍は、「サリカミッシュの戦い」の最盛期に、「ペルシャ野戦」でロシア軍の主要部隊の撤退を命じた。 >Persia was denuded ~ before and at Ardahan. ⇒ロシア軍兵士がペルシャからきれいに消えて、カルス、エリバン、およびユルファからの多勢の軍隊が、列車で前線に向かって急いだ―しかし、全くとまではいかないが、ほとんどが遅きに失した。第1方面軍団が意図していたカルスへの襲撃を行うことができたならば、彼らは揃って全く遅すぎたことになるだろう。そこで、総督の第一の関心事は、この軍団の2個師団による以前と今回のアルダハン攻撃に対して、単独で久しく耐えている勇敢な連隊に支援軍を送ることであった。 >Yet larger reinforcements ~ the closing stages[dubious – discuss]. ⇒より大きな増援隊がサリカミッシュに派遣されて、到着してみるとその場はロシアの手にかかって剥奪されていたが、戦いは彼らの同胞によって決然たる持続性と粘り強さをもって行われていることを彼らは発見した。終盤の段階でも、アルダハン同様サリカミッシュにもロシア軍はいなかった〔疑義あり‐要詳細議論〕。 >Hardly any information ~ Stange Bey Detachment group out. ⇒アルダハンの戦いに関しては、その場所が砲撃された後、ロシア軍がスタンゲ・ベイ分遣隊グループを追い出したという声明はあったが、それ以上はいかなる情報も得られていない。

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  • 日本語訳をお願い致します。

    Battle of Ardahan (Turkish: Ardahan Harekâtı; Russian: Битва при Ардагане) between 25 December 1914 to 18 January 1915 was the Ottoman military operation commanded by German Lt. Col. Stange to capture the city of Ardahan and cut the Russian support link to Sarikamish-Kars line in supporting the Battle of Sarikamish. The operation was part of what the Russian Empire viewed the Caucasus front. It was a secondary to the Eastern front. Russia had taken the fortress of Kars from the Turks during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877 and feared a campaign into the Caucasus, a Caucasus Campaign, aimed at retaking Kars and the port of Batum. The Ottoman generalship and organization were negligible compared to the Allies. Caucasus Campaign planned to be a distracting effect on Russian forces. Enver hoped a success would facilitate opening the route to Tbilisi and beyond, with a revolt of Caucasian Muslims another strategic goal was to cut Russian access to its hydrocarbon resources around the Caspian Sea. This long-term goal made Britain vary. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was in the proposed path. On 30 October 1914, the 3rd Army headquarters was informed by High Command in Istanbul about an exchange of fire during the pursuit of Goeben and Breslau in the Black Sea. High Command expected the Russian Army to cross the Ottoman border at any time. The Bergmann Offensive (2 November 1914 – 16 November 1914) ended with the defeat of Russian troops under the command of Bergmann. The Russian success was along the southern shoulders of the offense where Armenian volunteers visible (effective) and taken Karaköse and Doğubeyazıt. Hasan İzzet Pasha managed to stabilize the front by letting the Russians 25 kilometers inside the Ottoman Empire along the Erzurum-Sarikamish axis. The name of the force in western sources passes as the "I Army Corps," Turkish sources name it as Stange Bey (or Stanke Bey) detachment. The detachment was given to the command of the German Major Stange and became known as “Stange Bey Detachment”. The size of the force is also in dispute. Western sources claim it had from 30,000 to 35,000 combatants; the precise figure is uncertain. The left wing which made up of This detachment unit, known as Stanke Bey, consisted of two battalions of the 8th Infantry Regiment and two artillery batteries. It was brought at the outset of the war from Constantinople and landed at Kopa and other ports on the Black Sea south of Batum, and supplemented by many irregulars in the district of the Choruk (northeast of Erzerum), where its concentration was effected. Ardahan アルダハン

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Russian accounts state "by repeated charges utterly routed the enemy, who was crushed into fragments". Under the Russian Pressure the Kurdish Tribe volunteers separated from the Stange Bey Unit. These broken remnants fled in confusion back to Ardanuch, but, hotly pursued, were not allowed to rest there long, as it was reoccupied by the victors on 18 January 1915, some survivors from the Battle made good their escape into their own territory. The others sought refuge in the fastnesses of the Chorok ranges, where the Adjarians gave them shelter. This was the original unit established in Istanbul. Stenge Bey reestablished this unit. On 1 March 1915 The “Stange Bey Detachment” without volunteer support went back to its initial line, the “Stange Bey Detachment” managed to resist the Russians for more than two months in the region. The battle was the subject of a Lubok popular print. The Battle of Sarikamish (Armenian: Սարիղամիշի ճակատամարտ (Sarighamishi chakatamart), Russian: Сражение при Сарыкамыше; Turkish: Sarıkamış Harekatı) was an engagement between the Russian and Ottoman empires during World War I. It took place from December 22, 1914, to January 17, 1915, as part of the Caucasus Campaign. The outcome of the battle resulted in a Russian victory. The Ottomans employed a strategy which demanded that their troops be highly mobile and to arrive at specified objectives at precise times. This approach was based both on German and Napoleonic tactics. The Ottoman troops, ill-prepared for winter conditions, suffered major casualties in the Allahuekber Mountains. Afterward, Ottoman leader Enver Pasha publicly blamed his defeat on Armenians and the battle served as a prelude to the Armenian Genocide. Russia viewed the Caucasus Front as secondary to the Eastern Front, which enjoyed the major share of Russian resources. Russia had taken the fortress of Kars from the Turks during the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, when it was incorporated into the militarily administered Kars Oblast. After the Ottoman Empire entered the war in October 1914 on the side of the Central Powers, Russia now feared a Caucasus Campaign aimed at retaking Kars and the port of Batum. From the point of view of the Central Powers, a campaign in the Caucasus would have a distracting effect on Russian forces. The Ottoman plan for this campaign found sympathy with German advisors, as a success in this region would mean a diversion of Russian forces to this front from the Polish and Galician fronts. Germany supplied resources and the Ottoman Third Army was used in the battle. The Battle of Sarikamish サルカムシュの戦い

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    Hasan İzzet was not in favor of an offensive action in the harsh winter conditions. He was planning to remain in a defensive posture by pulling the Russians to Erzurum Fortress and launching a counterattack. Hafız Hakkı was sent to replace the commander of X Corps to energize the 3rd Army. Enver released Hasan İzzet from command on December 14. İzzet told Enver: We have to consider 8 or 9 days for a large scaled encircling manoeuvre. However, during this time the XI Corps, which will remain at the front, might be jeopardized. Even if we execute the manoeuvre with two corps, they will probably face difficulties against the enemy. Enver wanted his plan executed through a winter offensive, and decided to take charge. He left Istanbul with General Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf and the head of the Operations Office Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Feldmann. They arrived in Erzurum on December 21. Senior Turkish commanders opposed the forced resignation of Hasan İzzet due to his rejection of the plan. The war zone was nearly 1,250–1,500 kilometers (776–932 miles) wide from the Black Sea to Lake Van, which made military concentration difficult. The operation was executed at a plateau averaging 1,500–2,000 meters (5,000–6,500 feet) above sea level. The main difficulty with the region was the roads, with the transportation infrastructure on the Ottoman side far from adequate. Russia's main advantage was the Kars Gyumri Akhalkalaki railway line and a terminal at Sarikamish. The railway was 24 kilometres (15 mi) from the border. The only way for an army to get through the Caucasian heights was the high mountain passes in which lay the cities Kars and Sarikamish. Beyond, the upper valleys of the Aras River and Euphrates extended westward. Everywhere else the roads were mere tracks which were impenetrable to artillery. The forces were concentrated about 80 kilometres (50 mi) on each side of the border at the fortresses of Kars on the Russian side and Erzurum on the Ottoman side. The 3rd Army, under the command of Enver, was composed of the IX, X and XI Corps. 3rd Army's headquarters and the IX Corps were located in Erzurum. The X Corps was stationed in Sivas, and the XI Corps was in Elazığ (Mamuretülaziz). A detachment unit under the command of the German Lieutenant Colonel Stange was established from the 3rd Infantry Division, originally stationed in Thrace, to reinforce the offense and pin down the Russians. This detachment unit, known as Stanke Bey, consisted of two battalions of the 8th Infantry Regiment and two artillery batteries. The fighting power of 83,000 regular troops, reserves, and personnel from the Erzurum Fortress totalled 118,000.

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    The IX Corps were at Sarikamish. The X Corps were threatening to pierce the Russian front along the Kars railway to the east. The Stange regiment was descending upon Ardahan 60 miles to the northeast. Enver's operational plan was looking successful on paper. However, the Ottoman forces were worn out, half starved, and short of guns and ammunition. They had no hope of reaching their objective on time. Enver thought that the Russians were retreating to Kars. It was actually an encircling movement. Assault at Sarikamish, December 29 Russian trenches in the forests of Sarikamish On December 29, the assault took place. The IX and XI Corps, totaling 12,000 men, began to attack Sarikamish. During bayonet fighting, only 300 men succeeded in breaking into the city. They were driven off, losing 6,000 troops. Enver received information that Russians were preparing to encircle his forces with a force of five regiments. On December 31, the IX Corps was bogged down in the woods outside Sarikamish and had been reduced to some 2,500 men and 14 artillery guns and machine guns. On the same night news arrived to headquarters from Bardız: The 32nd Division had abandoned its positions to the Russians. This meant that the Barduz and Kızılkilise roads were now in Russian hands. The Ottoman forces were inside a semicircle. Enver refused to lose momentum, and ordered his units to continue with the plan. On January 1, the commander of the XI Corps pressed a frontal attack on Sarikamish that lasted for the next four days; after that the fighting began to lose momentum. Snow hindered advancing forces which were supposed to bring relief. The IX Corps melted away on the way to Sarikamish. One of the divisions lost 40% of its strength in a snowstorm. The X Corps never came to the rescue. 90% of X Corps was left on the slopes of the Allahüekber Mountains. The XI Corps was fighting in the Aras region. A regiment entered Çerkezköy, only to be taken prisoner. While the Stange regiment entered Ardahan on schedule, the troops were exhausted. The Russians were poised to encircle the remaining forces. Entrapped in a semicircle, January 2–3 On January 2, Russian artillery fire caused severe casualties. Enver received two reports; one was from the chief of staff of the IX Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Şerif, and the other from Colonel Hafız Hakkı. Both reports said that they were too weak to launch another attack. Enver responded to the units: "The offensive is to go on at full strength." Later Enver focused on securing routes for the retreat instead of insisting on new attacks to take Sarikamish. He combined the two corps and renamed it the "Left Wing Army." He promoted Colonel Hafız Hakkı to Brigadier General and gave him command of the Left wing Army.

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    The immediate strategic goal of the Caucasus Campaign was to retake Artvin, Ardahan, Kars, and the port of Batum. As a longer term goal, head of the Ottoman war ministry İsmail Enver hoped a success would facilitate opening the route to Tbilisi and beyond, which in turn would trigger a revolt of Caucasian Muslims. Another Turkish—or rather German—strategic goal was to cut Russian access to its hydrocarbon resources around the Caspian Sea. The headquarters of the Ottoman 3rd Army was in Erzurum, under the command of Hasan Izzet. On 30 October 1914, the 3rd Army headquarters was informed by High Command in Constantinople about the Ottoman navy's bombardment of the Russian ports of Novorossiysk, Odessa and Sevastopol in the Black Sea. High Command expected the Russian Army to cross the Ottoman border at any time. The Bergmann Offensive (November 2, 1914 – November 16, 1914) ended with the defeat of Russian troops under Bergmann. The Russian success was along the southern shoulders of the line. Hasan İzzet stabilized the front by letting the Russians 25 kilometres (16 mi) inside the Ottoman Empire along the Erzurum-Sarikamish axis. The Third Army was a relatively ragtag force when it was assigned to the offensive. The most combat-hardened and well-equipped units in the empire such as the III Corps were selected to defend the strategically significant Gallipoli peninsula. Facing the Russians in Caucasia, of the Third Army's nine infantry divisions, three were being rebuilt from scratch and four were new divisions deployed there from Thrace that year. Additionally, many of its approximately 118,000 soldiers were actually gendarmerie rather than regular army troops. Erickson describes the Third Army as "hastily assembled and clobbled-together army, hurled against the Russians with predictably disastrous results." The war minister, Ismail Enver, devised an operation plan while he was at the Department of War in Istanbul. His strategy was based on German principles copied from Napoleon. Enver's plan involved a single envelopment using three Corps. On the right flank, XI Corps would fix the Russians in place and conduct feint attacks. In the center, IX Corps would fight in the direction of Sarikamish Pass. Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Hafız Hakkı’s X Corps, which was to be on the left flank, would drive to Oltu, cross the Allahuekber Mountains, cut the Kars road, and drive the Russians to the Aras Valley, where the Russian forces would be destroyed by all three Corps attacking in concert. Meanwhile, a detachment unit under Stange Bey would conduct highly visible operations to distract and pin Russian units. Success depended on all troops arriving at their specified objectives at the correct moment. The first part of the plan was fulfilled when the Russians concentrated their forces at Sarikamish and Köprüköy after the Bergmann Offensive.

  • 以下の英文を和訳して下さい。

    On January 6, the 3rd Army headquarters found itself under fire. Hafiz Hakki Pasha ordered a total retreat. On January 7, the remaining forces began their march towards Erzurum. The resulting Battle of Sarikamish became a stunning defeat. Only 10% of the Army managed to retreat back to its starting position. Enver gave up command. The detachment Armenian volunteer units credited no small measure of the success which attended by the Russian forces; they challenged the Ottoman operations during the critical times: "the delay enabled the Russian Caucasus Army to concentrate sufficient force around Sarikamish". Enver blamed this defeat on Armenians living in the region actively siding with the Russians after his return to Constantinople. On January 18, 1915, the Lt. Col. Stange's unit was recalled from the area around Ardahan. It was to stay behind the lines in the region; only on March 1, 1915 did it regain its initial position.

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    Sievers warned the Northwest Front commander, General Nikolai Ruzsky, that they were likely to be attacked, but was ignored. On February 7, despite a heavy snowstorm, the left wing of Below's Eighth Army launched a surprise attack against Sievers, whose trenches were shallow, disconnected ditches, with little or no barbed wire because the first shipments had not arrived until December 1914. The following day, the German Tenth Army also drove forward. Snow, with drifts as high as a man, slowed German progress down the roads for the first two days; off the roads, the ground was too boggy for fighting. Despite these formidable obstacles, the German pincers advanced 120 km (75 mi) in a week, inflicting severe casualties on the Russians. As the Russians withdrew, the center of the German Eight Army began to thrust forward. The Russian withdrawal was disorderly; many prisoners were taken. Russian counterattacks on the lengthening flank of the German Tenth Army were beaten back. German men and horses fed on captured provisions, so only ammunition had to be hauled up to them. The snow was then washed away by torrential rain. The climax of the battle was on February 18, when the Russian 20th Army Corps, under General Bulgakov, was surrounded by the German Tenth Army in the vast Augustow Forest. On February 21, the survivors from the corps surrendered. The heroic stand of the Russian 20th Corps provided the time required for the rest of the Russian Tenth Army to form a new defensive position. On February 22, the day after the surrender of the 20th Corps, Plehve's Russian Twelfth Army counterattacked, which checked further German advances and brought the battle to an end. One source gives Russian losses as 92,000 prisoners and 300 guns, while another gives 56,000 men and 185 guns. The Germans lost 7,500 men and 14 guns. The Germans besieged the Russian fortress at Osowiec, but were unable to take it. The Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes gave the Germans a toehold in Russia; however, the Russians blocked further advances. In the following weeks, the Germans drove the Russians out of their remaining small enclaves in East Prussia. Further south, Alexander von Linsingen's offensive had failed with severe losses, and the fortress at Przemysl had been forced to surrender to the Russians. Clearly, the first Austro-Hungarian offensives of 1915 were abject failures. Henceforth, the Austro-Hungarians and Germans would work together more closely (see the Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive).

  • 英文を訳して下さい。

    On early December 22, Hafız Hakkı ordered his troops to move forward. They engaged in a brief skirmish against a Russian brigade commanded by General Istomin near Kaleboğazı, west of Oltu. The skirmishes at Kaleboğazı ended the next day with the Ottomans capturing four artillery guns, four machine guns, and 1,000 Russian troops. On December 23, Istomin abandoned his position and moved towards Ardahan. Hafız Hakkı sent two divisions to pursue Istomin. At the extreme left wing, the Stange Regiment, which had landed at Trabzon, was to move up the Çoruh valley towards Ardahan and through a pass at 2,438 metres (7,999 ft) altitude. On December 23, the 92nd Regiment of the Turkish 31st Division, believing the unit in front of them to be Russians, opened fire on the flank of the 32nd Division. The ensuing four-hour friendly fire battle in the fog killed 2,000 Turkish soldiers, and wounded many more. Ottoman machine gun unit at the Allahüekber Mountains On December 24, Hafız Hakkı was well beyond Oltu after having marched 75 kilometres (47 mi) in just over three days. However, they were not at the Kars-Sarikamish line as planned. On December 25, Ottoman troops had been marching for 14 hours under heavy snow. The soldiers were exhausted and hungry; the fear of frostbite and Russian machine guns was slowly being replaced by absolute indifference. In the early hours of December 26, at the 18th hour of the march, the 91st Regiment of X Corps came under enemy fire. The Russians left the scene after nearly two hours of fighting. The regiment resumed its march, and soon a snow storm began. Under these conditions the 91st Regiment managed to reach Kosor from Penek (a distance of just 8 km) in 21 hours. Other units reached their destinations at a similar rate. While Enver was ordering a night attack, elements of the X Corps were spending the night in the villages of Kosor, Arsenik, and Patsik, which were 40, 35 and 30 kilometers from Sarikamish respectively. The Allahüekber Mountains were still to be crossed. Thousands of Turkish soldiers died of hypothermia in the snow. The X Corps suffered a delay of 24 hours in the Barduz Pass, and 4th battalion of the Armenian volunteers lost 600 troops in a battle there. When commander Malyshevsky arrived at army headquarters in the Russian front lines, he gave the order for a general retreat. The process of withdrawing was to start on December 25 and 26. The Russians evacuated Sarikamish, leaving two cavalry squadrons and 1,000 railwaymen to defend it. Not all Russian commanders were in a state of panic. The Russian army headquarters maintained a solid grip on the situation, with the effective command and control never lost. General Yudenich, taking command of the II Turkestan Corps, decided to put up resistance. On December 28, the Russians were held by the XI Corps at Horasan.

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    The total manpower including transportation units, depot regiments, and military police was 150,000. There were 73 machine guns and 218 artillery pieces. Ottoman forces were inadequately prepared for the campaign. Two divisions of the IX Corps began a long trek with no winter clothing and only dry bread and olives for rations. The Russian Caucasus Army was a well-equipped 100,000 troops. However, the Russians redeployed almost half of the Caucasus Army to the Prussian front due to the defeats at the Battle of Tannenberg (August 23 – September 2, 1914) and the Masurian Lakes (September 9–14, 1914), leaving behind 60,000 -65,000 troops. To remedy these troop movements Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov consulted with the Mayor of Tbilisi Alexandre Khatsian, the primate of Tbilisi Bishop Mesrop, and the prominent civic leader Dr. Hakob Zavriev about the creation of Armenian volunteer detachments. The Russian Armenian reservists had already been drafted into the regular armed forces and sent to the European theatre. The volunteer units consisted of Armenians, who were not citizens of the empire or obligated to serve. However, many other, non-Russian communities were also represented in the Russian Caucasus Army as volunteers, conscripts, and regular soldiers and officers. These particularly included men who belonged to Christian Orthodox communities settled in the surrounding Kars Oblast since 1878, such as Georgians and Caucasus Greeks, who generally saw service in the Russian imperial army as a means of achieving their own communities' ambitions to recapture Greek Orthodox territory from the Muslim Ottomans on the back of the Russian imperial enterprise. Originally, there were four volunteer battalions created. Along the Kars Oblast, the 3rd battalion commanded by Hamazasp (Hamazasp Srvandztyan) and 4th battalion by Keri (Arshak Gavafian) operated on the front facing Erzurum between Sarikamish and Oltu. The Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Military District (Caucasian Army) was Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov. Effective command was in the hands of Infantry General Aleksandr Zakharevich Myshlayevsky, who was originally a military historian graduated from the Imperial General Staff Academy. General Nikolai Yudenich was his Chief of Staff. Initial manoeuvres, December 22–28 Soldiers push an artillery piece up a mountain pass Hafız Hakki was at the left flank. His order was to move the IX and X Corps to Sarikamish and Kars. He contemplated a two step plan: a sudden initial attack and a second step with both Corps proceeding at full speed towards Oltu. He expected the assault at Narman to be concluded by the afternoon of December 22. Then the Corps would march 30 kilometers a day and arrive in the Kars-Sarikamish line by December 25. Two divisions of the Stange regiment had been sent by sea from Constantinople to Trabzon.

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    But the German forces proved to be much harder to root out, and their stubborn resistance resulted in heavy casualties amongst the attacking Russians. As Russian losses mounted, demoralization of infantry soon begin to tell, and the further successes were only due to the work of cavalry, artillery and special "shock" battalions, which General Kornilov had formed. The other troops, for the most part, refused to obey orders. Soldiers' committees discussed whether the officers should be followed or not. Even when a division did not flatly refuse to fight, no orders were obeyed without preliminary discussion by the divisional committee, and even when the latter decided to obey orders it was usually too late to be of any use. The Russian advance collapsed altogether by July 16. On July 19, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians counterattacked, meeting little resistance and advancing through Galicia and Ukraine as far as the Zbruch River. The Russian lines were broken on July 20 and by July 23, the Russians had retreated about 240 kilometres (150 mi) (Vinny). "The only limit to the German advance was the lack of the logistical means to occupy more territory".The Russian provisional government was greatly weakened by this military catastrophe, and the possibility of a Bolshevik coup d'état became increasingly real. Far from strengthening Russian army morale, this offensive proved that Russian army morale no longer existed. No Russian general could now count on the soldiers under his command actually doing what they were ordered to do. This offensive helped the start of the July Days, and also affected the situation in Romania. Russo-Romanian forces, which first broke the Austro-Hungarian front at Mărăşti in support of the Kerensky Offensive, were stopped. One further fight took place between the Germans and the Russians in 1917. On September 1, 1917 the Germans attacked and captured Riga. The Russian soldiers defending the town refused to fight and fled from the advancing German troops.