British and German Forces in Mozambique during World War I
- The British native soldiers in Mozambique proved themselves to be tenacious and capable fighters despite adverse conditions.
- Communication between British white officers and their men was hindered by language barriers.
- Lt-Col George Giffard was a highly regarded British commander during the operations in Mozambique.
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At Lioma, for example, the 1/1st KAR mostly consisted of recent recruits from Nyasaland (modern-day Malawi) formed around a cadre of veterans. Furthermore, the extremely poor quality or non-existence of roads in Mozambique greatly hindered the supply of the large numbers of KAR soldiers who chased the small Schutztruppe. As result, both British white officers as well as askaris had to live off the land and often were, just like their German counterparts, near starvation. In one case, when "the officers and men [of one unit] were inspected at the end of their stint in the field they were described as resembling the victims of famine. Their experience of the hardships of war in East Africa was typical, not exceptional." Despite these adverse conditions, the British native soldiers generally proved themselves to be tenacious and very capable fighters, motivated by a variety of reasons, most of them rooted in traditional African concepts of loyalty and their comparable high wages. The white and black officers and NCOs of the King's African Rifles also led by example and like their Schutztruppe counterparts suffered heavy losses, though unlike the Germans the British could relatively quickly replace them. New British white officers often could not speak Swahili (the regional lingua franca), however, hindering communications with their men. One of the most important British commanders during the operations in Mozambique was Lt-Col George Giffard; leading a brigade (K.A.R. 2nd Col. or "KARTUCOL") specifically to find and destroy Lettow-Vorbeck's remaining troops, he was highly regarded by both his own forces and respected by the Germans. His troops would relieve the Lioma garrison on the battle's second day. The Schutztruppe arrived at area surrounding Lioma on 30 August. The British forces at Lioma had noticed the German approach hours before the latter's arrival, and thus could strengthen their defenses accordingly. Indeed, as the German columns (Abteilungen, short: Abt) advanced on the village, one of the relief units, namely 3/2nd KAR under Lt-Col Charles George Phillips, arrived around 12.00 and deployed neast-east of 1/1st main position at Lioma. While the newly arrived battalion was deploying, the Schutztruppe's vanguard, formed by Abt Müller, encountered a detached platoon of 1/1 KAR east of Lioma, resulting in a first skirmish, whereupon the leading soldiers of Abt Müller retreated southwards.
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＞At Lioma, for example, the 1/1st KAR mostly consisted of recent recruits from Nyasaland (modern-day Malawi) formed around a cadre of veterans. Furthermore, the extremely poor quality or non-existence of roads in Mozambique greatly hindered the supply of the large numbers of KAR soldiers who chased the small Schutztruppe. As result, both British white officers as well as askaris had to live off the land and often were, just like their German counterparts, near starvation. ⇒リオマでは、例えば、第1/1 KAR（王有アフリカライフル隊）は、主にベテラン幹部の周囲に形成されたニヤサランド（現代マラウイ）から新着した新入兵で構成されていた。さらに、モザンビークでは道路の質が悪いか、あるいは道路がないことで、小型植民地保護隊を追跡する大勢のKAR隊兵士の供給が大幅に阻害された。結果として、英国軍の白人将校と現地人軍の両方が土地を離れて生きなければならず、しばしば彼らに対応する相手のドイツ軍と同じように、ほとんど飢餓状態にあった。 ＞In one case, when "the officers and men [of one unit] were inspected at the end of their stint in the field they were described as resembling the victims of famine. Their experience of the hardships of war in East Africa was typical, not exceptional." Despite these adverse conditions, the British native soldiers generally proved themselves to be tenacious and very capable fighters, motivated by a variety of reasons, most of them rooted in traditional African concepts of loyalty and their comparable high wages. ⇒こんな一件もあった。すなわち、「戦闘の終わりに戦場での〔ある部隊の〕将校と兵士が検査されたとき、彼らは飢饉の被害者に似ていると言われた。この東アフリカにおける戦争の苦難の経験は例外的でなく、これが典型的なものであった」。これらの悪条件にもかかわらず、英国生まれの兵士は、主として、伝統的なアフリカの忠誠心とそれに匹敵する高い賃金の概念に根ざしたさまざまな理由によって動機づけられた、強靭で極めて能力の高い戦闘員であることを証明した。 ＞The white and black officers and NCOs of the King's African Rifles also led by example and like their Schutztruppe counterparts suffered heavy losses, though unlike the Germans the British could relatively quickly replace them. New British white officers often could not speak Swahili (the regional lingua franca), however, hindering communications with their men. ⇒手本に導かれた王有アフリカライフル隊の白人と黒人の将校およびNCO（無任所将校）も、相方の植民地保護隊同様、大きな損失を被った。ただし、ドイツ軍とは異なって英国軍は比較的早く損失の穴を埋めることができた。しかし、新しい英国軍の白人将校は、しばしばスワヒリ語（地域の言語）を話すことができず、（配属）兵士とのコミュニケーションが阻害された。 ＞One of the most important British commanders during the operations in Mozambique was Lt-Col George Giffard; leading a brigade (K.A.R. 2nd Col. or "KARTUCOL") specifically to find and destroy Lettow-Vorbeck's remaining troops, he was highly regarded by both his own forces and respected by the Germans. His troops would relieve the Lioma garrison on the battle's second day. ⇒モザンビークでの作戦行動中に最も重要だった英国軍司令官の1人は、ジョージ・ジファード中佐であった。レトウ=フォルベックの生き残り軍隊を見つけて破壊する旅団（第2KAR大佐、またの名「カルトゥコル」）を先導した。彼は自軍とドイツ軍の両軍に尊敬された。彼の軍隊は戦いの2日目にリオマ守備隊を解放することになるだろう。 ＞The Schutztruppe arrived at area surrounding Lioma on 30 August. The British forces at Lioma had noticed the German approach hours before the latter's arrival, and thus could strengthen their defenses accordingly. Indeed, as the German columns (Abteilungen, short: Abt) advanced on the village, one of the relief units, namely 3/2nd KAR under Lt-Col Charles George Phillips, arrived around 12.00 and deployed neast-east of 1/1st main position at Lioma. ⇒植民地保護隊は、8月30日にリオマの周辺地域に到着した。リオマの英国軍は、ドイツ軍が到着する数時間前にその接近に気づき、それに応じて防衛を強化することができた。事実、ドイツ軍の縦隊（Abteilungen〔アプテイルンゲン〕「大隊群」、略称：Abt）が村を進軍し、救援部隊の一つすなわちチャールス・ジョージ・フィリップス中佐麾下の第3/2 KAR隊が12時頃に到着し、リオマの第1/1陣地の西から東に布陣した。 ＞While the newly arrived battalion was deploying, the Schutztruppe's vanguard, formed by Abt Müller, encountered a detached platoon of 1/1 KAR east of Lioma, resulting in a first skirmish, whereupon the leading soldiers of Abt Müller retreated southwards. ⇒新しく到着した大隊が配地につく間、植民地保護隊の先遣隊がアプトミュラーによって編成されリオマの第1/1 KAR東小隊に遭遇し、そこで最初の小競合いとなり、アプトミュラー隊の先導兵士は南へ撤退した。
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With the Portuguese proving unable to defeat the German forces, the British had to bear the brunt of the fighting in Mozambique, and thus began to aggressively pursue Lettow-Vorbeck's small army. By August 1918, the Schutztruppe was heading north to return to German East Africa, while the British under Jacob van Deventer had begun to concentrate their forces in the area of Regone and Lioma in an attempt to encircle their enemy. Though Lettow-Vorbeck had received intel about the British plans, his forces were once again in dire need of supplies and Regone harbored a large supply depot. As result, the German commander planned a quick assault against the vulnerable village in order to capture as many supplies as possible: Speed was crucial for this plan, as Lettow-Vorbeck would have to outrace the British before they could reinforce Regone or catch up with him. Rough terrain, rain and fog hindered and delayed the Schutztruppe, however, so that when it reached Regone on 26 August, the British had already fortified and reinforced it. At this point, the Germans could only have taken Regone by a prolonged siege for which they had no time, so that Lettow-Vorbeck chose to call off the attack. His forces bypassed Regone and instead began to march to Lioma, another supply depot. Unknown to the Germans, a British battalion (1/1st KAR) already managed to reinforce the village on 28 August, while two other battalions also force-marched toward Lioma. Between the British forces at Regone and the units that gathered at Lioma the Schutztruppe would be trapped, and if everything went according to van Deventer's plans, destroyed. While British skirmishers harassed the approaching German forces, the 1/1st KAR under Maj Alexander Charles Masters dug in at Lioma: They formed a square defensive perimeter south of the village, and three small platoon outposts were also set up west, east and south of the British positions. Thus prepared, the Lioma garrison waited for the Schutztruppe, which would arrive in the area on 30 August. By 1918, the once strong Schutztruppe, which had successfully resisted the allies for four years, was much depleted and exhausted. Of its peak strength of around 15,000 soldiers in 1916 just about 1,600 were left. Many African as well as European soldiers had deserted or surrendered as the allies overran their home areas in German East Africa, wages were no longer paid, and life in the army became harder and more brutal.
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While the British had failed to finally crush the Schutztruppe, they had inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans, though the actual number of losses is disputed. Lettow-Vorbeck claimed that he had lost 29 killed, 27 wounded, 34 missing, and 5 captured, while British claims are around 222 killed, missing or captured, of whom 22-26 were Whites. These differences may stem from the Germans not counting non-combatants such as medical personnel as casualties. Regardless of the exact numbers, several of the Schutztruppe's irreplacable senior officers and NCOs were killed, captured or wounded, which was a heavy blow. The Germans had also failed in taking Lioma and thus could not replenish their supplies; instead, they had lost 50.000 rounds of ammunition, crucial medical stores, and around 200 carriers, who had been scattered in course of the battle. Miller judged that "the Germans had been more than bruised at Lioma; but for the almost total disorder and confusion [on both sides] that marked the two-day action, they would have been wiped out." Edward Paice calls the battle of Lioma a "narrow escape" for the Germans. Taken together with their casualties during the Battle of Pere Hills, another "near thing" soon after Lioma, Lettow-Vorbeck's forces lost 15% of their combat strength. Many of those wounded at Lioma did not recover enough to be combat-ready again; among them was Göring. Furthermore, a lung epidemic broke out among the Schutztruppe in September 1918, further reducing the Germans' manpower and undermining their morale. Many of the surviving white Germans increasingly began to question Lettow-Vorbeck's intention to continue fighting for what they perceived as lost cause. Nevertheless, the Schutztruppe did not surrender, and resumed their march northwards. After Pere Hills, it travelled the remaining distance to German East Africa largely unopposed, and would, albeit greatly reduced in strength and numbers, continue to stay in action until the end of the war. For the British, Lioma had been "the best chance [...] to inflict a decisive defeat upon the Schutztruppe". Lt-Col Giffard subsequently attributed the failure to encircle the Germans to the difficult communications between the British units and the missing information about enemy troop movements, this being "the difficulty which is always the same in the Bush of getting information accurately and quickly". The British casualties at Lioma were mostly unreported; it is only known that 1/1st KAR suffered 32 killed, 59 wounded, and 15 missing. After the battle four Distinguished Conduct Medals were awarded to European, and seven African Distinguished Conduct Medals to African soldiers of the 1/1st and 1/2nd KAR for gallantry, while the Distinguished Service Order was awarded to the commanders of 1/1st KAR (Alexander Charles Masters), 1/2 KAR (Edward Beckford Bevan) and 3/2 KAR (Charles George Phillips).
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Many of the soldiers also became unfit for combat due to the extreme food shortages and disease under which the Schutztruppe suffered. Driven from their territory and unable to reguarily recruit or train new soldiers, manpower shortages among the common soldiers were severe, while officers and NCOs became irreplaceable. This was particularly problematic because the Schutztruppe's ability to continue to function as coherent, effective fighting force largely rested upon its experienced and capable leadership. Nevertheless, most of the black soldiers who had already served since before the war were still staunchly loyal to Lettow-Vorbeck by 1918, with their fighting spirit and morale remaining largely unshaken. Even though they suffered from exhaustion, poor supplies, hunger, excessive heat or cold, and an increasingly experienced and stubborn opponent in form of the King's African Rifles during the fighting in Portuguese East Africa, these core cadres refused to give up - be it out of loyalty to their comrades, economic self-interest, desire for revenge, or sheer will to survive. Battle-hardened, experienced in mobile bush-warfare, and possessed by a strong esprit de corps after years of warfare, they still constituted a force to be reckoned with. Lettow-Vorbeck himself would judge after the Battle of Lioma that his men had fought "brilliantly" in face of the odds. Willpower alone could not substitute for adequate supplies and reinforcements, however, so that the Schutztruppe's effective combat power had still much declined by 1918, and the Germans could no longer meet strong enemy formations head-on without risking their own destruction. The British soldiers that faced the Schutztruppe at Lioma were part of the King's African Rifles (KAR), a long neglected branch of the British colonial forces. Having proven themselves to be among the most effective opponents of the Schutztruppe, the KAR were drastically expanded, strengthened and reorganized after 1915. Their tactics and strategies were adapted to the mobile German bush warfare, and better equipment and weaponry was given to the British askaris. Unlike the Germans, whose supply and recruitment prospects deteriorated as the war went on, the KAR could replenish its ranks. The massive expansion of the KAR meant, however, that most of its troops were fresh recruits and thus inferior in experience to the hardened Schutztruppe.
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In East Africa, the Congo Act was first broken by the British. On 5 August 1914, troops from the Uganda protectorate assaulted German river outposts near Lake Victoria, and on 8 August a direct naval attack commenced when the Royal Navy warships HMS Astraea and Pegasus bombarded Dar es Salaam from several miles offshore. In response, the commander of the German forces in East Africa, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, bypassed Governor Schnee, nominally his superior, and began to organize his troops for battle. At the time, the German Schutztruppe in East Africa consisted of 260 Germans of all ranks and 2,472 Askari and was approximately numerically equal with the two battalions of the King's African Rifles (KAR) based in the British East African colonies.
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The second prong would be an attack on the German defences at Longido in the north around Kilimanjaro, then swing south and seize Neu Moshi, the western terminus of the Usambara or Northern Railroad. According to author Charles Miller, "the objective for the capture of Longido was to squeeze the German Schutztruppe in the upper end of a two-hundred-mile pincer." The region was a major German settlement area with established plantations of sisal, coffee and other cash crops at the northern edge of the Usambara highlands. Since small German raiding parties had already begun to ambush British detachments and attack the Uganda Railway, the destruction of German forces in the area bordering British East Africa was a key objective of the British plan of operation. Miller later wrote that "the strategy was faultless on paper." By late October 1914 the British Indian Expeditionary Force "C" gathered with 4,000 men near the border of British and German East Africa, commanded by Brigadier General J. M. Stewart. The brigade included colonial volunteers who called themselves the East Africa Mounted Rifles. Flawed intelligence reports estimated the German military presence in the region at 200 men; however, there were 600 askaris in three companies plus the colonial volunteers of 8th Schützenkompagnie [rifle company] of 86 young Germans on horseback. On 3 November 1914, some 1,500 Punjabis of the British force came up the slope at night near Longido and, at daylight in the morning fog, were caught in the crossfire of a strong German defensive position. The large force of Indian infantry fought well when counterattacked, however, during the day the British attackers made no headway, but suffered substantial casualties.By mid-morning, a mounted patrol of the 8th Rifle Company ambushed a British supply column; roughly 100 mules carrying water for the troops were stampeded away by the German horsemen. Some of the carriers in the column panicked and dropped their loads leaving food, ammunition and equipment behind. The British officers with their now widely scattered troops waited until darkness, determined their situation to be untenable, pulled out and down the mountain and marched back to British East Africa having accomplished nothing. This defeat of the invaders by a force less than half their size cooled the enthusiasm for war especially among the British colonial volunteers. The northern prong attack at Longido had been intended as little more than a diversion. Byron Farwell recounts that "the main effort was [the] ambitious amphibian assault on the port of Tanga" that commenced on 2 November 1914. With the northern prong accounted for, the askari companies were shuttled by rail to Tanga to assist in opposing the southern prong.
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Lt-Col Giffard, who had arrived with 2/2nd KAR and now took command over all present British forces, consequently saw a good opportunity to finally encircle and crush the Schutztruppe. The German forces began to move northeast towards the Lioma-Muanhupa road at 9.00 on 31 August, after regrouping during the night. In order to speed up their advance, they left behind seriously wounded and sick Schutztruppe personnel as well as prisoners. These were later captured by the British. The German vanguard was once again formed by the columns of Müller and Göring, the main body was led by Gen. Maj. Kurt Wahle, while Hptm. Stemmermann was left in charge of the rearguard. Lettow-Vorbeck would freely move through the force to oversee its advance and take command wherever he was most needed. Even though they sent out patrols to learn about the Schutztruppe's location throughout the night, the British only received reports about Lettow-Vorbeck's movement at 10.00. Thereupon Giffard ordered 2/2nd KAR and half of 3/2nd KAR to move eastwards, and 1/2nd KAR to march west in order to engage and encircle the German forces between them. 1/1st KAR, badly shaken by the previous day's fighting, was to remain at Lioma to guard the British baggage and reserve ammunition, while the other half of 3/2nd KAR was held as mobile reserve. Two companies of 2/2nd KAR came up against the German vanguard's flank on the Lioma-Muanhupa road around 12.00, immediately starting a stubborn, but stagnant firefight with Abt Müller and Abt Göring. Other elements of the 2/2nd and 3/2nd KAR attempted to flank this vanguard and attack the German main body in order to scatter its carriers and capture its supplies, which would have meant a heavy logistical blow for the Schutztruppe. Well covered by the bush and the rugged hills, however, the German main body evaded the British to the west and managed to move eastwards along the road, and then on a trail into the northern hills. After encountering 2/2nd and 3/2nd KAR, Lettow-Vorbeck initially assumed that he could possibly destroy them with a determinded counter-attack using all his forces; this plan was dropped, however, when it became clear that the German main body had already too far advanced northwards to be called back for an assault. Meanwhile, unknown to the Germans, 1/2nd KAR marched southwest along the Lioma-Muanhupa road, and encountered parts of the Schutztruppe's rearguard by 14.30. Completely surprising the defenders, 1/2nd KAR managed to overrun a whole enemy field hospital largely unopposed.
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A light cruiser SMS Königsberg of the Imperial German Navy was in the Indian Ocean when war was declared. In the Battle of Zanzibar, Königsberg sank the old protected cruiser HMS Pegasus in Zanzibar harbour and then retired into the Rufiji River delta. After being cornered by warships of the British Cape Squadron, including an old pre-dreadnought battleship, two shallow-draught monitors with 6 in (150 mm) guns were brought from England and demolished the cruiser on 11 July 1915. The British salvaged and used six 4 in (100 mm) guns from the sunken Pegasus, which became known as the Peggy guns; the crew of Königsberg and the 4.1 in (100 mm) main battery guns were taken over by the Schutztruppe and saw major use in various points throughout the area until the end of operations.
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A large number of German casualties were caused by the change in the wind direction and the decision to go ahead against protests by local officers, which were increased by British troops, who fired on German soldiers as they fled in the open. The gas used by the German troops at Hulluch was a mixture of chlorine and phosgene, which had first been used against British troops on 19 December 1915 at Wieltje, near Ypres. The German gas was of sufficient concentration to penetrate the British PH gas helmets and the 16th Division was unjustly blamed for poor gas discipline.
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After the defeat at the Battle of Sarikamish, the Ottomans tried to reorganize. The Armenian Genocide made supplying their forces a problem. Trade by Armenians, which had supplied the Ottoman Army, was disrupted.Dismissal of Armenian soldiers into labor battalions and their massacres further worsened the problem. However, throughout 1915, the northern sectors of this front remained quiet. At the same time, the end of the Gallipoli Campaign would free up considerable Turkish soldiers. Nikolai Yudenich, commander of the Russian Caucasus Army, knew this and prepared to launch an offensive. He hoped to take the main fortress of Erzurum in the area followed by Trabzon. It was a difficult campaign as Erzurum was protected by a number of forts in the mountains. Eight of these divisions were designated for the Caucasus Front. Yudenich believed he could launch an offensive before these divisions could be ready for battle.
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In January 1916, Baratov drove the Turks and Persian tribesman and occupied Hamedan. On February 26, Baratov's forces captured Kermanshah. On March 12, Baratov's forces captured Kharind. Baratov reached the Ottoman frontier, 150 miles from Baghdad in the Mesopotamia campaign, by the middle of May. It was expected that this unit would eventually effect a juncture with the British army in Mesopotamia. In fact, a Cossack company of five officers and 110 men left the Baratov's Russian division on May 8, rode southward a distance of about 180 miles through the territory of disaffected tribesmen, crossing several mountain passes at an altitude of 8,000 feet, and reached the British front on the Tigris on May 18.
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