The Battle of Polygon Wood

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  • The Battle of Polygon Wood was a significant battle in World War I that took place in Flanders.
  • The battle resulted in heavy losses for both sides and the capture of over 1,300 prisoners by the British.
  • Despite the success of the attack, the German counter-attacks were delayed due to the British barrage fire.
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日本語訳をお願いいたします。

Gough wrote later On the V Corps front they launched no less than six counter-attacks.... Their losses were very heavy and we captured over 1,300 prisoners. — Hubert Gough The official historians of the Reichsarchiv wrote, The German Eingreifdivisionen, 16th Bavarian Division at Gheluwe, 236th Division at Moorslede and 234th Division at Oostniewkerke in the Flandern III Stellung were assembled at their stations at 8:00 a.m. in readiness to move.... In spite of this the counter-attacks did not take effect until the late afternoon; for the tremendous British barrage fire caused most serious loss of time and crippled the thrust power of the reserves. — Reichsarchiv By nightfall the Eingreifdivisionen had been defeated. Analysis In 1948, J. E. Edmonds, the British official historian, wrote that with the exception of the failure to capture Tower Hamlets, at the top of the Bassevillebeek Spur the objectives of the attack had been achieved and the changed tactics of the Germans confounded. The French and British public knew little of the success but the contending armies in Flanders were well aware of its significance. The British relieved many of the attacking divisions, whose troops reported, that if all attacks could be so well prepared, the troops would be content. On 20 September and the next few days of local fighting the German had been driven from the positions on the Gheluvelt Plateau that had been the site of the main defensive effort (Schwerpunkt) since July. On 21 September, Haig ordered the next attack of Plumer's scheme, to complete the capture of Polygon Wood and part of Zonnebeke. In 1996, Prior and Wilson wrote that the battle had been more costly relative to the ground gained on 31 July even with the artillery reinforcements and better weather that made British artillery-fire more accurate. The German artillery was still able to inflict casualties at a higher rate and the success on the Gheluvelt Plateau took less ground than on 31 July.

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>Gough wrote later On the V Corps front they launched no less than six counter-attacks.... Their losses were very heavy and we captured over 1,300 prisoners. — Hubert Gough ⇒後にゴフは書いた 第5軍団の前線に対して、彼ら(ドイツ軍)は6回以上の反撃を浴びせました…。彼らの損失は極めて甚大で、我々は1300人以上の囚人を捕縛しました。―ヒューバート・ゴフ >The official historians of the Reichsarchiv wrote, The German Eingreifdivisionen, 16th Bavarian Division at Gheluwe, 236th Division at Moorslede and 234th Division at Oostniewkerke in the Flandern III Stellung were assembled at their stations at 8:00 a.m. in readiness to move.... In spite of this the counter-attacks did not take effect until the late afternoon; for the tremendous British barrage fire caused most serious loss of time and crippled the thrust power of the reserves.— Reichsarchiv By nightfall the Eingreifdivisionen had been defeated. ⇒帝国公文書館の公報史家は書いた、 ドイツ軍のアイングリーフ師団、ゲルーヴェの第16バヴァリア師団、モースレデの第236師団、およびフランドル第III陣地内オーストニューケルケの第234師団は、午前8時に駐屯地に集まって移動の準備を整えていました…。これにもかかわらず、反撃は午後遅くまで発効しませんでした。というのも、英国軍の膨大な集中砲火が極めて深刻な時間的損失を引き起こし、(控えていた)予備軍の襲撃力を損なったからでした。―帝国公文書館 夕暮れまでにアイングリーフ師団は敗北した。 >Analysis In 1948, J. E. Edmonds, the British official historian, wrote that with the exception of the failure to capture Tower Hamlets, at the top of the Bassevillebeek Spur the objectives of the attack had been achieved and the changed tactics of the Germans confounded. The French and British public knew little of the success but the contending armies in Flanders were well aware of its significance. ⇒分析 1948年に、英国の公報史家J. E.エドモンズはこう書いた。バセヴィレベーク山脚頂上のタワー・ハムレッツを攻略しそこなったことを除けば、攻撃の目的は達成され、戦術の変化にドイツ軍は混乱した。フランスと英国の国民は、ほとんど成功とは認めなかったが、フランドルで闘争する方面軍は、その意義を十分に認識していた。 >The British relieved many of the attacking divisions, whose troops reported, that if all attacks could be so well prepared, the troops would be content. On 20 September and the next few days of local fighting the German had been driven from the positions on the Gheluvelt Plateau that had been the site of the main defensive effort (Schwerpunkt) since July. On 21 September, Haig ordered the next attack of Plumer's scheme, to complete the capture of Polygon Wood and part of Zonnebeke. ⇒英国軍は攻撃師団の多くを安心させた。というのも、すべての攻撃が準備さえうまくできれば、軍隊は満足(して戦う)だろうと当の軍隊が報告したからであった。局地戦の9月20日とそれに続く数日間、ドイツ軍は、7月以来主要な防衛奮闘の場所(重要拠点)となっていたゲルヴェルト台地の陣地から放逐された。9月21日、ヘイグはプルマー計画の次の攻撃を命じて、ポリゴン・ウッドとゾンネベケの一部の攻略を完了した。 >In 1996, Prior and Wilson wrote that the battle had been more costly relative to the ground gained on 31 July even with the artillery reinforcements and better weather that made British artillery-fire more accurate. The German artillery was still able to inflict casualties at a higher rate and the success on the Gheluvelt Plateau took less ground than on 31 July. ⇒1996年に、プリオールとウィルソンはこう書いた。すなわち、7月31日に得られた地面を考えると、たとえ砲兵隊の増援があっても、英国軍の砲撃をより正確にしてくれるような好天に恵まれても、費用面では相対的に高くついたかも知れない。ドイツ軍の砲兵隊はさらに高率の死傷者を負わされたかも知れないし、ゲルヴェルト台地での成功は、7月31日のそれより少なかったかも知れないのだから。(=7月31日は成功とだった言える。)

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  • Gunew
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回答No.1

こんにちは。 下記、ご質問の日本語訳になります。 誤訳が有りましたらすみません; ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ゴフは後で書いた 5軍団の前で、彼らは6回以上の反撃を打ちました....彼らの損失は非常に重く、1300人以上の捕虜を捕らえました。 - ヒューバート・ゴフ・ライヒザーチヴの公式の歴史家は、 ドイツのアイグレイフェンディヴィジョナン(ドイツ・EingreifDivisionen=介入部門)、ゲリューの第16回バイエルン部、ムーンアズリードの第236部、フランダース IIIの位置(=Stellung)のオーストニーグーカーク(=Oostniewkerke)の234部門は、午前8時に駅に集まって移動する準備が整いました.... これにもかかわらず、反撃午後遅くまで有効にならなかった。 巨大な英銃弾が最も深刻な時間の損失をもたらし、埋蔵量の勢いを失ったためです。 -国立公文書館(=ドイツ語・ Reichsarchiv) 夕暮れまでにアイグレイフェンディヴィジョナン(=Eingreifdivisionen)は敗北した。 分析 英国の公式史家J. E. エドモンズは、1948年に、バスリヴベークスプール(=Bassevillebeek Spur)の頂上にタワーハムレッツ(=Tower Hamlets)を捕らえなかったことを除いて、攻撃の目的が達成され、ドイツ人の変化した戦術が混乱していると書いています。 フランスと英国の国民はほとんど成功しなかったが、フランダースの敵対軍はその意義を十分に認識していた。 イギリス軍は、すべての攻撃がうまく準備できれば、軍隊に満足するだろうと、軍隊が報告した攻撃部門の多くを安堵させた。 9月20日と地方戦闘の数日後、ドイツ軍は、7月から主な防衛努力の場所(シュウェーペンクト)になっていたゲルベルトプラトー(=Gheluvelt Plateau)の地位から追い出された。ヘイグ(= Haig)は9月21日、プラマー(=Plumer)の計画の次の攻撃を注文して、ポリゴンウッド(=Polygon Wood)とゾンエベケ(=Zonnebeke)の一部の取得を完了しました。 1996年に、プリオール(=Prior)とウィルソン(=Wilson)は、戦闘が、砲兵増援とより良い天気であっても、7月31日に得られた地上よりもコストがかかり、英国の砲撃をより正確にしたと書いている。 ドイツの砲兵はまだ死傷者を増やすことができ、ゲルベルト プラトウの成功は7月31日よりも少なくなっています。 以上になります。 お役にたてれば幸いです

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    Visibility increased except for frequent ground fog around dawn, which helped conceal British infantry during the attack, before clearing to expose German troop movements to British observation and attack. The British infantry succeeded in capturing most of their objectives and then holding them against German counter-attacks, inflicting many casualties on the local German defenders and Eingreif divisions sent to reinforce them by massed artillery and small-arms fire. German defences on the Gheluvelt Plateau, which had been retained or quickly recaptured in July and August were lost and the British began a run of success which lasted into early October. Strategic background The Kerensky Offensive by Russia in July had accelerated the disintegration of the Russian Army, increasing the prospect of substantial German reinforcements for the Western Front. The French attack at Verdun in August had inflicted a defeat on the German 5th Army similar in extent to the defeat of the 4th Army in the Battle of Messines in June but morale in the French army was still poor. In reports to the War Cabinet on 21 August and 2 September, Sir Douglas Haig repeated his view that the British campaign at Ypres was necessary to shield the other armies of the alliance, regardless of the slow geographical progress being made in the unusually wet weather of August. Tactical developments The German 4th Army had defeated British attempts to advance to the black and green (second and third) lines set for 31 July in the centre of the battlefield and on the Gheluvelt Plateau on the southern flank, during the frequent weather interruptions in August. These defensive successes had been costly and by mid-August, German satisfaction at their defensive achievements was accompanied by concern at the extent of casualties. The rain, constant bombardments and British air attacks had also put great strain on the German defence between British attacks.

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  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    British counter-attack patrols easily observed the advance and as the lines of German troops breasted Broodseinde ridge at 2:30 p.m., a huge bombardment enveloped them. German field artillery with the infantry was hit by artillery-fire, which blocked the roads, causing delays and disorganisation. German infantry had many casualties, as they advanced down the slope in good visibility. The 236th Division lost so many men that it was only able to reinforce the troops of the 3rd Reserve Division, found east of the Zonnebeke–Haus Kathé road on Grote Molen spur, chasing a few Australian souvenir hunters out of Molenaarelsthoek. The 4th Bavarian Division had to find a way across the mud and floodings of the Paddebeek east of Kleinmolen spur, losing 1,340 casualties to reach the survivors of the 3rd Reserve Division (Polygon Wood–Kleinmolen) and the 23rd Reserve Division (Kleinmolen–St Julien). A renewal of the British attack at 6:00 p.m. and the German counter-attack over Hill 40 and Kleinmolen met, the mélee leaving both sides where they began. British artillery fire slowed the advance of the Eingreif units, which took up to two hours to cover one kilometre and arrived at the front line exhausted. The 17th Division had replaced the 16th Bavarian Division as the Eingreif division covering the forces near Zandvoorde, just before the battle began. At 10:00 a.m. movement orders arrived and parts of the division advanced north-west towards Terhand, where the first layer of the British barrage (directed by artillery-observation aircraft) was met, delaying the arrival of advanced units in their assembly areas until 1:00 p.m.. The order to advance took until 2:00 p.m. to reach all units and then the advance resumed through crater fields and the British bombardment, having to disperse to avoid swamps and the worst of the British artillery fire. Polderhoek was not reached until 4:10 p.m. and as soon as the first battalions crossed the skyline near Polderhoek Château they were hit by artillery and machine-gun fire from three sides and the counter-attack "withered away".

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    XIV Corps was to advance to the south edge of Houthoulst Forest with the 4th, 29th and Guards divisions, as the French First Army conformed on its left. Raids and artillery bombardments were arranged along the rest of the front, to deceive the Germans as to the objectives of the attacks. German defensive preparations Main article: 4th Army defensive changes: September–November 1917 Opposite I Anzac Corps the 233rd Division held the line, with the 220th Division as its counter-attack (Eingreif) division. To the north against II Anzac Corps, were the 195th Division and part of 16th Division, with the 20th Division and 45th Reserve Divisions as Eingreif divisions; further north was the 227th Division. The 18th Division held Flandern I Stellung near Poelcappelle and the 119th Division held Houthoulst Forest. The Germans were also hampered by the weather but as their positions were on the edge of the beaten zone, routes to their front line were in better condition until closer to the front. A German soldier wrote, The ground was unbelievably boggy, we just hardly got forward. The man to my front threatened to disappear in the darkness, so I moved quicker, only to get stuck up to my knees in the morass.... but then the man behind me got stuck as well in the filthy mess.... At long last the two of us were extracted from the bog. — Fähnrich Britten On 7 October, the 4th Army headquarters rescinded the policy of a reinforced front defence zone, to avoid another disaster like 4 October. Front line regiments were dispersed again, with their reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line. More artillery was to be used against British artillery, to protect the Eingreifdivisionen as they advanced. The Eingreifdivisionen were placed closer to the front line, to intervene as swiftly as possible once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artillery. On 9 October Ludendorff issued a memorandum to all Western Front divisions, complaining that Eingreifdivisionen were being misused. Dispersal, poorly timed attacks, disorganisation and poor co-ordination with the artillery, had led to high casualties. Ludendorff emphasised that the reserve units of ground holding divisions, should conduct hasty attacks (Gegenstöße) to push attackers out of their area.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    Laffert had expected that the two Eingreif divisions behind Messines Ridge, would reach the Höhen (second) line before the British. The divisions had reached assembly areas near Gheluvelt and Warneton by 7:00 a.m. and the 7th Division was ordered to move from Zandvoorde to Hollebeke, to attack across the Comines canal, towards Wijtschate into the British northern flank. The 1st Guard Reserve Division was to move to the Warneton line east of Messines, then advance around Messines to recapture the original front system. Both Eingreif divisions were plagued by delays, being new to the area and untrained for counter-attack operations. The 7th Division was shelled by British artillery all the way to the Comines canal, then part of the division was diverted to reinforce the remnants of the front divisions holding positions around Hollebeke. The rest of the division found that the British had already taken the Sehnen (Oosttaverne) line, by the time that they arrived at 4:00 p.m. The 1st Guard Reserve Division was also bombarded as it crossed the Warneton (third) line but reached the area east of Messines by 3:00 p.m., only to be devastated by the resumption of the British creeping barrage and forced back to the Sehnen (Oosttaverne) line, as the British began to advance to their next objective. Laffert contemplated a further withdrawal, then ordered the existing line to be held after the British advance stopped. Most of the losses inflicted on the British infantry by the German defence came from German artillery fire. In the days after the main attack, German shellfire on the new British lines was extremely accurate and well-timed, inflicting 90 percent of the casualties suffered by the 25th Division.