• ベストアンサー
  • 困ってます

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

Behind the Flandern I Stellung were the Flandern II Stellung and the Flandern III Stellung (still under construction). In his Operation Order of 27 June to the Fifth Army corps commanders, Gough gave the green line (third objective) as the main objective. Advances towards the red line, (fourth objective) were to be made by patrols of fresh troops, to take vacant ground that was tactically valuable, exploiting any German disorganisation in the first 24 hours. The Fifth Army plan was more ambitious than Plumer's version, which had involved a shallower advance of 1,000–1,750 yards (910–1,600 m) on the first day. Major-General John Davidson, Director of Operations at General Headquarters expressed concern that there was "ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives". Davidson suggested reverting to an advance of no more than 1,500–3,000 yards (1,400–2,700 m), to increase the concentration of British artillery. Gough's reply stressed the need to plan for opportunities to take ground left temporarily undefended and that this was more likely in the first attack, that would have the benefit of a longer period of preparation. After discussions at the end of June, Haig endorsed the Fifth Army plan, as did Plumer the Second Army commander. The front held by the French extended 4.3 miles (7 km) from Boesinghe (Boezinge) to the north of Nordschoote (Noordschote), the ground to the north being a morass created by the Belgians, when they flooded the area during the Battle of the Yser in 1914. A paved road between Reninghe, Nordschoote and Drie Grachten ran on a bank just above the water level. Into the inundations ran the Kemmelbeek, Yperlee (Yser Canal) and Martjevaart. Between Nordschoote and the Maison du Passeur pillbox, the opposing lines were separated by a wide stretch of ground, which was mostly flooded. At the Maison du Passeur there was a French outpost on the east side of the Yperlee, connected with the west bank by a footbridge. From this point to Steenstraat, no man's land was about 200–300 yards (180–270 m) wide. From Boesinghe to Steenstraat the Yperlee running from Ypres, formed the front line.

共感・応援の気持ちを伝えよう!

  • 回答数1
  • 閲覧数152
  • ありがとう数1

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • 回答No.1
  • Nakay702
  • ベストアンサー率81% (7365/9083)

>Behind the Flandern I Stellung were the Flandern II Stellung and the Flandern III Stellung (still under construction). In his Operation Order of 27 June to the Fifth Army corps commanders, Gough gave the green line (third objective) as the main objective. Advances towards the red line, (fourth objective) were to be made by patrols of fresh troops, to take vacant ground that was tactically valuable, exploiting any German disorganisation in the first 24 hours. ⇒フランドル第I陣地の背後に、フランドル第II陣地とフランドル第III陣地(まだ工事中)があった。ゴフは、6月27日の「作戦指令」では緑部分(第3標的)が主要標的であることを第5方面軍指揮官らに伝えた。赤線部(第4標的)方面への進軍は、新しい軍隊のパトロールによってなされることになっていた。そして、最初の24時間でいかなる(ささいな)ドイツ軍の混乱でも利用して、戦術的に貴重な退去地面を奪取することにいていた。 >The Fifth Army plan was more ambitious than Plumer's version, which had involved a shallower advance of 1,000–1,750 yards (910–1,600 m) on the first day. Major-General John Davidson, Director of Operations at General Headquarters expressed concern that there was "ambiguity as to what was meant by a step-by-step attack with limited objectives". Davidson suggested reverting to an advance of no more than 1,500–3,000 yards (1,400–2,700 m), to increase the concentration of British artillery. ⇒第5方面軍の計画はプルーマー案より野心的であったが、1日目には1,000–1,750ヤード(910–1,600m)という、浅い進軍(だけ)を盛り込んでいた。総司令部の作戦行動の管理者ジョン・テビッドソン少将は、「限られた標的に対する段階的な攻撃によって意味されることに関する曖昧さ」があるという懸念を表明した。デーヴィッドソンは、英国軍砲兵隊の集中を増やすために、1,500–3,000ヤード(1,400–2,700m)以上にならない進軍に戻ることを提案した。 >Gough's reply stressed the need to plan for opportunities to take ground left temporarily undefended and that this was more likely in the first attack, that would have the benefit of a longer period of preparation. After discussions at the end of June, Haig endorsed the Fifth Army plan, as did Plumer the Second Army commander. ⇒ゴフの返事は、一時的に無防備のままになる地面を奪取する機会の利用を計画に入れる必要性を強調した。これは最初の攻撃において可能性が大きく、そこには長い準備の利点があるだろうと強調した。ヘイグは6月末の議論の後、第2方面軍指揮官のプルーマーと同じく、第5方面軍の計画を支持した。 >The front held by the French extended 4.3 miles (7 km) from Boesinghe (Boezinge) to the north of Nordschoote (Noordschote), the ground to the north being a morass created by the Belgians, when they flooded the area during the Battle of the Yser in 1914. A paved road between Reninghe, Nordschoote and Drie Grachten ran on a bank just above the water level. Into the inundations ran the Kemmelbeek, Yperlee (Yser Canal) and Martjevaart. Between Nordschoote and the Maison du Passeur pillbox, the opposing lines were separated by a wide stretch of ground, which was mostly flooded. ⇒フランス軍が占拠する前線はボージンゲからノルドスコーテ北まで4.3マイル(7km)伸びたが、その北方の地面は、1914年の「イゼールの戦い」の間にベルギー軍が氾濫させてつくった沼地の地域であった。レニンゲ、ノルドスコーテおよびドリエ・グラフテンの間の舗装道路は、水位よりちょっと上の岸を通っていた。ケメルベーク、イペルレー(イゼール運河)、およびマルジェヴァートを通るあたりでは冠水していた。ノルドスコーテとメゾン・デュ・パセ(通行の館)のピルボックスとの間で、対立する戦線は広い地面の広がりによって切り離されているが、それは大部分が浸水しているところであった。 >At the Maison du Passeur there was a French outpost on the east side of the Yperlee, connected with the west bank by a footbridge. From this point to Steenstraat, no man's land was about 200–300 yards (180–270 m) wide. From Boesinghe to Steenstraat the Yperlee running from Ypres, formed the front line. ⇒メゾン・デュ・パセでは、イペルレーの東側にフランス軍の哨戒陣地があり、歩道橋で西岸とつながっていた。この地点からシュテーンシュトラートまでの中間地帯は、幅が200–300ヤード(180–270m)であった。イープルから出るイペルレー(運河)がボージンゲからシュテーンシュトラートまで走っていて、最前線を形成していた。

共感・感謝の気持ちを伝えよう!

質問者からのお礼

回答ありがとうございました。

関連するQ&A

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The advance was to be by bounds to objective lines behind a creeping barrage moving at 90 m (98 yd) every four minutes, with pauses to make sure that the French barrage kept pace with the British barrage. The first objective was the two German lines east of the Yser Canal and the second objective was the German third line. A total advance of 5,000 yards (4,600 m) to the red line was not fundamental to the plan, being an attempt to provide enough discretion to the divisional commanders to make local advances without the need to request permission, based on the extent of local German resistance, in accordance with the manual SS 135. This was intended to avoid situations that had occurred in previous offensives, when vacant ground had not been promptly occupied and had then to be fought for in later attacks. Had the German defence collapsed and the red line been reached, the German Flandern I, II and III Stellungen would have been intact, except for Flandern I Stellung for a mile south of Broodseinde. On 10 August, II Corps was required to reach the black line of 31 July, an advance of 400–900 yards (370–820 m) and at the Battle of Langemarck on 16 August, the Fifth Army was to advance 1,500 yards (1,400 m). The German 4th Army operation order for the defensive battle was issued on 27 June. The German 4th Army had about 600 aircraft of the Luftstreitkräfte, 200 being single-seat fighters; eventually eighty German air units operated over the Flanders front. German defences had been arranged as a forward zone, main battle zone and rearward battle zone. The defence in depth began with a front system of three breastworks each about 200 yards (180 m) apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion, with listening-posts in no man's land. About 2,000 yards (1,800 m) behind these works was the Albrecht Stellung (second line), a secondary or artillery protective line that marked the rear boundary of the forward zone.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    During the Battle of Arras the British Fifth Army was intended to help the operations of the Third Army, by pushing back German rear guards to the Siegfriedstellung (Hindenburg Line) and then attacking the position from Bullecourt to Quéant, which was 3.5 miles (5.6 km) from the main Arras–Cambrai road. The German outpost villages from Doignies to Croisilles were captured on 2 April and an attack on a 3,500-yard (3,200 m) front, with Bullecourt in the centre was planned. The wire-cutting bombardment was delayed by transport difficulties behind the new British front line and the attack of the Third Army, which was originally intended to be simultaneous, took place on 9 April. A tank attack by the Fifth Army was improvised for 10 April on a front of 1,500 yards (1,400 m) to capture Riencourt and Hendecourt. The attack was intended to begin 48 minutes before sunrise but the tanks were delayed by a blizzard and the attack was cancelled at the last minute; the 4th Australian Division withdrawal from its assembly positions was luckily obscured by a snowstorm.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    The armies were to capture Passchendaele Ridge and advance on Roulers and Thourout, to cut the railway supplying the German garrisons holding the Western Front north of Ypres and the Belgian coast. An attack by the Fourth Army would then begin on the coast, combined with Operation Hush (including an amphibious landing) in support of the main advance to the Netherlands frontier. On 13 May, Haig appointed General Hubert Gough to command the Ypres operation and the coastal force; Macmullen gave Gough the GHQ 1917 plan the next day. Entente offensive preparations Gough held meetings with his Corps commanders on 6 and 16 June where the third objective of the GHQ 1917 plan, which included the German Wilhelm Stellung (third line), was added to the first and second objectives to be taken on the first day. A fourth objective was also given for the first day but was only to be attempted opportunistically, in places where the German defence had collapsed. Gough intended to use five divisions from the Second Army, nine divisions and one brigade from the Fifth Army and two divisions from the French First Army (1re Armée). Gough planned a preparatory bombardment from 16–25 July. The Second Army was to create the impression of a more ambitious attack beyond Messines Ridge, by capturing outposts in the Warneton line. The Fifth Army was to attack along a front of approximately 14,000 yards (13,000 m), running from Klein Zillebeke in the south to the Ypres–Staden railway in the north, with the French First Army on the northern flank attacking with two divisions, from the boundary with the XIV Corps north to the flooded area just beyond Steenstraat. The infantry trained on a replica of the German trench system, built using information from aerial photographs and trench raids. Specialist platoons were given additional training on methods to destroy German pillboxes and blockhouses. The attack was not a breakthrough attempt, for the German fourth-line defensive position (the Flandern I Stellung), lay 10,000–12,000 yards (9,100–11,000 m) behind the front line, well beyond the fourth objective (red line).

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Battle of Langemarck (1917) The Battle of Langemarck was fought from 16–18 August; the Fifth Army headquarters was influenced by the effect that delay would have on Operation Hush, which needed the high tides at the end of August or it would have to be postponed for a month. Gough intended that the rest of the green line, just beyond the Wilhelm Stellung (German third line), from Polygon Wood to Langemarck, to be taken and the Steenbeek crossed further north. In the II Corps area, the disappointment of 10 August was repeated, with the infantry managing to advance, then being isolated by German artillery and (except in the 25th Division area near Westhoek) and forced back to their start line by German counter-attacks. Attempts by the German infantry to advance further were stopped by British artillery fire with many losses. The advance further north in the XVIII Corps area, retook and held the north end of St Julien and the area south-east of Langemarck, while XIV Corps captured Langemarck and the Wilhelm Stellung, north of the Ypres–Staden railway near the Kortebeek. The French First Army conformed, pushing up to the Kortebeek and St. Jansbeck stream west of the northern stretch of the Wilhelm Stellung, where it crossed to the east side of the Kortebeek. Smaller British attacks from 19–27 August also failed to hold captured ground, although a XVIII Corps attack on 19 August succeeded. Exploiting observation from higher ground to the east, the Germans were able to inflict many losses on the British divisions holding the new line beyond Langemarck. After two fine dry days from 17–18 August, XIX Corps and XVIII Corps began pushing closer to the Wilhelm Stellung (third line). On 20 August, an operation by British tanks, artillery and infantry captured strong points along the St. Julien–Poelcappelle road and two days later, more ground was gained by the two corps but they were still overlooked by the Germans in the un-captured part of the Wilhelm Stellung.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The French Fifth Army fell back about 10 miles (16 km) from the Sambre during the Battle of Charleroi (22 August) and began a greater withdrawal from the area south of the Sambre on 23 August. The BEF fought the Battle of Mons on 24 August, by when the French First and Second armies had been pushed back by attacks of the German 7th and 6th armies between St. Dié and Nancy, the Third Army held positions east of Verdun against attacks by the 5th Army, the Fourth Army held positions from the junction with the Third Army south of Montmédy, westwards to Sedan, Mezières and Fumay, facing the 4th Army and the Fifth Army was between Fumay and Maubeuge, with the 3rd Army advancing up the Meuse valley from Dinant and Givet into a gap between the Fourth and Fifth armies and the 2nd Army pressed forward into the angle between the Meuse and Sambre directly against the Fifth Army. On the far west flank of the French, the BEF prolonged the line from Maubeuge to Valenciennes against the 1st Army and Army Detachment von Beseler masked the Belgian army at Antwerp.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    On 22 August, the 13th Division of the VII Corps, on the right flank of the 2nd Army, encountered British cavalry north of Binche, as the rest of the army to the east began an attack over the Sambre river, against the French Fifth Army. By the evening the bulk of the 1st Army had reached a line from Silly to Thoricourt, Louvignies and Mignault; the III and IV Reserve corps had occupied Brussels and screened Antwerp. Reconnaissance by cavalry and aircraft indicated that the area to the west of the army was free of troops and that British troops were not concentrating around Kortrijk, Lille and Tournai but were thought to be on the left flank of the Fifth Army, from Mons to Maubeuge. Earlier in the day, British cavalry had been reported at Casteau, to the north-east of Mons. A British aeroplane had been seen at Louvain (Leuven) on 20 August and on the afternoon of 22 August, a British aircraft en route from Maubeuge, was shot down by the 5th Division. More reports had reached the IX Corps, that columns were moving from Valenciennes to Mons, which made clear the British deployment but were not passed on to the 1st Army headquarters. Kluck assumed that the subordination of the 1st Army to the 2nd Army had ended, since the passage of the Sambre had been forced. Kluck wished to be certain to envelop the left (west) flank of the opposing forces to the south but was again over-ruled and ordered to advance south, rather than south-west, on 23 August.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The divisional boundary was west of the western road from Courcelette to Miraumont, the 99th Brigade attacking on a 700 yards (640 m) front, with boundaries marked by the two sunken roads. The 54th Brigade had a front which sloped steeply to the left and included Boom Ravine (Baum Mulde), with both brigades vulnerable to flanking fire from the right. The 53rd Brigade on the left of the attack had a wider front, much of which was also exposed to fire from the positions on the north bank that were due to be attacked by the 63rd Division and was to consolidate at the second objective. The main attack had three objectives, the first about 600 yards (550 m) forward along the southern slope of Hill 130, the second at South Miraumont Trench required an advance of another 600 yards (550 m) to the north slope of Hill 130 on the right and the railway between Grandcourt and Miraumont on the western flank; the final objective was the southern fringe of Petit Miraumont.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The Fifth Army retreat after the Battle of Charleroi, arguably saved the French army from decisive defeat, as it prevented the much sought envelopment of the Schlieffen plan. After fighting another defensive action in the Battle of St. Quentin, the French were pushed to within miles of Paris. Lanrezac was sacked by Joffre on 3 September (four days after General Pierre Ruffey, the Third Army commander) and replaced by Lieutenant-General Louis Franchet d'Espèrey. The 1934 work by the French Fascist and writer Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, The Comedy of Charleroi, explores the author's role in the battle. Casualties In 2001 Brose recorded 10,000 Fifth Army losses and in 2009, Herwig recorded that the 3rd Army had 4,275 casualties at Dinant. On the western flank of the French, the BEF lost 1,600 men.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    A cavalry division was given to each army, to operate with the reserve divisions, two tank battalions were attached to the Second Army and a tank brigade to the Fifth Army to exploit the firmer going, should the advances take place. In the early morning of 4 October, news arrived at British Headquarters (HQ) of the great success of the attack. Brigadier-General Charteris, Chief Intelligence Officer at General Headquarters, was sent from Haig's Advanced HQ to the Second Army HQ to discuss a possible exploitation. Plumer did not agree that exploitation was possible, because eight more uncommitted German divisions were behind the battlefield and there were another six beyond them; Plumer preferred to wait until the expected German counter-attacks that day had been defeated. German artillery fire was still heavy and the Flandern II and Flandern III Stellungen (defence lines) behind the attack front could be occupied by the fresh German divisions. An attack on these defensive lines would need close artillery support, which would be impossible because the British artillery was behind a severely battered strip of muddy ground 2 mi (3.2 km) wide. As the magnitude of the victory became apparent, Plumer had second thoughts but by 2:00 p.m., accepted that the moment had passed. On the Fifth Army front, an attempt to get further forward was ordered by Gough and then cancelled, after a local German counter-attack was reported to have pushed the 4th Division off 19 Metre Hill. Rain fell again on 4 October, continued on 5 and 6 October then became a downpour on 7 October. On 5 October, General Birdwood commander of I Anzac Corps told Plumer that the exploitation would not be possible, as the Corps light railway and the Westhoek to Zonnebeke road could not carry forward all the artillery necessary. On 7 October Haig cancelled the exploitation attack to the second objectives (red line), intended for the afternoon of 9 October. The rain stopped that night and the ground began to dry on 8 October, until late afternoon when another downpour began. From 4–9 October, over 30 millimetres (1.2 in) of rain fell, in a month when average rainfall was 75 millimetres (3.0 in).

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    A German attack from south-eastern Belgium towards Mézières and a possible offensive from Lorraine towards Verdun, Nancy and St. Dié was anticipated; the plan was an evolution from Plan XVI and made more provision for the possibility of a German offensive from the north through Belgium. The First, Second and Third armies were to concentrate between Épinal and Verdun opposite Alsace and Lorraine, the Fifth Army was to assemble from Montmédy to Sedan and Mézières and the Fourth Army was to be held back west of Verdun, ready to move east to attack the southern flank of a German invasion through Belgium or southwards against the northern flank of an attack through Lorraine. No formal provision was made for combined operations with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) but joint arrangements had been made and in 1911 during the Second Moroccan Crisis, the French had been told that six British divisions could be expected to operate around Maubeuge.