攻撃部隊の補充と新たな防御ラインの構築 -攻撃部隊や予備部隊からの新鮮な兵-

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Laffert had expected that the two Eingreif divisions behind Messines Ridge, would reach the Höhen (second) line before the British. The divisions had reached assembly areas near Gheluvelt and Warneton by 7:00 a.m. and the 7th Division was ordered to move from Zandvoorde to Hollebeke, to attack across the Comines canal, towards Wijtschate into the British northern flank. The 1st Guard Reserve Division was to move to the Warneton line east of Messines, then advance around Messines to recapture the original front system. Both Eingreif divisions were plagued by delays, being new to the area and untrained for counter-attack operations. The 7th Division was shelled by British artillery all the way to the Comines canal, then part of the division was diverted to reinforce the remnants of the front divisions holding positions around Hollebeke. The rest of the division found that the British had already taken the Sehnen (Oosttaverne) line, by the time that they arrived at 4:00 p.m. The 1st Guard Reserve Division was also bombarded as it crossed the Warneton (third) line but reached the area east of Messines by 3:00 p.m., only to be devastated by the resumption of the British creeping barrage and forced back to the Sehnen (Oosttaverne) line, as the British began to advance to their next objective. Laffert contemplated a further withdrawal, then ordered the existing line to be held after the British advance stopped. Most of the losses inflicted on the British infantry by the German defence came from German artillery fire. In the days after the main attack, German shellfire on the new British lines was extremely accurate and well-timed, inflicting 90 percent of the casualties suffered by the 25th Division.

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As darkness fell and being under the impression that all the Australians had retired, New Zealand artillery observers called for the barrage to be brought closer to the observation line, when they feared a German counter-attack. The bombardment fell on the rest of the Australians, who withdrew with many casualties, leaving the southern part of the Oosttaverne line unoccupied, as well as the gap around the Blauwepoortbeek. An SOS barrage on the IX Corps front stopped a German counter-attack from the Roozebeke valley but many shells fell short, precipitating another informal withdrawal. Rumour led to the barrage being moved closer to the observation line, which added to British casualties until 10:00 p.m., when the infantry managed to get the artillery stopped and were then able to re-occupy the positions. Operations to re-take the Oosttaverne line in the II Anzac Corps area started at 3:00 a.m. on 8 June.[93As the infantry moved to the attack contact-patrol aircraft flew low overhead, two being maintained over each corps during the day. The observers were easily able to plot the positions of experienced troops, who lit flares and waved anything to attract attention. Some troops, poorly trained and inexperienced, failed to co-operate, fearing exposure to the Germans so aircraft flew dangerously low to identify them, four being shot down in consequence. Although air observation was not as vital to German operations because of their control of commanding ground, the speed by which reports from air observation could be delivered, made it a most valuable form of liaison between the front line and higher commanders. German infantry proved as reluctant to reveal themselves as the British so German flyers also had to make visual identifications. Reports and maps were dropped at divisional headquarters and corps report centres, allowing the progress of the infantry to be followed.

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The effectiveness of the British mines, barrages and bombardments was improved by advances in artillery survey, flash-spotting and centralised control of artillery from the Second Army headquarters. British attacks from 8–14 June advanced the front line beyond the former German Sehnen (Oosttaverne) line. The Battle of Messines was a prelude to the much larger Third Battle of Ypres campaign, the preliminary bombardment for which began on 11 July 1917.In 1916, the British planned to clear the German army from the Belgian coast to prevent them from using the coastal ports as bases from which to attack merchant ships and troop transports in the North Sea and English Channel. In January 1916, General Sir Herbert Plumer recommended to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig the capture of Messines Ridge (part of the southern arc of the Ypres Salient) before an operation to capture the Gheluvelt plateau further north. The Flanders campaign was postponed because of the Battle of Verdun in 1916 and the demands of the Battle of the Somme. When it became apparent that the Second Battle of the Aisne (Nivelle Offensive) (16 April – 9 May 1917) had failed to achieve its most ambitious objectives, Haig instructed the Second Army to capture the Messines–Wytschaete Ridge as soon as possible. Haig intended to force the Germans to move troops away from the French armies on the Aisne front, where demoralisation amid the failure of the Nivelle Offensive had led to mutinies. British operations in Flanders would relieve pressure on the French Army and the capture of Messines Ridge would give the British control of the strategically important ground on the southern flank of the Ypres Salient, shorten the front, deprive the Germans of observation over British positions further north.

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Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders.

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The 4th Army held a front of 25 miles (40 km) with three Gruppen, composed of a corps headquarters and a varying complement of divisions; Group Staden, based on the headquarters of the Guards Reserve Corps was added later. Group Dixmude held 12 miles (19 km) with four front divisions and two Eingreif divisions, Group Ypres held 6 miles (9.7 km) from Pilckem to Menin Road with three front divisions and two Eingreif divisions and Group Wijtschate held a similar length of front south of the Menin road, with three front divisions and three Eingreif divisions. The Eingreif divisions were stationed behind the Menin and Passchendaele ridges. About 5 miles (8.0 km) further back, were four more Eingreif divisions and 7 miles (11 km) beyond them, another two in Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL) reserve. The Germans were anxious that the British would attempt to exploit the victory at the Battle of Messines, with an advance to the Tower Hamlets spur, beyond the north end of Messines Ridge. On 9 June, Crown Prince Rupprecht proposed a withdrawal to the Flandern line east of Messines. Construction of defences began but were terminated after Fritz von Loßberg was appointed as the new Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. Loßberg rejected the proposed withdrawal to the Flandern line and ordered that the current front line east of the Oosttaverne line be held rigidly. To this end, the Flandern Stellung (Flanders Position) along Passchendaele Ridge, in front of the Flandern line, would become the Flandern I Stellung and a new Flandern II Stellung would run west of Menin and north to Passchendaele. Construction of a Flandern III Stellung east of Menin northwards to Moorslede was also begun. From mid-1917, the area east of Ypres was defended by the front position, Albrecht Stellung (second line), Wilhelm Stellung (third line), Flandern I Stellung (fourth line), Flandern II Stellung (fifth line) and Flandern III Stellung (under construction); between the German defences lay the villages of Zonnebeke and Passchendale.

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The offensive had resumed on 20 September, using similar step-by-step methods to those of the Fifth Army after 31 July, with a further evolution of technique, based on the greater mass of artillery made available, to enable the consolidation of captured ground with sufficient strength and organisation to defeat German counter-attacks. At the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, most of the British objectives had been captured and held, with substantial losses being inflicted on the six German ground-holding divisions and their three supporting Eingreif divisions. British preparations for the next step began immediately and both sides studied the effect of the battle and the implications it had for their dispositions. British offensive preparations Main article: The British set-piece attack in late 1917 On 21 September, Haig instructed the Fifth and Second armies to make the next step across the Gheluvelt Plateau, on a front of 8,500 yd (7,800 m). The I ANZAC Corps would conduct the main advance of about 1,200 yd (1,100 m), to complete the occupation of Polygon Wood and the south end of Zonnebeke village. The Second Army altered its corps frontages soon after the attack of 20 September so that each attacking division could be concentrated on a 1,000 yd (910 m) front. Roads and light railways were built behind the new front line to allow artillery and ammunition to be moved forward, beginning on 20 September; in fine weather this was finished in four days. As before Menin Road, bombardment and counter-battery fire began immediately, with practice barrages fired daily as a minimum. Artillery from the VIII and IX Corps in the south conducted bombardments to simulate attack preparations on Zandvoorde and Warneton. Haig intended that later operations would capture the rest of the ridge from Broodseinde, giving the Fifth Army scope to advance beyond the ridge north-eastwards and allow the commencement of Operation Hush. The huge amounts of shellfire from both sides had cut up the ground and destroyed roads. New road circuits were built to carry supplies forward, especially artillery ammunition.

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In the Second Action of Givenchy (15–16 June), IV Corps of the British First Army, attacked north-west of La Bassée with the 7th, 51st and Canadian divisions after a 60-hour bombardment, in which an attempt to alleviate an acute ammunition shortage was made by relying on artillery observation and tactical reconnaissance by reinforced RFC squadrons. No covering fire was available for the attack and the German defenders were seen to have manned the front line before the advance began. The Germans opened massed small-arms fire but were not able to prevent the British from entering the German front trench, where a bombing fight began. German infantry were well-supplied with hand grenades but the British were isolated by cross-fire along no man's land and were pushed back as they ran out of ammunition, the last troops retiring at 4:00 a.m. A new attack on 15 June, using all of the artillery ammunition left was delayed by thick mist and the difficulty in reorganising the infantry but went ahead at 4:45 p.m. and took the German front line. The advance was stopped until the line was consolidated but the British and Canadian troops who had not been pinned down in their own trenches were forced back by a German counter-attack at 8:00 p.m. after which further attacks were cancelled. The British Second Army conducted the First Attack on Bellewaarde on 16 June with the 3rd Division, which took the German first line easily at 4:15 a.m. The second and third waves rushed forward and ran into the British bombardment, which was not seen by the gunners due to the amount of mist and smoke created by the bombardment. The British still managed to reach the German second line and three German counter-attacks had only managed to push the 3rd Division back to the first line, when the British ran short of ammunition. Support from a brigade of the 14th Division to exploit the success, was delayed by German artillery-fire and fewer than two battalions of the 3rd Division managed to advance at 3:30 p.m., up a flat open slope and were repulsed with many casualties. At 6:00 p.m. the German front trench from Menin road to Railway Wood was consolidated, which was short of Bellewaarde ridge and the German observation posts along it. Joffre criticised British "inaction", which enabled the Germans to concentrate resources against the Tenth Army. The British First Army attacked in the Battle of Aubers Ridge, in support of the French offensive further south. North of La Bassée Canal, British artillery fire increased against the II Bavarian and XIX Saxon corps and at 6:00 a.m., an attack began against the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division and broke into the first line north of Fromelles. Fighting continued into the evening, when the trenches were recaptured. More British attacks occurred at Richbourg l'Avoué and at times penetrated to the German first line before being repulsed. Little ground was captured, none was held against German counter-attacks and German troops were soon sent south to reinforce the Arras front.

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As a preliminary to capturing the Loupart Wood line (another British term for R. I Stellung), Gough intended the Fifth Army to continue the process of small advances in the Ancre valley, by attacking Hill 130, the Butte de Warlencourt, Gueudecourt, Serre and Miraumont, before attacking the Loupart Wood line three days before the Third Army offensive at Arras. The capture of Hill 130, would command the southern approach to Miraumont and Pys, exposing German artillery positions behind Serre to ground observation, while attacks on the north bank took ground overlooking Miraumont from the west, possibly inducing the Germans to withdraw voluntarily and uncover Serre. II Corps planned to attack on 17 February with the 2nd, 18th and 63rd divisions, on a 3,000-yard (2,700 m) front.

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Attempts to hold the ground between the black and green lines failed due to the communication breakdown, the speed of the German advance and worsening visibility as the rain increased during the afternoon. The 55th and 15th division brigades beyond the black line, were rolled up from north to south and either retreated or were overrun. It took until 6:00 p.m. for the Germans to reach the Steenbeek, as the downpour added to the mud and flooding in the valley. When the Germans were 300 yards (270 m) from the black line, the British stopped the German advance with artillery and machine-gun fire. The success of the British advance in the centre of the front caused serious concern to the Germans. The defensive system was designed to deal with some penetration but it was meant to prevent the 4,000-yard (3,700 m) advance that XVIII and XIX Corps had achieved. German reserves from the vicinity of Passchendaele, had been able to begin their counter-attack at 11:00–11:30 a.m. when the three British brigades facing the counter-attack by regiments of the German 221st and 50th Reserve Divisions of Group Ypres, were depleted and thinly spread. The British brigades could not communicate with their artillery due to the rain and because the Germans also used smoke shell in their creeping barrage. The German counter-attack was able to drive the British back from the green line along the Zonnebek–Langemarck road, pushing XIX Corps back to the black line. The Germans also recaptured St Julien just west of the green line on the XVIII Corps front, where the counter-attack was stopped by mud, artillery and machine-gun fire. The three most advanced British brigades had lost 70 percent casualties by the time they had withdrawn from the green line. On the flanks of the Entente attack, German counter-attacks had little success. In the XIV Corps area, German attacks made no impression against British troops, who had had time to dig in but managed to push back a small bridgehead of the 38th Division from the east bank of the Steenbeek, after having suffered heavy losses from British artillery, when advancing around Langemarck.

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German defensive changes: late 1917 On 7 October, the 4th Army again dispersed its troops in the front defence zone. Reserve battalions moved back behind the artillery protective line and the Eingreif divisions were organised to intervene as swiftly as possible once an attack commenced, despite the risk of being devastated by the British artillery. Counter-battery fire to reduce British artillery fire was to be increased, to protect the Eingreif divisions as they advanced. All of the German divisions holding front zones were relieved and an extra division brought forward, as the British advances had lengthened the front line. Without the forces necessary for a counter-offensive south of the Gheluvelt plateau towards Kemmel Hill, Rupprecht began to plan for a slow withdrawal from the Ypres salient, even at the risk of uncovering German positions further north and the Belgian coast. Battle of Poelcappelle The French First Army and British Second and Fifth armies attacked on 9 October, on a 13,500 yards (12,300 m) front, from south of Broodseinde to St. Jansbeek, to advance half of the distance from Broodseinde ridge to Passchendaele, on the main front, which led to many casualties on both sides. Advances in the north of the attack front were retained by British and French troops but most of the ground taken in front of Passchendaele and on the Becelaere and Gheluvelt spurs was lost to German counter-attacks. General William Birdwood later wrote that the return of heavy rain and mud sloughs was the main cause of the failure to hold captured ground. Kuhl concluded that the fighting strained German fighting power to the limit but that the German forces managed to prevent a breakthrough, although it was becoming much harder to replace losses. First Battle of Passchendaele Passchendaele:パッシェンデール The First Battle of Passchendaele on 12 October, was another Allied attempt to gain ground around Passchendaele. Heavy rain and mud again made movement difficult and little artillery could be brought closer to the front. Allied troops were exhausted and morale had fallen.

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As the Canadians began preparations for an assault, the Germans were in the process of executing an assault plan of their own. The XIII (Royal Württemberg) Corps spent six weeks planning and carefully preparing their attack on the Mount Sorrel, Tor Top (Hill 62) and Hill 61 peaks. Their objective was to take control of the observation positions east of Ypres and keep as many British units as possible pinned down in the area, to avoid them transferring to the Somme front and assisting with the observed build-up in that area. The Germans constructed practice trenches resembling the Canadian positions near Tor Top to rehearse the assault, well behind their own lines. Destroyed dugouts and shelters. Prior to the war, most of the terrain here was heavily wooded. In mid-May, aerial reconnaissance near Mont Sorrel indicated that German forces were preparing an attack.

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Due to the excellent observation possessed by the Germans, zero hour had been chosen for dawn at 3:50 a.m. but with mist and unbroken cloud at 500–800 feet (150–240 m), it was still dark when the British bombardment began. The shelling was maintained for six minutes, while the British infantry crossed the 200–300 yards (180–270 m) of no man's land, then the barrage began to creep forward at a rate of 100 yards (91 m) in four minutes. The attack extended from opposite Deûlémont in the Second Army area, to the boundary with the Fifth Army, to convince the Germans that a serious effort was being made to capture the Warneton–Zandvoorde line. The II Anzac Corps took the German outpost line west of the Lys river. The New Zealand Division captured La Basseville, south-west of Warneton, in street fighting with the German garrison, who eventually withdrew towards Warneton and the 3rd Australian Division captured outposts and strong points of the Warneton line near Gapaard. To the north, IX Corps with the 39th and 19th divisions, advanced 500 yards (460 m) astride the Wambeke and Roosebeke streams and down the Oosttaverne spur between them, to the blue line (first objective) 1,000–1,500 yards (910–1,370 m) forward. The 19th Division attacked from Bee Farm in the south to Forret in the north. Two battalions of the 37th Division were attached to the right flank of the 19th Division to capture the blue line, from July to Bee Farms and revert to the command of the 37th Division for the next phase, for an attack south of July Farm. The 19th Division attack was conducted by the 56th Brigade, with three attacking battalions and one in reserve. Each battalion assembled in the front line and the support battalions took post in the old British front line, which had been made redundant by the Battle of Messines in June, then advanced to occupy the vacated front-line positions, when the attack began. Artillery support came from the 19th divisional artillery, the left group of the 37th divisional artillery and two 6-inch batteries of the IX Corps heavy artillery; a machine-gun barrage was to be fired by about 30 machine-guns.

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The Battle of the Ancre Heights (1 October – 11 November 1916), is the name given to the continuation of British attacks after the Battle of Thiepval Ridge from 26–28 September during the Battle of the Somme. The battle was conducted by the Reserve Army (renamed Fifth Army on 29 October) from Courcelette near the Albert–Bapaume road, west to Thiepval on Bazentin Ridge.[a] British possession of the heights would deprive the German 1st Army of observation towards Albert to the south-west and give the British observation north over the Ancre valley to the German positions around Beaumont Hamel, Serre and Beaucourt.

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The attacks would confront the German 6th Army with a joint offensive, on a 70 mi (110 km) front, eastwards into the Douai plain, where an advance of 10–15 mi (16–24 km) would cut the railways supplying the German armies as far south as Reims. The French attacked Vimy Ridge and the British attacked further north in the Battle of Aubers Ridge (9 May) and the Battle of Festubert (15–25 May). The battle was fought during the German offensive of the Second Battle of Ypres (21 April – 25 May), which the Germans ended to reinforce the Artois front. The initial French attack broke through and captured Vimy Ridge but reserve units were not able to reinforce the troops on the ridge, before German counter-attacks forced them back about half-way to their jumping-off points. The British attack at Aubers Ridge was a costly failure and two German divisions in reserve were diverted south against the Tenth Army. The British offensive was suspended until 15 May, when the Battle of Festubert began and French attacks from 15 May to 15 June were concentrated on the flanks to create jumping-off points for a second general offensive, which began on 16 June. The British attacks at Festubert forced the Germans back 1.9 mi (3 km) and diverted reserves from the French but the Tenth Army gained little more ground, despite firing double the amount of artillery ammunition, at the cost of many casualties to both sides. On 18 June, the main offensive was stopped and local attacks were ended on 25 June. The French offensive had advanced the front line about 1.9 mi (3 km) towards Vimy Ridge, on an 5.0 mi (8 km) front. The failure to break through, despite the expenditure of 2,155,862 shells and the suffering of 102,500 casualties, led to recriminations against Joffre; the German 6th Army suffered 73,072 casualties. A lull followed until the Second Battle of Champagne, the Third Battle of Artois and the Battle of Loos in September. After the Marne campaign in 1914, French offensives in Artois, Champagne and at St Mihiel had been costly failures, leading to criticism of the leadership of General Joseph Joffre, within the army and the French government. The French President, Raymond Poincaré, arranged several meetings between Joffre and the Council of Ministers (Conseil des ministres) in March and April 1915, where reports of the failed operations were debated, particularly a condemnation of the April offensive against the St Mihiel salient. Joffre retained undivided command and freedom to conduct operations as he saw fit, which had been given at the beginning of the war but was instructed to consult with his subordinates; provisional army groups, which had been established in late 1914, were made permanent soon afterwards.

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The operation was intended to engage as many German formations as possible and to prevent them from reinforcing the Ypres sector during the Third Battle of Ypres. Command of the Canadian Corps had only recently changed. A month earlier, Canadian Corps commander Julian Byng was promoted to General and replaced General Edmund Allenby as commander of the Third Army. Arthur Currie, the 1st Canadian Division commander, was promoted to Lieutenant-General and assumed command of the Canadian Corps. Currie regarded control of either Hill 70 or Sallaumines Hill as tactically more important than control of the city of Lens. Merely to occupy the city while the Germans held the high ground, would place the attackers in an unfavourably lower and more exposed position than the ones they occupied. At a conference of corps commanders, Currie persuaded the First Army commander General Henry Horne to make Hill 70, not Lens, the main objective of the limited offensive. Controlling Hill 70 would provide excellent observation over the German lines, in preparation for more offensives. Currie believed the Germans would attempt to counter-attack if Hill 70 were captured, largely because of its observational importance. Nevertheless, Currie believed that the advantageous observational position of Hill 70 would permit well directed artillery to effectively deal with any counter-attacks. The plan was therefore to occupy the high ground quickly, establish defensive positions and utilize combined small arms and artillery fire to repel expected counter-attacks and inflict as many casualties as possible. In an attempt to further deceive the Germans, minor operations were conducted in an effort to suggest a forthcoming attack by the British First Army south of La Bassée Canal. This included an attack by the 9th Canadian Brigade against units of the German 36th Reserve Division at Mericourt Trench and a British First Army poison gas attack north of Loos, both in late July 1917. Bad weather led to the postponement of the attack on Hill 70 from late July until mid-August.

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On 14 July, during the Battle of Bazentin Ridge, this southern section of the German second line was captured by the British Fourth Army of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson. The possibility of "rolling up" the German second line by turning north now presented itself if Pozières could be captured. The British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Douglas Haig, lacked the ammunition to immediately execute another broad-front attack after 14 July. Believing that Pozières and Thiepval would become untenable for the Germans as the British continued their eastward momentum, Haig ordered Rawlinson to concentrate on the centre between High Wood and Delville Wood as well as the villages of Guillemont and Ginchy.

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Three squadrons of 1st Wing Royal Flying Corps (RFC) were attached to the First Army, to fly defensive patrols for four days before the attack, to deter enemy reconnaissance. During the attack they were to conduct artillery observation and reconnaissance sorties and bomb enemy rear areas, railway junctions and bridges further away. This battle was an unmitigated disaster for the British army. No ground was won and no tactical advantage gained. It is doubted if it had the slightest positive effect on assisting the main French attack 15 miles (24 km) to the south. The battle was renewed slightly to the south, from 15 May as the Battle of Festubert. In the aftermath of the Aubers Ridge failure, the war correspondent of The Times, Colonel Charles à Court Repington, sent a telegram to his newspaper highlighting the lack of high-explosive shells, using information supplied by Sir John French; The Times headline on 14 May 1915 was: "Need for shells: British attacks checked: Limited supply the cause: A Lesson From France". This precipitated a political scandal known as the Shell Crisis of 1915. The German Official Historians of the Reichsarchiv recorded c. 102,500 French casualties from 9 May – 18 June, 32,000 British casualties and 73,072 German casualties for the operations of the Second Battle of Artois. The British Official Historian, J. E. Edmonds recorded British casualties as 11,619 men. Edmonds wrote that the German Official History made little reference to the battle but in 1939 G. C. Wynne wrote that Infantry Regiment 55 had 602 casualties and Infantry Regiment 57 lost 300 casualties. The Battle of Festubert (15–25 May 1915) was an attack by the British army in the Artois region of France on the western front during World War I. The offensive formed part of a series of attacks by the French Tenth Army and the British First Army in the Second Battle of Artois (3 May – 18 June 1915). After the failure of the attempted breakthrough by the First Army in the attack at Aubers Ridge (9 May 1915) tactics of a short hurricane bombardment and an infantry advance with unlimited objectives, were replaced by the French practice of slow and deliberate artillery-fire intended to prepare the way for an infantry attack. A continuous three-day bombardment by the British heavy artillery was planned, to cut wire and demolish German machine-gun posts and infantry strong-points. The German defences were to be captured by a continuous attack, by one division from Rue du Bois to Chocolat Menier Corner and by a second division 600 yards (550 m) north, which was to capture the German trenches to the left of Festubert. The objectives were 1,000 yards (910 m) forward, rather than the 3,000 yards (2,700 m) depth of advance intended at Aubers Ridge. The battle was the first British attempt at attrition. Festubert フェステュベール

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On 25 June, Erich Ludendorff, the First Quartermaster General, suggested to Crown Prince Rupprecht that Group Ypres should withdraw to the Wilhelm Stellung, leaving only outposts in the Albrecht Stellung. On 30 June, the army group Chief of Staff, General von Kuhl, suggested a withdrawal to the Flandern I Stellung along Passchendaele ridge, meeting the old front line in the north near Langemarck and close to Armentières in the south. Such a withdrawal would avoid a hasty retreat from Pilckem Ridge and force the British into a time-consuming redeployment. Lossberg disagreed, believing that the British would launch a broad front offensive, that the ground east of the Sehnen line was easy to defend, that the Menin road ridge could be held, if it was made the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) of the German defensive effort. Pilckem Ridge deprived the British of ground observation over the Steenbeek Valley, while the Germans could see the area from Passchendaele Ridge, allowing German infantry to be supported by observed artillery fire. Lossberg's judgement was accepted and no withdrawal was made. Main article: Battle of Messines (1917) The first stage in the British plan was a preparatory attack on the German positions south of Ypres at Messines Ridge. The German positions had observation over Ypres and unless captured, would enable observed enfilade artillery-fire against a British attack eastwards from the salient. Since mid-1915, the British had been covertly digging mines under the German positions on the ridge. By June 1917, 21 mines had been filled with nearly 1,000,000 long tons (1,000,000 t) of explosives. The Germans knew the British were mining and had taken some counter-measures but they were taken by surprise at the extent of the British effort. Two of the mines failed to detonate but 19 went off on 7 June, at 3:10 a.m. British Summer Time. The final objectives were largely gained before dark and the British had fewer losses than expected, the plan having provided for up to 50 percent in the initial attack. Battle of Messines (1917) 　メセンの戦い

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Wire-cutting began on 21 May and an extra two days were added to the bombardment for more counter-battery fire. The main bombardment began on 31 May, with only one day of poor weather before the attack. Two flights of each observation squadron concentrated on counter-battery observation and one became a "bombardment flight", working with particular artillery '"bombardment groups" for wire-cutting and trench-destruction; these flights became "contact-patrol flights" intended to observe the positions of British troops once the assault began. The attack barrage was rehearsed on 3 June to allow British air observers to plot masked German batteries, which mainly remained hidden but many minor flaws in the British barrage were reported. A repeat performance on 5 June induced a larger number of hidden German batteries to reveal themselves. The 25th Division made its preparations on a front from the Wulverghem–Messines road to the Wulverghem–Wytschaete road, facing 1,200 yards (1,100 m) of the German front line, which tapered to the final objective 700 yards (640 m) wide at the near crest of the ridge, 3,000 yards (2,700 m) distant, behind nine German defensive lines. The advance would begin up a short rise to the near edge of the Steenbeek Valley, then up the steep rise from the valley floor between Hell and Sloping Roof Farms to Four Huns, Chest and Middle Farms on the main ridge, with Lumm Farm on the left flank of the objective. Artillery emplacements for the 25th divisional artillery and 112th Army Field Brigade were built and the Guards Division field artillery was placed in concealed forward positions. Road making and the construction of dug-outs and communication trenches took place between 12–30 April and between 11 May – 6 June.

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In 2007 Sheldon gave 22,988 casualties for the German 4th Army from 1–10 June 1917. At 3:00 a.m. on 8 June, the British attack to regain the Oosttaverne line from the river Douve to the Warneton road found few German garrisons as it was occupied. German artillery south of the Lys, heavily bombarded the southern slopes of the ridge and caused considerable losses among Anzac troops pinned there. Ignorance of the situation north of the Warneton road continued; a reserve battalion was sent to reinforce the 49th Australian Battalion near the Blauwepoortbeek for the 3:00 a.m. attack, which did not take place. The 4th Australian Division commander, Major-General William Holmes, went forward at 4:00 a.m. and finally clarified the situation. New orders instructed the 33rd Brigade (11th Division) to side-step to the right and relieve the 52nd Australian Battalion, which at dusk would move to the south and join the 49th Australian Battalion for the attack into the gap at the Blauwepoortbeek. All went well until observers on the ridge saw the 52nd Australian Battalion withdrawing, mistook it for a German counter-attack and called for an SOS bombardment. German observers in the valley saw troops from the 33rd Brigade moving into the area to relieve the Australian battalion, mistook them for an attacking force and also called for an SOS bombardment. The area was deluged with artillery fire from both sides for two hours, causing many casualties and the attack was postponed until 9 June. Confusion had been caused by the original attacking divisions on the ridge, having control over the artillery which covered the area occupied by the reserve divisions down the eastern slope. The arrangement had been intended to protect the ridge from large German counter-attacks, which might force the reserve divisions back up the slope.

攻撃部隊の補充と新たな防御ラインの構築

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攻撃部隊の補充と新たな防御ラインの構築

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

お礼 2017/04/26 22:04

関連するQ&A

日本語訳をお願いいたします。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語に翻訳してください。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

日本語訳をお願いいたします。

英文を訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

下記の英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文翻訳をお願いします。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

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