Unyielding Defence vs Defence of Positions - A Shift in Tactics| OKWAVE

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In a new manual of 1 December 1916, Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg (Principles of Command for Defensive Battle), the policy of unyielding defence of ground regardless of its tactical value, was replaced by the defence of positions suitable for artillery observation and communication with the rear, where an attacking force would "fight itself to a standstill and use up its resources while the defenders conserve their strength". Defending infantry would fight in areas, with the front divisions in an outpost zone up to 3,000 yards (2,700 m) deep behind listening posts, with the main line of resistance placed on a reverse slope, in front of artillery observation posts, which were kept far enough back to retain observation over the outpost zone. Behind the main line of resistance was a Grosskampfzone (battle zone), a second defensive area 1,500–2,500 yards (1,400–2,300 m) deep, also sited as far as possible on ground hidden from enemy observation, while in view of German artillery observers. A rückwärtige Kampfzone (rear battle zone) further back was to be occupied by the reserve battalion of each regiment.

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Where the lay of the land gave observation from behind the system, it was built on reverse slopes (a Hinterhangstellung), with a short field of fire for the infantry, according to the experience of the Western Front defensive battles of 1915 and 1916, when forward-slope positions had been smashed by observed Franco-British artillery-fire. In much of the new position, the new principles of reverse-slope positions with artillery-observation posts to the rear was not followed. Artillery observation posts were built in the front-trench system or in front of it. Trenches had been dug near a crest, on a forward slope or at the rear of a reverse slope, which replicated the obsolete positions being abandoned. The 1st Army commander, General von Below, and his Chief of Staff Colonel von Lossberg rejected this layout since smoke and dust would make artillery observation from such positions impossible.

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Steel-reinforced concrete dug-outs for infantry squads and artillery-observation posts were standard designs and all woodwork was made to a pattern. The line was 90 miles (140 km) long and built for a garrison of twenty divisions, one every 4.5 miles (7.2 km). Telephone cables were deeply buried and light railways built to carry supplies to the defences. The position had two trenches about 200 yards (180 m) apart, with sentry garrisons to occupy the front trench. The main line of defence was the second line, which was equipped with dug-outs for most of the front garrison. Fields of barbed-wire up to 100 yards (91 m) deep, were fixed with screw pickets in three belts 10–15 yards (9.1–13.7 m) wide and 5 yards (4.6 m) apart, in a zig-zag so that machine-guns could sweep the sides placed in front of the trench system. Artillery observation posts and machine-gun nests were built in front of and behind the trench lines.

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Command of areas rather than units was also introduced in divisions, with command of regiments devolved to the front battalion commander (Kampftruppenkommandeur), which reduced the chain of command from five to two posts. The value of ground was to be determined by its importance to a defensive position. Where the lay of the land gave the defender a tactical advantage, by which an attacker could be defeated with the minimum of casualties to the defenders, with small-arms fire from dispersed, disguised positions and observed artillery-fire, it was to be fought for by the garrison and local reserves, which would counter-attack to regain any ground lost. The changes were codified in a training manual Grundsätze für die Führung in der Abwehrschlacht (The Conduct of the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare) issued on 1 December 1916, which made infantry sections (Gruppen) rather than the battalion the basic tactical unit.

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The advance was to be by bounds to objective lines behind a creeping barrage moving at 90 m (98 yd) every four minutes, with pauses to make sure that the French barrage kept pace with the British barrage. The first objective was the two German lines east of the Yser Canal and the second objective was the German third line. A total advance of 5,000 yards (4,600 m) to the red line was not fundamental to the plan, being an attempt to provide enough discretion to the divisional commanders to make local advances without the need to request permission, based on the extent of local German resistance, in accordance with the manual SS 135. This was intended to avoid situations that had occurred in previous offensives, when vacant ground had not been promptly occupied and had then to be fought for in later attacks. Had the German defence collapsed and the red line been reached, the German Flandern I, II and III Stellungen would have been intact, except for Flandern I Stellung for a mile south of Broodseinde. On 10 August, II Corps was required to reach the black line of 31 July, an advance of 400–900 yards (370–820 m) and at the Battle of Langemarck on 16 August, the Fifth Army was to advance 1,500 yards (1,400 m). The German 4th Army operation order for the defensive battle was issued on 27 June. The German 4th Army had about 600 aircraft of the Luftstreitkräfte, 200 being single-seat fighters; eventually eighty German air units operated over the Flanders front. German defences had been arranged as a forward zone, main battle zone and rearward battle zone. The defence in depth began with a front system of three breastworks each about 200 yards (180 m) apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion, with listening-posts in no man's land. About 2,000 yards (1,800 m) behind these works was the Albrecht Stellung (second line), a secondary or artillery protective line that marked the rear boundary of the forward zone.

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Allgemeines über Stellungsbau (Principles of Field Fortification) was published in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone (Vorpostenfeld) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front. Sentries could retreat to larger positions (Gruppennester) held by Stosstrupps (five men and an NCO per Trupp), who would join the sentries to recapture sentry-posts by immediate counter-attack. Defensive procedures in the battle zone were similar but with greater numbers. The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of the battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to Gegenstoss in der Stellung (immediate counter-attack within the position). Such a decentralised battle by large numbers of small infantry detachments would present the attacker with unforeseen obstructions. Resistance from troops equipped with automatic weapons, supported by observed artillery fire, would increase the further the advance progressed.

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Allgemeines über Stellungsbau (Principles of Field Fortification) was published in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone (Vorpostenfeld) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front. Sentries could retreat to larger positions (Gruppennester) held by Stosstrupps (five men and an NCO per Trupp), who would join the sentries to recapture sentry-posts by immediate counter-attack. Defensive procedures in the battle zone were similar but with greater numbers. The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of the battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to Gegenstoss in der Stellung (immediate counter-attack within the position). Such a decentralised battle by large numbers of small infantry detachments would present the attacker with unforeseen obstructions. Resistance from troops equipped with automatic weapons, supported by observed artillery fire, would increase the further the advance progressed. A school was opened in January 1917 to teach infantry commanders the new methods.

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A British outpost in the Meisennest, 500 metres (550 yd) from St. Pierre Divion, in the German front line near Thiepval, was attacked by units drawn from three German regiments, after a short artillery bombardment and recaptured. German losses were severe, as the second position had few deep dug-outs and Anglo-French artillery-fire was directed with great accuracy by observers in artillery-observation aircraft. Communication with the front-line was cut and Gruppe von Stein did not know if the line between Contalmaison and Pozières was still held; a counter-attack by two regiments was postponed.

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A second battalion advanced through the wood, lost direction and stumbled on German posts in Central Trench, until about 150 survivors reached the eastern edge of the wood south of the Guillemont track, thinking that they were at the northern tip of the wood. Attempts to advance north in daylight failed and an attack from Longueval Alley by a third battalion, was stopped by massed small-arms and artillery-fire 100 yards (91 m) short of the wood and the battalion withdrew, apart from a small party, which bombed up the alley to the tip of the wood. With three hours before the big attack on the German second position began, the 54th Brigade was ordered to attack before dawn, to take the eastern fringe of the wood as a defensive flank for the 9th Division, as it attacked Longueval.

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With the ground still frozen, assembly trenches could not be dug, so it was decided that the troops would assemble in the open for the attack. The artillery of II Corps began a destructive and wire-cutting bombardment on 14 February, using the new fuze 106 against the German wire, which proved an effective wire-cutter, although fog and mist made aiming and observation of the results difficult. At zero hour, four siege groups were to begin a bombardment of rear lines and machine-gun nests and four counter-battery groups were to neutralise German artillery within range of the attack. Artillery tactics were based on the experience of 1916, with a creeping barrage fired by half of the 18-pounders, beginning 200 yards (180 m) in front of the infantry and moving at 100 yards (91 m) in three minutes.

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Companies of the support battalions were located at the back of the forward zone with half in the pillboxes of the Albrecht Stellung. Dispersed in front of the Albrecht Stellung were divisional sharpshooter machine-gun nests. The Albrecht Stellung marked the front of the main zone with the Wilhelm Stellung (third line), located a further 2,000 yards (1,800 m) away, marking the rear of the main zone. This zone contained most of the field artillery supporting the front divisions. In pillboxes of the Wilhelm Stellung were reserve battalions of the front-line regiments in divisional reserve. The rearward zone, located between the Wilhelm Stellung and the Flandern I Stellung, contained the support and reserve assembly areas for the Eingreif divisions. The German failures at the Battle of Verdun in December 1916 and at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 had given more importance to these areas, since the forward zones had been overrun and the garrisons lost. It was anticipated that the main defensive engagement would take place in the main battle zone, against attackers who had been slowed and depleted by the forward garrisons, reinforced if need be by the Eingreif divisions. The Germans planned a rigid defence of the front system and forward zone supported by counter-attacks. Local withdrawals according to the concept of elastic defence, was rejected by Lossberg the new 4th Army Chief of Staff, who believed that they would disorganise troops moving forward to counter-attack. Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters, which were man traps but evacuate them as soon as the battle began and move forward and to the flanks to avoid British fire and to counter-attack. A small number of machine-gun nests and permanent garrisons were separate from the counter-attack organisation, to provide a framework for the re-establishment of defence in depth once an attack had been repulsed. German infantry equipment had recently been improved by the arrival of thirty-six MG08/15 machine-guns per regiment, which gave German units more means for fire and manoeuvre.

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Operations to increase British infantry losses in line with the instructions of 22 September were to continue. Gas bombardments of forward British infantry and artillery positions, were to be increased whenever the winds allowed. Every effort was to be made to induce the British to reinforce their forward positions, where the German artillery could engage them.　 Between 26 September and 3 October, the Germans attacked at least 24 times.　 Operation Hohensturm, a bigger German methodical counter-attack, intended to recapture the area around Zonnebeke was planned for 4 October. Battle of the Menin Road Ridge Wounded men at the side of a road after the Battle of Menin Road The British plan for the battle fought from 20–25 September, included more emphasis on the use of heavy and medium artillery to destroy German concrete pill-boxes and machine-gun nests, which were more numerous in the battle zones being attacked and to engage in more counter-battery fire. The British had 575 heavy and medium and 720 field guns and howitzers, having more than doubled the quantity of artillery available at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge.　Aircraft were to be used for systematic air observation of German troop movements, to avoid the failures of previous battles, where too few aircraft crews had been burdened with too many duties and had flown in bad weather.　 On 20 September, the Allies attacked on a 14,500 yards (13,300 m) front and captured most of their objectives, to a depth of about 1,500 yards (1,400 m) by mid-morning.　The Germans made many counter-attacks, beginning around 3:00 p.m. until early evening, all of which failed to gain ground or made only a temporary penetration of the new British positions. The German defence had failed to stop a well-prepared attack made in good weather.　 Minor attacks took place after 20 September, as both sides jockeyed for position and reorganised their defences. A mutually-costly attack by the Germans on 25 September, recaptured pillboxes at the south western end of Polygon Wood. Next day, the German positions near the wood were swept away in the Battle of Polygon Wood. Battle of Polygon Wood ポリゴンの森の戦い

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The German began preparing for the attack during April, placing about 7,400 gas cylinders along a 3-kilometre (1.9 mi) front from Cité St. Elie to Loos, where no man's land had been only 120–300 yards (110–270 m) apart since the Battle of Loos (25 September – 14 October 1915). German artillery began a systematic bombardment of British observation posts, supply points and communication trenches, supplemented by trench mortar and rifle grenade fire. Shelling diminished from 24–25 April and on 26 April, the positions of the British 16th Division were bombarded and the 12th Division front was raided. The next day was fine and warm, with a wind blowing towards the British lines.The 4th Bavarian Division was to follow up a gas attack on 27 April with patrols against the British positions.

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A second breastwork Wohngraben begun as part of a general strengthening of the Western Front earlier in the year, about 200 yards (180 m) behind the front line was nearly finished. The Wohngraben had dug-outs underneath to accommodate 20–30 men and was connected to the front breastwork by communication trenches. Close to the front the communication trenches were solidly built, with concrete shelters and were ready to be used as flanking trenches in the event of a breakthrough. The second line of defence was far enough back from the front line for shells falling on one not to affect the other and the front breastwork became a line of sentry-posts and the second the accommodation for the main garrison, which was to move forward during an attack to hold the front line at all costs. Further back about 700–1,000 yards (640–910 m) from the front breastwork, a line of concrete machine-gun posts known as Stützpunktlinie had been built about 1,000 yards (910 m) apart, as rallying points for the infantry if an attack broke through the front position. Opposite Rue du Bois were emplacements at La Tourelle, Ferme du Bois (Apfelhof) and Ferme Cour d'Avoué (Wasserburg). Battalion frontages were held by two companies of about 280 men on a frontage of 800–1,000 yards (730–910 m), with one company in support 2,000 yards (1,800 m) to the rear and the fourth company in reserve another 2,000–4,000 yards (1,800–3,700 m) back. The new communication trenches were arranged so that the support companies could easily block a break-in from the flanks; most of the field artillery of 6–12 four-gun field batteries and several heavy batteries in each division, were on Aubers Ridge 2,500–4,000 yards (2,300–3,700 m) behind the front line, between Lorgies and Gravelin. A second line of gun positions between La Cliqueterie Farm, Bas Vailly, Le Willy and Gravelin about 2,500 yards (2,300 m) behind the forward battery positions had been built so that the guns could be moved back temporarily, until enough reinforcements had arrived from Lille and La Bassée to counter-attack and reoccupy the front line. Intelligence about the newly strengthened German positions was not available or given insufficient attention where known. No surprise was achieved because the British bombardment was wholly insufficient to break the German wire and breastwork defences or knock out the German front-line machine-guns. German artillery and free movement of reserves were also insufficiently suppressed. Trench layout, traffic flows and organisation behind the British front line did not allow for easy movement of reinforcements and casualties. British artillery equipment and ammunition were in poor condition: the first through over-use, the second through faulty manufacture. It soon became impossible to tell where British troops were; accurate artillery fire was impossible.

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The British line was held by posts about 30 yards (27 m) apart during the day and on 29 November a German raid on an outpost failed. At the end of December, a sudden increase in the number of German prisoners being taken was noticed, partly because a new German division had arrived, partly due to men getting lost in the fog and stumbling into British positions and partly because of an unusual willingness to surrender. Twenty Germans were captured on 1 January, 29 prisoners taken on 2 January and another 50 prisoners were taken during the week, many of whom willingly gave themselves up.

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Visual signalling was used as a substitute for line communications but some short-range (7,000-yard (6,400 m)) wireless transmitters were introduced; weighing 101 pounds (46 kg), needing four men to carry and considerable time to set up, they proved of limited value. Artillery boards came into use, which had blank sheets with a 1:10,000 scale grid in place of maps, datum shooting was used to check gun accuracy from 2–3 times a day and better calibration drills and meteor (weather) telegrams were announced. The tactical role of artillery was defined as, the overpowering of enemy artillery, the killing or incapacitating of enemy infantry and the destruction of defences and other obstacles to movement. Barbed-wire was the most difficult obstruction to tackle and 1,800–2,400 yards (1,600–2,200 m) was the best range for cutting it with 18-pdr field guns (with regular calibration and stable gun platforms), conditions which were not always met.

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On 15 September Generalfeldmarschall Crown Prince Rupprecht, commander of the northern group of armies, was ordered to prepare a rear defensive line and on 23 September work on the new Siegfriedstellung (Hindenburg Line) began. On 21 September, after the battle of Flers–Courcelette (15–22 September), Hindenburg ordered that the Somme front was to have priority in the west for troops and supplies. By the end of the Battle of Morval (25–28 September) Rupprecht had no reserves left on the Somme front. During September, the Germans sent another thirteen fresh divisions to the British sector and scraped up troops wherever they could be found. The German artillery fired 213 train-loads of field artillery shells and 217 train-loads of heavy ammunition, yet the début of the tank, the defeat at the Battle of Thiepval (26–28 September) and the number of casualties (September was the costliest month of the battle for the German armies) had been severe blows to German morale.

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The German army had begun 1916 equally well-provided for in artillery and ammunition, massing 8.5 million field and 2.7 million heavy artillery shells for the beginning of the Battle of Verdun but four million rounds were fired in the first fortnight and the 5th Army needed about 34 ammunition trains a day to continue the battle. The Battle of the Somme further reduced the German reserve of ammunition and when the infantry was forced out of the front position, the need for Sperrfeuer (defensive barrages), to compensate for the lack of obstacles, increased. Before the war, Germany had imported nitrates for propellant manufacture and the war could only be continued because of the discovery of the Haber process for the synthesis of nitrates from atmospheric nitrogen but developing the Haber process and building factories to exploit it took time.

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The village of Pozières, on the Albert–Bapaume road, lies atop a ridge approximately in the centre of what was the British sector of the Somme battlefield. Close by the village is the highest point on the battlefield. Pozières was an important German defensive position, the fortified village was an outpost to the second defensive trench system, which had become known to the British as the O.G. Lines. This German second line extended from beyond Mouquet Farm in the north, ran behind Pozières to the east, then south towards the Bazentin ridge and the villages of Bazentin le Petit and Longueval.

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The Kampf battalion usually had three companies in the front system (which had three lines of breastworks called "Ia", "Ib" and "Ic") and one in the Sonne (intermediate) line (with a company of the support battalion, available for immediate counter-attack) between the front system and the Höhen (second) line on the ridge crest. The other three companies of the support battalion sheltered in the Höhen (second) line. About 32 machine-gun posts per regimental sector were dispersed around the defensive zone. The German defence was intended to be mobile and Stosstrupps in "Ic" the third breastwork, were to conduct immediate counter-attacks to recapture "Ia" and "Ib". If they had to fall back, the support battalions would advance to restore the front system, except at Spanbroekmolen Hill, which due to its importance was to be held at all costs (unbedingtes Halten). Aerial photograph of Messines, 2 June 1917. On 8 May, the British preliminary bombardment began and on 23 May became much heavier. The breastworks of the front defences were demolished and concrete shelters on both sides of the ridge were systematically destroyed. Air superiority allowed the British artillery observation aircraft to cruise over the German defences, despite the defensive efforts of Jagdgeschwader 1 (the Richthofen Circus). On 26 May, the German front garrisons were ordered to move forward 50 yards (46 m) into shell-holes in no-man's-land at dawn and return to their shelters at night. When the shelters were destroyed, shell-hole positions were made permanent as were those of the companies further back. Troops in the Höhen (second) line were withdrawn behind the ridge and by the end of May, the front battalions changing every two days instead of every five, due to the effect of the British bombardment.

Unyielding Defence vs Defence of Positions - A Shift in Tactics

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Unyielding Defence vs Defence of Positions - A Shift in Tactics

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