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Allgemeines über Stellungsbau (Principles of Field Fortification) was published in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone (Vorpostenfeld) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front. Sentries could retreat to larger positions (Gruppennester) held by Stosstrupps (five men and an NCO per Trupp), who would join the sentries to recapture sentry-posts by immediate counter-attack. Defensive procedures in the battle zone were similar but with greater numbers. The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of the battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to Gegenstoss in der Stellung (immediate counter-attack within the position). Such a decentralised battle by large numbers of small infantry detachments would present the attacker with unforeseen obstructions. Resistance from troops equipped with automatic weapons, supported by observed artillery fire, would increase the further the advance progressed.

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>Allgemeines über Stellungsbau (Principles of Field Fortification) was published in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone (Vorpostenfeld) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front. Sentries could retreat to larger positions (Gruppennester) held by Stosstrupps (five men and an NCO per Trupp), who would join the sentries to recapture sentry-posts by immediate counter-attack. ⇒「強化陣地の一般原則」(フィールド強化の原則)は、1917年1月に出版されて、4月までには歩哨・衛兵によって保持される前哨地帯(哨戒陣地)が西部戦線に沿って造られていた。(攻撃を受けた場合)歩哨は、数部隊の突撃班(1部隊につき5人の兵士と1人の下士官)によって保持されるより大きな陣地(集団陣地)へ退却することができた。そして、その突撃班は、即時の反撃によって、哨戒陣地を取り戻すために歩哨兵と合流するものとされた。 NCO:Noncommissioned officer「下士官」。 >Defensive procedures in the battle zone were similar but with greater numbers. The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of the battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to Gegenstoss in der Stellung (immediate counter-attack within the position). ⇒交戦地帯の防御手順は、数がより多いことを別にすれば、(我々の場合と)類似している。前線塹壕のシステムは、交戦地帯駐屯軍のための前哨戦線で、(一旦)敵軍の集中砲火から逃れて、それから戦闘地帯や哨戒基地地帯を回復するために反撃することができた。そのような撤退は、連合国軍の砲火砲撃によって維持できなくなったような戦場の幾つかの小部分で、「陣地内の逆襲」(陣地の中の即時の反撃)の前兆として、起こることが予測・構想された。 >Such a decentralised battle by large numbers of small infantry detachments would present the attacker with unforeseen obstructions. Resistance from troops equipped with automatic weapons, supported by observed artillery fire, would increase the further the advance progressed. ⇒多数の小さな歩兵分遣隊によって引き起こされる分散・散発的戦闘が、思いがけない障害を伴う攻撃となって現われることであろう。進軍が進むほどに、守りの砲火で支えられつつ、自動小銃を装備した軍隊からの抵抗が増加することになるだろう。 ※ドイツ語の頻出する文章で、むずかしいです。誤訳があるかも知れませんが、その節はどうぞご容赦ください。

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  • 和訳をお願いします。

    Allgemeines über Stellungsbau (Principles of Field Fortification) was published in January 1917 and by April an outpost zone (Vorpostenfeld) held by sentries, had been built along the Western Front. Sentries could retreat to larger positions (Gruppennester) held by Stosstrupps (five men and an NCO per Trupp), who would join the sentries to recapture sentry-posts by immediate counter-attack. Defensive procedures in the battle zone were similar but with greater numbers. The front trench system was the sentry line for the battle zone garrison, which was allowed to move away from concentrations of enemy fire and then counter-attack to recover the battle and outpost zones; such withdrawals were envisaged as occurring on small parts of the battlefield which had been made untenable by Allied artillery fire, as the prelude to Gegenstoss in der Stellung (immediate counter-attack within the position). Such a decentralised battle by large numbers of small infantry detachments would present the attacker with unforeseen obstructions. Resistance from troops equipped with automatic weapons, supported by observed artillery fire, would increase the further the advance progressed. A school was opened in January 1917 to teach infantry commanders the new methods.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    A school was opened in January 1917 to teach infantry commanders the new methods. Given the Allies' growing superiority in munitions and manpower, attackers might still penetrate to the second (artillery protection) line, leaving in their wake German garrisons isolated in Widerstandsnester, (resistance nests, Widas) still inflicting losses and disorganisation on the attackers. As the attackers tried to capture the Widas and dig in near the German second line, Sturmbattalions and Sturmregimenter of the counter-attack divisions would advance from the rückwärtige Kampfzone into the battle zone, in an immediate counter-attack, (Gegenstoss aus der Tiefe). If the immediate counter-attack failed, the counter-attack divisions would take their time to prepare a methodical attack, provided the lost ground was essential to the retention of the main position. Such methods required large numbers of reserve divisions ready to move to the battlefront. The reserve was obtained by creating 22 divisions by internal reorganisation of the army, bringing divisions from the eastern front and by shortening the western front, in Operation Alberich. By the spring of 1917, the German army in the west had a strategic reserve of 40 divisions.

  • 和訳をお願いします。

    The Battle of Morval, 25–28 September 1916, was an attack during the Battle of the Somme by the British Fourth Army on the villages of Morval, Gueudecourt and Lesbœufs held by the German 1st Army, which had been the final objectives of the Battle of Flers–Courcelette (15–22 September). The main British attack was postponed, to combine with attacks by the French Sixth Army on the village of Combles south of Morval, to close up to the German defences between Moislains and Le Transloy, near the Péronne–Bapaume road (N 17).

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    The increased amount of heavy artillery was to be used to destroy German concrete shelters and machine-gun nests, which were more numerous in German "battle zones", than the "outpost zones" which had been captured in July and August and to engage in more counter-battery fire. Few German concrete pill-boxes and machine gun nests had been destroyed during earlier preparatory bombardments and attempts at precision bombardment between attacks had also failed. The 112 heavy and 210 field guns and howitzers in the Second Army on 31 July, were increased to 575 heavy and medium and 720 field guns and howitzers for the battle, which was equivalent to one artillery piece for every 5 ft (1.5 m) of the attack front and more than double the density in the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. Plumer's tactical refinements sought to undermine the German defence by making a shallower penetration and then fighting the principal battle against German counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions. By further reorganising infantry reserves, Plumer ensured that the depth of the attacking divisions roughly corresponded to the depth of local German counter-attack reserves and their Eingreif divisions. More infantry was provided for the later stages of the advance, to defeat German counter-attacks, by advancing no more than 1,500 yd (1,400 m) before consolidating their position. When the Germans counter-attacked they would encounter a British defence-in-depth, protected by artillery and suffer heavy casualties to little effect, rather than the small and disorganised groups of British infantry that the Germans had driven back to the black line on the XIX Corps front on 31 July. Minor operations During a lull in early September, both sides tried to improve their positions; on 1 September, a determined German attack at Inverness Copse was repulsed. Further north in the XIX Corps area, a battalion of the 61st Division rushed Hill 35 but only took a small area; another attempt on 3 September failed.

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

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