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That day, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 2nd Light Horse Brigades commanded by Edward Chaytor made a reconnaissance in force to Khan Yunis 5 miles (8.0 km) past Rafa. Khan Yunis was held in strength, and the Chaytor's Column withdrew after "a brush" with the defenders. The town was found to be part of a line of strong posts held by the Ottoman Army protecting southern Palestine. Known as the Hans Yonus–El Hafir line, these posts consisted of well-dug trenches. They were located at Shellal, which was a particularly strongly fortified position, at Weli Sheikh Nuran, at Beersheba, and at Khan Yunis. As a consequence of the reconnaissance to Khan Yunis, and the growing strength of EEF units in the area, the Ottoman Army garrisons realised the line was nevertheless too weak to be successfully defended. In February, Enver Pasha, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, and Cemal Pasha withdrew from the line, retiring 14 miles (23 km) northwards.

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>That day, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the 2nd Light Horse Brigades commanded by Edward Chaytor made a reconnaissance in force to Khan Yunis 5 miles (8.0 km) past Rafa. Khan Yunis was held in strength, and the Chaytor's Column withdrew after "a brush" with the defenders. ⇒その日、エドワード・チェーターの指揮するニュージーランド騎馬ライフル隊と第2軽騎馬旅団は、ラファを5マイル(8キロ)通り過ぎたカーン・ユニスに強行偵察をした。チェーターの縦隊は、そのカーン・ユニスを強引に抑え、守備隊との「小ぜりあい」の後、撤退した。 >The town was found to be part of a line of strong posts held by the Ottoman Army protecting southern Palestine. Known as the Hans Yonus–El Hafir line, these posts consisted of well-dug trenches. They were located at Shellal, which was a particularly strongly fortified position, at Weli Sheikh Nuran, at Beersheba, and at Khan Yunis. ⇒その町は、南パレスチナを守るオスマントルコ軍によって保持される強力な哨戒陣地が連なる戦線の一部であると分かった。ハンス・ユヌス-エル・ハフィル戦線として知られるこれらの哨戒陣地は、頑丈に掘られた塹壕群から成っていた。それらは、シェラルというところに位置していたが、それは特別に強く守備を固めた陣地で、ウェリ・シャイフ・ヌラン、ベールシェバ、およびカーン・ユニスなどに(連続して)立地していた。 >As a consequence of the reconnaissance to Khan Yunis, and the growing strength of EEF units in the area, the Ottoman Army garrisons realised the line was nevertheless too weak to be successfully defended. In February, Enver Pasha, Friedrich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, and Cemal Pasha withdrew from the line, retiring 14 miles (23 km) northwards. ⇒それでも、カーン・ユニスへの斥候調査と地域のEEF部隊の増大する軍勢(を目の当たりにして)の結果として、オスマントルコ駐屯軍は、戦線をうまく守るにはあまりに弱いと認識した。(ということで)2月に、エンベル・パシャ、フリードリヒ・フライハー・クレス・フォン・クレッセンシュタイン、およびケマル・パシャらは戦線から撤退して、北方に14マイル(23キロ)退却したのである。

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