• ベストアンサー
  • 困ってます

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

German infantry found that it was easier for the French to endure preparatory bombardments, since French positions tended to be on dominating ground, not always visible and sparsely occupied. As soon as German infantry attacked, the French positions "came to life" and the troops began machine-gun and rapid fire with field artillery. On 22 April, the Germans had suffered 1,000 casualties and in mid-April, the French fired 26,000 field artillery shells during an attack to the south-east of Fort Douaumont. A few days after taking over at Verdun, Pétain told the air commander, Commandant Charles Tricornot de Rose, to sweep away the German air service and to provide observation for the French artillery. German air superiority was challenged and eventually reversed, using eight-aircraft Escadrilles for artillery-observation, counter-battery and tactical support.

共感・応援の気持ちを伝えよう!

  • 回答数1
  • 閲覧数175
  • ありがとう数1

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • 回答No.1
  • Nakay702
  • ベストアンサー率81% (7481/9227)

>German infantry found that it was easier for the French to endure preparatory bombardments, since French positions tended to be on dominating ground, not always visible and sparsely occupied. As soon as German infantry attacked, the French positions "came to life" and the troops began machine-gun and rapid fire with field artillery. On 22 April, the Germans had suffered 1,000 casualties and in mid-April, the French fired 26,000 field artillery shells during an attack to the south-east of Fort Douaumont. ⇒ドイツ歩兵連隊にとっては、フランス軍の陣地が優勢な立地状況にあって、必ずしも目に触れるとは限らず、散在している傾向があるので、フランス軍は予備爆撃に耐えるのがより簡単である、ということが分かった。ドイツ歩兵連隊が攻撃をかけるや否や、フランス軍陣地は「生き返った」、そして軍隊は野戦砲兵隊をもって機関銃と速射砲の砲火を開始した。4月22日、ドイツ軍は1,000人の犠牲者を被り、4月中旬にフランス軍はドゥオモン要塞の南東部に攻撃を仕かけたとき、その間に26,000発の野戦砲の砲弾を発射した。 >A few days after taking over at Verdun, Pétain told the air commander, Commandant Charles Tricornot de Rose, to sweep away the German air service and to provide observation for the French artillery. German air superiority was challenged and eventually reversed, using eight-aircraft Escadrilles* for artillery-observation, counter-battery and tactical support. ⇒ヴェルダンに関わること数日後、ペテーンは、航空隊指揮官、シャルル・トリコルノ・ド・ローズ司令官にドイツ軍の航空軍役隊を一掃して、フランス砲兵隊のために観察結果を提供するようにと言った。彼トリコルノは、戦術支援隊、反撃飛行隊として8機編成のエスカドリル*を使って、ドイツ軍の制空権に挑戦して、結局逆転した。 *エスカドリル:第1次世界大戦時のフランス空軍の飛行中隊(普通は、6機編成)。

共感・感謝の気持ちを伝えよう!

質問者からのお礼

回答ありがとうございました。

関連するQ&A

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    On the left flank of the division, Bethmann-Hollweg Trench to the north-east of Mont Sans Nom, was captured along with six guns, which secured Mont Sans Nom from an attack against the eastern slope. c. 1,100 prisoners, 22 guns, sixty mortars and 47 machine-guns were captured by the Foreign Legion. On 25 April, the 34th Division was relieved by the 19th Division. In the attack of 17 April, the Fourth Army had swiftly reached the crest of the Moronvilliers massif but German observation over the battlefield had enabled accurate German artillery-fire against the French infantry. The attack had been costly, despite fog protecting the French infantry from the fire of some German machine-guns. Tunnels driven through the chalk connected the foremost German positions with the rear. German infantry could fire until the last moment, then retire through them to the northern slopes. French heavy artillery-fire blocked some tunnels, subways, deep dugouts and caverns, entombing German troops and others were overrun and captured. As the French infantry encountered the German reverse-slope defences, fatigue, losses and the relatively undamaged state of the German positions, stopped the French advance. Possession of the crest was a substantial tactical advantage for the French, which denied the Germans observation to the south.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    In June 1916, the amount of French artillery at Verdun had been increased to 2,708 guns, including 1,138 × 75 mm field guns; the French and German armies fired c. 10,000,000 shells, with a weight of 1,350,000 long tons (1,370,000 t) from February–December. The German offensive had been contained by French reinforcements, difficulties of terrain and the weather by May, with the 5th Army infantry stuck in tactically dangerous positions, overlooked by the French on the east bank and the west bank, instead of secure on the Meuse Heights. Attrition of the French forces was inflicted by constant infantry attacks, which were vastly more costly than waiting for French counter-attacks and defeating them with artillery. The stalemate was broken by the Brusilov Offensive and the Anglo-French relief offensive on the Somme, which had been expected to lead to the collapse of the Anglo-French armies.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    As darkness fell and being under the impression that all the Australians had retired, New Zealand artillery observers called for the barrage to be brought closer to the observation line, when they feared a German counter-attack. The bombardment fell on the rest of the Australians, who withdrew with many casualties, leaving the southern part of the Oosttaverne line unoccupied, as well as the gap around the Blauwepoortbeek. An SOS barrage on the IX Corps front stopped a German counter-attack from the Roozebeke valley but many shells fell short, precipitating another informal withdrawal. Rumour led to the barrage being moved closer to the observation line, which added to British casualties until 10:00 p.m., when the infantry managed to get the artillery stopped and were then able to re-occupy the positions. Operations to re-take the Oosttaverne line in the II Anzac Corps area started at 3:00 a.m. on 8 June.[93As the infantry moved to the attack contact-patrol aircraft flew low overhead, two being maintained over each corps during the day. The observers were easily able to plot the positions of experienced troops, who lit flares and waved anything to attract attention. Some troops, poorly trained and inexperienced, failed to co-operate, fearing exposure to the Germans so aircraft flew dangerously low to identify them, four being shot down in consequence. Although air observation was not as vital to German operations because of their control of commanding ground, the speed by which reports from air observation could be delivered, made it a most valuable form of liaison between the front line and higher commanders. German infantry proved as reluctant to reveal themselves as the British so German flyers also had to make visual identifications. Reports and maps were dropped at divisional headquarters and corps report centres, allowing the progress of the infantry to be followed.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    4 July was rainy, with low cloud and no German aircraft were seen by British aircrew, who flew low over the German lines, on artillery-observation sorties. In the evening, a large column of German troops was seen near Bazentin le Grand and machine-gunned from the air and the British advance to the southern fringe of Contalmaison was observed and reported. On 6 July, German positions near Mametz Wood and Quadrangle Support Trench were reconnoitred by a 3 Squadron crew, which reported that the defences of Mametz Wood were intact. On 6 July, a 9 Squadron observer saw infantry and transport near Guillemont and directed the fire of a heavy battery on the column, which inflicted many casualties; a German infantry unit entering Ginchy was machine-gunned and forced to disperse.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    After the defeats of 20 May, the Germans counter-attacked the next day and were repulsed. On 23 May, an assault on Mont Haut was stopped by artillery-fire and on 25 May, the French took more ground on both sides of Mont Cornillet and took 120 prisoners. At dawn on 2 May, German attacks began at Le Téton and the French positions further east and gained temporary footholds in the French positions, before counter-attacks forced the German infantry back. In the afternoon, a German attack on the summit of Le Casque and more attacks at dusk on Le Casque and Le Téton failed, as did an attempt at dawn on 28 May; a raid against the French on Mont Blond and a fresh attack on Mont Blond on 30 May, also failed. After a gas bombardment on Mont Blond and the French lines north-west of Aubérive, German infantry attacked again at 2:00 a.m. on 31 May, at Mont Haut, Le Casque and Le Téton. The German attacks continued all day and were eventually defeated in hand-to-hand fighting; some advanced posts north-east of Mont Haut were captured, until French counter-attacks managed to push the Germans back. By 3 June, Army Group German Crown Prince had recovered hardly any ground lost from 16 April – 20 May on the Aisne front and on the Moronvilliers Heights. German counter-attacks had mostly been costly failures and from 16 April – 2 June, the Franco-British had taken c. 52,000 prisoners, 440 heavy and field guns, many trench mortars and more than 1,000 machine-guns.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Although the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) entered the Battle with inferior aircraft to the Luftstreitkräfte, this did not deter their commander, General Trenchard, from adopting an offensive posture. Dominance of the air over Arras was essential for reconnaissance and the British carried out many aerial patrols. Trenchard's aircraft, acting in support of ground forces, carried out artillery spotting, photography of trench systems and bombing. The reconnaissance activities were coordinated by the 1st Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers. Aerial observation was hazardous work as, for best results, the aircraft had to fly at slow speeds and low altitude over the German defences. It became even more dangerous with the arrival of the "Red Baron", Manfred von Richthofen, with his highly experienced and better-equipped Jagdgeschwader 1 (JG 1, Richthofen's Flying Circus) in March 1917. The presence of JG 1 led to sharply increased losses of Allied pilots and April 1917, that became known as Bloody April. A German infantry officer later wrote,

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    200 troops were stationed around the town, 1,000 were kept as a mobile reserve to the west while another 1,000 were kept in reserve on the other side of a mountain. On 7 September 1916, the 3rd Infantry Division conducted a frontal assault on the defensive positions of the Schutztruppen. German Field Artillery and 4.1 inch (100 mm) guns, salvaged from the SMS Koenigsberg, blasted the South African formations. The 1st Mounted Brigade attempted to maneuver around the flank and prepared to assault on the German positions. However, the treacherous terrain, and loss of the radio linking them to 3rd Infantry Division, caused them to arrive on 8 September.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Wire-cutting began on 21 May and an extra two days were added to the bombardment for more counter-battery fire. The main bombardment began on 31 May, with only one day of poor weather before the attack. Two flights of each observation squadron concentrated on counter-battery observation and one became a "bombardment flight", working with particular artillery '"bombardment groups" for wire-cutting and trench-destruction; these flights became "contact-patrol flights" intended to observe the positions of British troops once the assault began. The attack barrage was rehearsed on 3 June to allow British air observers to plot masked German batteries, which mainly remained hidden but many minor flaws in the British barrage were reported. A repeat performance on 5 June induced a larger number of hidden German batteries to reveal themselves. The 25th Division made its preparations on a front from the Wulverghem–Messines road to the Wulverghem–Wytschaete road, facing 1,200 yards (1,100 m) of the German front line, which tapered to the final objective 700 yards (640 m) wide at the near crest of the ridge, 3,000 yards (2,700 m) distant, behind nine German defensive lines. The advance would begin up a short rise to the near edge of the Steenbeek Valley, then up the steep rise from the valley floor between Hell and Sloping Roof Farms to Four Huns, Chest and Middle Farms on the main ridge, with Lumm Farm on the left flank of the objective. Artillery emplacements for the 25th divisional artillery and 112th Army Field Brigade were built and the Guards Division field artillery was placed in concealed forward positions. Road making and the construction of dug-outs and communication trenches took place between 12–30 April and between 11 May – 6 June.

  • 日本語訳をお願いいたします。

    The cost of the Nivelle Offensive in casualties and loss of morale were great but German losses were also high and the tactical success of the offensive in capturing elaborately fortified positions and defeating counter-attacks, reduced German morale. The German had been forced from three of the strongest positions on the Western Front and had failed to recapture them. Vimy Ridge, the Scarpe Heights, the caverns, spurs and plateau of the Chemin des Dames and the Moronvilliers massif had been occupied for more than two years, carefully surveyed by German engineers and fortified to make them impregnable. In six weeks all were lost and the Germans were left clinging to the eastern or northern edges of the ridges of the summits, having lost the western or southern sides. The French tactic of assault brutal et continu suited the German defensive dispositions, since much of the new construction had taken place on reverse slopes. The speed of attack and the depth of the French objectives meant that there was no time to establish artillery observation posts overlooking the Ailette valley, in the areas where French infantry had reached the ridge. The tunnels and caves under the ridge nullified the destructive effect of the French artillery, which was also inhibited by poor weather, which reduced observation and by German air superiority, which made French artillery-observation aircraft even less effective.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Two squadrons were reserved for close air support on the battlefield and low attacks on German airfields. The British planned to advance on a 17,000-yard (16,000 m) front, from St. Yves to Mt. Sorrel east to the Oosttaverne line, a maximum depth of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). Three intermediate objectives to be reached a day at a time became halts, where fresh infantry would leap-frog through to gain the ridge in one day. In the afternoon a further advance down the ridge was to be made. The attack was to be conducted by three corps of the Second Army (General Sir Herbert Plumer): II Anzac Corps in the south-east was to advance 800 yards (730 m), IX Corps in the centre was to attack on a 5,000 yards (4,600 m) front, which would taper to 2,000 yards (1,800 m) at the summit and X Corps in the north had an attack front of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). The corps planned their attacks under the supervision of the army commander, using as guides, the analyses of the Somme operations of 1916 and successful features of the attack at Arras on 9 April. Great care was taken in the planning of counter-battery fire, the artillery barrage time-table and machine-gun barrages. German artillery positions and the second (Höhen) line were not visible to British ground observers. For observation over the rear slopes of the ridge, 300 aircraft were concentrated in II Brigade RFC and eight balloons of II Kite Balloon Wing were placed 3,000–5,000 feet (910–1,520 m) behind the British front line. The Second Army artillery commander, Major-General George Franks, co-ordinated the corps artillery plans, particularly the heavy artillery arrangements to suppress German artillery, which were devised by the corps and divisional artillery commanders.