German Strategy: Offensive against France and Defensive against Russia
- The German strategy prioritized offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891.
- The plan was to bypass French fortifications by attacking on the northern flank through Belgium.
- The goal was to obtain a decisive victory by enveloping the French armies and pressing them back.
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英文翻訳をお願いします。
German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906 devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications, with an offensive on the northern flank which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899 such a manoeuvre was intended to rapidly pass through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants to the plan, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium and attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on the left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated or the manoeuvre from the north would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.
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ドイツ軍の戦略は、1891年以降フランスに対しては攻撃作戦を優先し、ロシアに対しては防衛を優先した。ドイツ軍の計画は、数的劣勢、移動と集結の速度、および近代兵器の膨大な増加の影響などによって決定づけられた。特にフランス軍とロシア軍が、ドイツとの前線で防備を現代化したあとは、ドイツ軍にとって正面からの攻撃は高コストになって長引きがちとなり、限定的な戦果しかあげられない状況に至った。 1891–1906年（在任）の、ドイツ帝国総司令官（Oberste Heeresleitung OHL参謀統帥）アルフレッド・フォン・シュリーフェンは、フランス軍の防備前線を避け、地域の数的優勢があって迅速かつ決定的な勝利を得られそうな北部側面を攻撃する計画を考案した。1898–1899年、迅速にアントワープ・ナミュール間のベルギーを通り抜けて、北からパリを脅かすような作戦行動を企てたのである。 1906年、青年ヘルムート・フォン・モルトケがシュリーフェンの跡を継いだが、フランスがドイツの推測どおりになるかどうか定かでなかった。モルトケは、布陣と集結の計画を勘案して、「ヴェステア」（西部戦線軍）での動員が予定されている約1,700,000人の兵士から数個師団をフランス前線に対峙する左翼に適宜追加することによって、中央部への突撃攻撃、または両側面からの包囲攻撃をやりくりすることにした。 ドイツ軍の主要部隊はさらにベルギーを通って進軍し、フランス南部を攻撃するものとすれば、フランス軍は左翼側で包囲されて、ミューズ、エーン、ソンム、オアーズ、マルヌ、セーヌに推し戻され、中央フランスに撤退することはできなくなるだろう。フランス軍は大打撃を受けるか、北からの作戦行動が、中央部またはロレーヌの共通境界線におけるドイツ軍勝利の条件を生み出すはずである。
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- kuronekofan
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一点補足です。 「青年ヘルムート・フォン・モルトケ」 は、「ヘルムート・フォン・モルトケ(小モルトケ)」。 作家の 大デュマ、小デュマのような意味合いだと思いました。
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- 英文翻訳をお願いします。
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. German strategy would need to become more opportunistic and Moltke modified German plans to make them less rigid to enable this, making the offensives of 1914 the opening moves of what was expected to be a long war with no certainty of victory. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men expected to be mobilised in the Westheer (western army). The main German force would still advance through Belgium and attack southwards into France and the French armies would be enveloped on the left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated or the manoeuvre from the north would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine.
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German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906, devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications with an offensive on the northern flank, which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899, such a manoeuvre was intended to pass swiftly through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.
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Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.
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German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906, devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications with an offensive on the northern flank, which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899, such a manoeuvre was intended to pass swiftly through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north.
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- 英語
- 日本語訳をお願いいたします。
From his assessment of French defensive capability Schlieffen concluded that the German army would need at least 48.5 corps to succeed with an attack on France by way of Belgium, but Moltke planned to attack through Belgium with just 34 corps at his disposal in the west. The Schlieffen plan [sic] amounts to a critique of German strategy in 1914 since it clearly predicted the failure of Moltke’s underpowered invasion of France. [...] Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any further along these lines.
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Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung OHL) from 1891–1906 devised a number of plans that called for winning a decisive battle against the French army in Germany, Belgium or France as the war-situation required. Aufmarsch I West was a contingency plan for a Franco-German war, in which France (due to fewer numbers) would be on the defensive and Germany would attack by invading Belgium between Antwerp and Namur and then advancing south to breach the Verdun–Marne–Paris defensive area. German forces would then hold there until rail-supply could be restored and sufficient stocks of ammunition and food built up, in preparation for a second offensive operation. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and became convinced that an isolated Franco-German war was impossible and that Italian and Austro-Hungarian forces would not be available to defend the Franco-German border as originally planned. Under Moltke, Aufmarsch I was retired but in 1914 he attempted to apply the offensive strategy of Aufmarsch I to the deployment plan Aufmarsch II and the two-front war it anticipated,
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Joffre set 14 August as the date when the First and Second armies were to invade Lorraine between Toul and Épinal, south of the German fortified area of Metz-Thionville. The First Army was to attack in the south with four corps, towards Sarrebourg 60 kilometres (37 mi) east of Nancy and Donon 25 kilometres (16 mi) south of Sarrebourg. Passes in the Vosges to the south of Donon were to be captured before the main advance began. The Second Army was to attack towards Morhange 45 kilometres (28 mi) north-east of Nancy, with two corps north of the First Army and three advancing successively behind the left flank of the corps to the south, to counter a German attack from Metz. The French offensive was complicated by the two armies diverging as they advanced, on difficult terrain particularly in the south, the combined fronts eventually being 150 kilometres (93 mi) wide. The advances of the First and Second armies were to attract German forces towards the south, while a French manoeuvre took place in Belgium and Luxembourg, to pierce a weak point in the German deployment and then destroy the main German armies.
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Even with the expansion of the German army over the winter and the transfer of divisions from Russia, 154 German divisions the Western Front were confronted by 190 French, British and Belgian divisions, many of which were bigger than the German equivalents. The Wotan–Siegfried–Riegel plan would reduce the front by 13 kilometres (8.1 mi) and need six fewer front-holding divisions, compared to a shortening of 45 kilometres (28 mi) and a saving of 13–14 divisions by withdrawing an average of 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) to the Siegfriedstellung (Hindenburg Line). The German army was far from defeat but in 1916 had been forced back on the Somme and at Verdun, as had the Austro-Hungarian army in southern Russia. At the Chantilly Conference of November 1916 the Allies agreed to mount another general offensive. The Anglo-French contribution was to be a resumption of the Somme offensive with much larger forces, extending the attack north to Arras and south to the Oise, followed by a French attack between Soissons and Rheims.
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The 5th Army would begin a big offensive with limited objectives, to seize the Meuse Heights on the right bank of the river, from which German artillery could dominate the battlefield. By being forced into a counter-offensive against such formidable positions, the French Army would "bleed itself white". As the French were weakened, the British would be forced to launch a hasty relief offensive, which would also be a costly defeat. If such defeats were not enough to force negotiations on the French, a German offensive would mop up the last of the Franco-British armies and break the Entente "once and for all". In a revised instruction to the French army of January 1916, the General Staff had stated that equipment could not be fought by men.
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News that German forces were attacking towards the Meuse bridges south of Namur, led Joffre to expect a German attack from Mézières to Givet, 40 kilometres (25 mi) further north, intended to envelop the French northern flank and another force to try to cross the Meuse from Montmédy to Sedan. On 12 August, Joffre allowed Lanrezac to move the I Corps west to Dinant on the Meuse and on 15 August, Joffre ordered the bulk of the Fifth Army to move north-west behind the Sambre. No large German force was expected to cross to the north of the Meuse, which made the French general staff certain that the German centre was weaker than expected. On 18 August, Joffre directed the Third, Fourth and Fifth armies together with the Belgians and British, to attack the German armies around Thionville and Luxembourg, where 13–15 German corps were thought to have assembled. The Third and Fourth armies were to defeat German forces between Thionville and Bastogne, as they attacked westwards towards Montmédy and Sedan. The Fifth Army was to intercept German forces advancing towards Givet and then the Fourth Army was to swing north and attack the southern flank of the German armies. The Third and Fourth armies would defeat decisively the main German armies in the west and for this, two more corps were added to the four in the Fourth Army, taken from the flanking armies.
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