• ベストアンサー
  • 困ってます

英文を日本語訳して下さい。

All of the units suffered from lack of equipment, including ammunition. There was a shortage of capable officers, and only 120 machine guns in the whole army. The army possessed no field howitzers or heavy artillery. In terms of appearance, the dark-blue uniforms and personal equipment issued to soldiers in 1914 had not changed visibly since 1853.[9] Standards of discipline were frequently lax and Belgian soldiers were often seen as "indisciplined and careless".[9] The army had no coherent doctrine and its had as many as five strategic plans, none of which commanded total support from the High Command. The Belgian army was divided into two, with the majority assigned to the Field Army and lower-quality troops to guard the country's three fortified zones.

共感・応援の気持ちを伝えよう!

  • 回答数1
  • 閲覧数213
  • ありがとう数0

質問者が選んだベストアンサー

  • ベストアンサー
  • 回答No.1
  • Nakay702
  • ベストアンサー率81% (7365/9083)

>All of the units suffered from lack of equipment, including ammunition. There was a shortage of capable officers, and only 120 machine guns in the whole army. The army possessed no field howitzers or heavy artillery. ⇒すべての部隊が、弾薬を含む装備の欠落に悩んでいた。全軍で有能な将校が不足しており、機関銃もわずか120丁しかなかった。軍は、野戦用の榴弾砲*や重砲**を保有していなかった。 *榴弾砲(りゅうだんほう):弾道に軽い湾曲をつけることによって、掩護物の後方にある目標を射撃する。 **重砲:口径の大きい、強大な砲弾の威力をもつ大砲。 >In terms of appearance, the dark-blue uniforms and personal equipment issued to soldiers in 1914 had not changed visibly since 1853.[9] Standards of discipline were frequently lax and Belgian soldiers were often seen as "indisciplined and careless".[9] The army had no coherent doctrine and its had as many as five strategic plans, none of which commanded total support from the High Command. ⇒外観について言えば、1914年に兵士に支給された濃青色の制服と装備品は、見た目では1853年以来変更されていなかった。訓練基準は頻繁に厳格性を欠き、ベルギー兵はしばしば「無規律かつ無頓着」に見られた。軍には首尾一貫した方策がなく、せいぜい5つの戦略計画があるのみだった。しかもそれは、どれ1つとして、最高司令部の全体的支援の下に命じられたものではなかった。 >The Belgian army was divided into two, with the majority assigned to the Field Army and lower-quality troops to guard the country's three fortified zones. ⇒ベルギー軍は、二つに分けられていた。大多数は野戦用の方面軍に割り当てられ、戦力の劣る軍隊は、国内3か所の防備強化地帯の防衛用に配置されていた。

共感・感謝の気持ちを伝えよう!

関連するQ&A

  • 英文翻訳をお願いします。

    The Belgian government ordered a general mobilisation on 31 July 1914. During the early stages of the 1914 campaign, the military had a strength of nearly 220,000 men: 120,500 regular soldiers. 65,000 reservists assigned to fortress units 46,000 militia of the Garde Civique 18,000 new volunteers. All of the units suffered from lack of equipment, including ammunition. There was a shortage of capable officers, and only 120 machine guns in the whole army. The army possessed no field howitzers or heavy artillery. In terms of appearance, the dark-blue uniforms and personal equipment issued to soldiers in 1914 had not changed visibly since 1853. Standards of discipline were frequently lax and Belgian soldiers were often seen as "indisciplined and careless". The army had no coherent doctrine and its had as many as five strategic plans, none of which commanded total support from the High Command. The Belgian army was divided into two, with the majority assigned to the Field Army and lower-quality troops to guard the country's three fortified zones.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    At the outbreak of World War I, the Belgian army was in the middle of a reorganisation. Historically, Belgium had a reputation for neglecting its military. During the 19th century, military reform had been a major political issue as successive governments remained unsure of whether the signatory nations of the 1839 Treaty of London would intervene to guarantee Belgian neutrality if the country were invaded. Belgian politicians were also aware of the rapid expansion of French and German armies during the period. From the 1880s onwards, the Belgian government embarked on an ambitious series of fortress construction but failed to expand or reform the military itself. In 1902, the regular army stood at just 42,800 men with a potential post-mobilisation strength of 180,000.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The Belgian army was to be massed in central Belgium, in front of the National redoubt of Belgium, ready to face any border, while the Fortified Position of Liège and Fortified Position of Namur were left to secure the frontiers. On mobilization, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan, disorganised and poorly trained Belgian soldiers would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader but it would also need fortifications for defence, which were on the frontier. A school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment, in line with French theories of the offensive. Belgian plans became a compromise, in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river, with two divisions further forward at Liège and Namur.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Belgian military planning was based on an assumption, that other powers would eject an invader but the likelihood of a German invasion did not lead to France and Britain being seen as allies or for the Belgian government intending to do more than protect its independence. The Anglo-French Entente (1904) had led the Belgians to perceive that the British attitude to Belgium had changed and that the British would fight to protect Belgian independence. A General Staff was formed in 1910 but the Chef d'État-Major Général de l'Armée, Lieutenant-Général Harry Jungbluth was retired on 30 June 1912 and not replaced until May 1914 by Lieutenant-General Chevalier de Selliers de Moranville who began planning for the concentration of the army and met railway officials on 29 July. Belgian troops were to be massed in central Belgium, in front of the National redoubt of Belgium ready to face any border, while the Fortified Position of Liège and Fortified Position of Namur were left to secure the frontiers. On mobilization, the King became Commander-in-Chief and chose where the army was to concentrate. Amid the disruption of the new rearmament plan the disorganised and poorly trained Belgian soldiers would benefit from a central position to delay contact with an invader but it would also need fortifications for defence, which were on the frontier. A school of thought wanted a return to a frontier deployment in line with French theories of the offensive. Belgian plans became a compromise in which the field army concentrated behind the Gete river with two divisions forward at Liège and Namur.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with "Groups of Reserve Divisions" attached to each army and a Group of Reserve Divisions on each of the extreme flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a map exercise of the German general staff of 1905, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    On 22 August, the 13th Division of the VII Corps, on the right flank of the 2nd Army, encountered British cavalry north of Binche, as the rest of the army to the east began an attack over the Sambre river, against the French Fifth Army. By the evening the bulk of the 1st Army had reached a line from Silly to Thoricourt, Louvignies and Mignault; the III and IV Reserve corps had occupied Brussels and screened Antwerp. Reconnaissance by cavalry and aircraft indicated that the area to the west of the army was free of troops and that British troops were not concentrating around Kortrijk, Lille and Tournai but were thought to be on the left flank of the Fifth Army, from Mons to Maubeuge. Earlier in the day, British cavalry had been reported at Casteau, to the north-east of Mons. A British aeroplane had been seen at Louvain (Leuven) on 20 August and on the afternoon of 22 August, a British aircraft en route from Maubeuge, was shot down by the 5th Division. More reports had reached the IX Corps, that columns were moving from Valenciennes to Mons, which made clear the British deployment but were not passed on to the 1st Army headquarters. Kluck assumed that the subordination of the 1st Army to the 2nd Army had ended, since the passage of the Sambre had been forced. Kluck wished to be certain to envelop the left (west) flank of the opposing forces to the south but was again over-ruled and ordered to advance south, rather than south-west, on 23 August.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Under Plan XVII, the French peacetime army was to form five field armies of c. 2,000,000 men, with groups of Reserve divisions attached to each army and a group of reserve divisions on the flanks. The armies were to concentrate opposite the German frontier around Épinal, Nancy and Verdun–Mezières, with an army in reserve around Ste. Ménéhould and Commercy. Since 1871, railway building had given the French General staff sixteen lines to the German frontier against thirteen available to the German army and the French could wait until German intentions were clear. The French deployment was intended to be ready for a German offensive in Lorraine or through Belgium. It was anticipated that the Germans would use reserve troops but also expected that a large German army would be mobilised on the border with Russia, leaving the western army with sufficient troops only to advance through Belgium, south of the Meuse and the Sambre rivers. French intelligence had obtained a 1905 map exercise of the German general staff, in which German troops had gone no further north than Namur and assumed that plans to besiege Belgian forts were a defensive measure against the Belgian army.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    After clearing Wellington Ridge, the mounted riflemen, light horsemen and infantrymen pressed forward from ridge to ridge without pause. These troops swept down on a body of about 1,000 to 1,500 Ottoman soldiers, who became demoralised. As a result of this attack, a white flag was hoisted and by 05:00 the German and Ottoman soldiers who had stubbornly defended their positions on Wellington Ridge, dominating the camps at Romani, were captured. A total of 1,500 became prisoners in the neighbourhood of Wellington Ridge; 864 soldiers surrendered to infantry in the 8th Scottish Rifles alone, while others were captured by the light horse and mounted rifles regiments.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    Joseph Joffre, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the French army since 1911 and the Minister of War, Adolphe Messimy met on 1 August, to agree that the military conduct of the war should exclusively be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. On 2 August, as small parties of German soldiers crossed the French border, Messimy told Joffre that he had the freedom to order French troops across the German but not the Belgian frontier. Joffre sent warning orders to the covering forces near the frontier, requiring the VII Corps to prepare to advance towards Mühlhausen (French: Mulhouse) to the north-east of Belfort and XX Corps to make ready to begin an offensive towards Nancy. As soon as news arrived that German troops had entered Luxembourg, the Fourth Army was ordered to move between the Third and Fifth armies, ready to attack to the north of Verdun. Operations into Belgium were forbidden, to deny the Germans a pretext until 4 August, when it was certain that German troops had already violated the Belgian border. To comply with the Franco-Russian Alliance, Joffre ordered an invasion of Alsace-Lorraine on for 14 August, although anticipating a German offensive through Belgium.

  • 英文を日本語訳して下さい。

    The British Second Army, with some 275,000 veteran soldiers, entered Germany in late 1918. In March 1919, this force became the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The total number of troops committed to the occupation rapidly dwindled as veteran soldiers were demobilized, and were replaced by inexperienced men who had finished basic training following the cessation of hostilities. By 1920, the BAOR consisted of only 40,594 men and the following year had been further reduced to 12,421. The size of the BAOR fluctuated over the following years, but never rose above 9,000 men. The British did not adhere to all obligated territorial withdrawals as dictated by Versailles, on account of Germany not meeting her own treaty obligations. A complete withdrawal was considered, but rejected in order to maintain a presence to continue acting as a check on French ambitions and prevent the establishment of an autonomous Rhineland Republic. The French Army of the Rhine was initially 250,000 men strong, including at a peak 40,000 African colonial troops (Troupes coloniales). By 1923, the French occupation force had decreased to roughly 130,000 men, including 27,126 African troops. The troop numbers peaked again at 250,000 during the occupation of the Ruhr, before decreasing to 60,000 men by 1926. Germans viewed the use of French colonial troops as a deliberate act of humiliation, and used their presence to create a propaganda campaign dubbed the Black shame. This campaign lasted throughout the 1920s and 30s, although peaked in 1920 and 1921. For example, a 1921 German Government memo detailed 300 acts of violence from colonial troops, which included 65 murders and 170 sexual offenses. Historical consensus is that the charges were exaggerated for political and propaganda purposes, and that the colonial troops behaved far better than their white counterparts. An estimated 500–800 Rhineland Bastards were born as a result of fraternization between colonial troops and German women, and whom would latter be persecuted. The United States Third Army entered Germany with 200,000 men. In June 1919, the Third Army demobilized and by 1920 the US occupation force had been reduced to 15,000 men. Wilson further reduced the garrison to 6,500 men, prior to the inauguration of Warren G. Harding in 1921. On 7 January 1923, after the Franco–Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, the US senate legislated the withdrawal of the remaining force. On 24 January, the American garrison started their withdrawal from the Rhineland, with the final troops leaving in early February.