ベルギー軍の再編と歴史的な弱点

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  • 第一次世界大戦勃発時、ベルギー軍は再編の最中にありました。
  • 19世紀において、ベルギーは軍事を軽視するという評判がありました。
  • 1880年代以降、ベルギー政府は要塞の建設に取り組みましたが、軍自体の拡充や改革には失敗しました。
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英文を日本語訳して下さい。

At the outbreak of World War I, the Belgian army was in the middle of a reorganisation. Historically, Belgium had a reputation for neglecting its military. During the 19th century, military reform had been a major political issue as successive governments remained unsure of whether the signatory nations of the 1839 Treaty of London would intervene to guarantee Belgian neutrality if the country were invaded. Belgian politicians were also aware of the rapid expansion of French and German armies during the period. From the 1880s onwards, the Belgian government embarked on an ambitious series of fortress construction but failed to expand or reform the military itself. In 1902, the regular army stood at just 42,800 men with a potential post-mobilisation strength of 180,000.

  • s4330
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  • Nakay702
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回答No.1

最近、同じ質問に答えましたので、それとほとんど同じですが、 以下のとおりお答えします。 >At the outbreak of World War I, the Belgian army was in the middle of a reorganisation. Historically, Belgium had a reputation for neglecting its military. ⇒第一次世界大戦の勃発時には、ベルギー軍は組織づくりの只中にあった。歴史的に見ると、ベルギーは自国の軍隊を軽んじているという世評があった。 >During the 19th century, military reform had been a major political issue as successive governments remained unsure of whether the signatory nations of the 1839 Treaty of London would intervene to guarantee Belgian neutrality if the country were invaded. ⇒19世紀の間、軍の改革は政府存続に関わる大きな政治問題であった。なぜなら、同国が侵略されるような場合、1839年の「ロンドン条約」の署名国がベルギーの中立を保証するために介入してくれるかどうか、不確実のままだったからである。 >Belgian politicians were also aware of the rapid expansion of French and German armies during the period. From the 1880s onwards, the Belgian government embarked on an ambitious series of fortress construction but failed to expand or reform the military itself. In 1902, the regular army stood at just 42,800 men with a potential post-mobilisation strength of 180,000. ⇒ベルギーの政治家たちは、その時期の間にフランスとドイツの軍事力が急拡張していることにも気づいていた。1880年代から、ベルギー政府は野心的な一連の要塞建設にとりかかったが、軍そのものの改革や拡充は実行しそこなっていた。軍の潜在的な総動員力180,000人のところ、1902年の正規軍はわずかに42.800人だった。

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