Indian Units in World War I: Ill-equipped and Understaffed
- During World War I, Indian units were ill-equipped compared to other British troops and had fewer artillery assigned to them.
- Indian divisions had lighter artillery, more suitable for expeditions along the North-West Frontier.
- The Indian Corps divisions were brought up to date with the latest weaponry during their time in France, but most of this equipment was left behind when they were withdrawn.
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Comparatively, the Indian units were even more ill-equipped for modern war than the rest of troops of Britain's empire. Indian divisions had less artillery assigned to it. At the start of the war, an Indian Division had one brigade of artillery, as opposed to the three assigned to a British European division. What artillery that an Indian division did have was typically lighter, more suited for expeditions along the North-West Frontier. Its troops were deliberately kept a generation behind in infantry weaponry. During their time in France, the Indian Corps divisions had been brought up to date with the latest weaponry, including flare guns and bombs. However, when withdrawn from France, most of this equipment was left behind in France for their replacements to use. To manage the fighting of this ad-hoc unit, Aylmer had almost no staff support. His staff for the relief force, designated as Tigris Corps, consisted of one staff officer, one wounded officer, and one brigadier who had failed to finish the Quetta Staff College. In addition to this staff, his collection of brigades would be under the command of the Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC of the 7th (Meerut) Division, who was without his staff. Just after the new year, Aylmer's ordered his force to move upriver from Ali Gharbi.
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以下のとおりお答えします。原文・訳文（および注）を併記します。 （訳文の流れがいまいちよくありませんが、どうぞ悪しからず。） ＞Comparatively, the Indian units were even more ill-equipped for modern war than the rest of troops of Britain's empire. Indian divisions had less artillery assigned to it. At the start of the war, an Indian Division had one brigade of artillery, as opposed to the three assigned to a British European division. What artillery that an Indian division did have was typically lighter, more suited for expeditions along the North-West Frontier. ⇒インド部隊は、現代的戦争のためにはイギリス帝国の分割現地軍より相対的に装備が貧弱であった。インドの師団がそれに割り当てた大砲は少なかった。戦争開始の時に、インド師団は1個旅団分の砲兵隊を擁していたに過ぎないが、対比的に英国ヨーロッパ師団に割り当てられていたのはその3個体分であった。インド師団が持っていた大砲はすべて、一般に軽便なもので、むしろ北西前線沿いの遠征隊に適していた。 ＞Its troops were deliberately kept a generation behind in infantry weaponry. During their time in France, the Indian Corps divisions had been brought up to date with the latest weaponry, including flare guns and bombs. However, when withdrawn from France, most of this equipment was left behind in France for their replacements to use.⇒その軍（砲兵隊）は意図的に、歩兵武器隊の1段階後を守っていた。インドの軍団がフランスに（遠征して）いた間は、炎銃と爆弾を含む最新の武器を携えていた。しかし、フランスから引き戻される時に、この火器のほとんどは、彼らの交代要員が使用するためにフランス内に残された。 ＞To manage the fighting of this ad-hoc unit, Aylmer had almost no staff support. His staff for the relief force, designated as Tigris Corps, consisted of one staff officer, one wounded officer, and one brigadier who had failed to finish the Quetta Staff College. In addition to this staff, his collection of brigades would be under the command of the Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC* of the 7th (Meerut) Division, who was without his staff. Just after the new year, Aylmer's ordered his force to move upriver from Ali Gharbi. ⇒この特設の（その場限りの）部隊の戦いを管理するために、アイルマーの持つ要員の支援はほとんど皆無だった。彼の救援軍はチグリス隊と称されたが、その要員は1人の参謀将校、1人の負傷将校、およびクェッタ士官大学の修了に失敗した1人の准将から成っていた。この要員に加えて、少将ジョージ・ヤングハズバンド卿の指揮下に彼（アイルマー）の旅団編成隊が入ることになるだろう。この人（ヤングハズバンド）は、第7（メールト）師団のGOC（総指揮官）*なのであるが、彼にとっても他に要員はいなかった。新年を迎えた直後に、アイルマーは己の軍隊にアリ・ガルビから上流へ移動するよう命じた。 ＊GOC：General Officer Commanding「総指揮をとる将官」。
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Comparatively, the Indian units were even more ill-equipped for modern war than the rest of troops of Britain's empire. Indian divisions had less artillery assigned to it. At the start of the war, an Indian Division had one brigade of artillery, as opposed to the three assigned to a British European division. What artillery that an Indian division did have was typically lighter, more suited for expeditions along the North-West Frontier. Its troops were deliberately kept a generation behind in infantry weaponry. During their time in France, the Indian Corps divisions had been brought up to date with the latest weaponry, including flare guns and bombs. However, when withdrawn from France, most of this equipment was left behind in France for their replacements to use. To manage the fighting of this ad-hoc unit, Aylmer had almost no staff support. His staff for the relief force, designated as Tigris Corps, consisted of one staff officer, one wounded officer, and one brigadier who had failed to finish the Quetta Staff College. In addition to this staff, his collection of brigades would be under the command of the Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC of the 7th (Meerut) Division, who was without his staff. Just after the new year, Aylmer's ordered his force to move upriver from Ali Gharbi.
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Not only did Lake lack faith in Aylmer's abilities, Aylmer himself had lost confidence in the abilities of his subordinates. Of his two divisional commanders, Major-General Henry D'Urban Kearny, GOC 3rd (Lahore) Division, and Major-General Sir George Younghusband, GOC 7th (Meerut) Division, neither were detailed to the principal commander for the planned operation. Major-General D'Urban Keary would be assigned to command one of the three columns, the other two being commanded by Major-General George Kemball, one of his brigade commanders. Aylmer made his decision claiming that Kemball was a more energetic commander. Major-General Younghusband, who had been the chief proponent of a desert march to outflank the Ottoman lines entirely, was assigned to command the diversion force on the left bank. Like the British, the Ottoman Sixth Army was also stretched to the limit of logistical support. The lack of any sort of industrial infrastructure (i.e. paved road capable of military transport or railways) made it exceedingly difficult for the Sixth Army to be rapidly reinforced. What the Ottoman army did have going in its favor was time. They had recognized that for the time, they were at the extent of their supply line from Baghdad.
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Downriver from Kut, at Ali Gharbi, Lieutenant-General Fenton Aylmer was collecting forces to relieve the Kut garrison. Initially, the only force available in theatre which were not already in Kut was the 6th Indian Cavalry Brigade and the 35th and 28th Indian Brigades. They would soon be joined by the first elements of the 7th (Meerut) Division. With pressure from both Townshend in Kut and Nixon in Basra, Aylmer succumbed to their demands and began his advance upriver as soon as his he had collected three full brigades of infantry. Setting out on 4 January 1916, Aylmer would be able to commit approximately 9,900 infantry, 1340 cavalry, and 42 field guns. Additionally, along the Tigris there would be four gunboats to support the advance.
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Colonel Khalil Pasha's XIII Corps, composed up of 35th and 52nd Infantry Divisions, moved down river to block any advance by the Tigris Corps. The 52nd Division had arrived in region in time to take part in the Battle of Ctesiphon and the early stages of the siege of Kut. It was a war formed division which originally served in Caucasus region before being rushed to the Mesopotamian theater. The 35th Division, on the other hand, was a pre-war division that had originally been assigned to defend the Basra and Baghdad vilayets. Along with the 38th Division, they had unsuccessfully opposed the I.E.F. "D" initial advances. After suffering heavy casualties, the survivors of the 35th and 38th Divisions had been consolidated into a single division. While this brought the 35th Division up to something close to an effective combat strength, it also brought with it the morale problems which had existed in the 38th Division. The 38th Division had been composed primarily of levies from the Arab and Kurdish populations. Neither group felt any particular attachment to the Ottoman government. Their loyalty was suspect, and discipline was always a problem. Between them, the 35th and 52nd Divisions would be able to muster approximately 9000 infantry, 20 artillery pieces, a brigade of cavalry, as well as a group of mounted Arab irregulars.
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The Third Battle of Krithia (Turkish: Üçüncü Kirte Muharebesi), fought on the Gallipoli peninsula during World War I, was the last in a series of Allied attacks against the Ottoman defences aimed at achieving the original objectives of 25 April 1915. The previous failures in the first and second battles resulted in a less ambitious plan being developed for the attack, but the outcome was another costly failure for the Allies. The allied aim was, as always to facilitate the capture of Alçı Tepe (Achi Baba) which commanded most of the peninsula. By late May, the British contingent on the Cape Helles front at Gallipoli had been expanded to three division and a brigade: the 29th Division (which had made the original landing), the Royal Naval Division (now reinforced to 12 battalions), the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division and the 29th Indian Brigade. On 24 May, the commander of the 29th Division, Major General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was promoted to lieutenant general and given command of the British VIII Corps containing all British units at Helles. Major General Beauvoir De Lisle took over command of the 29th Division. The early battles at Helles had been fought over thinly fortified ground, but by late May two lines of trenches had begun to demarcate the battlefield. The British, in readiness for a new offensive, had been advancing their front line by stealth during the night, eventually gaining half a mile in ground while incurring only slight casualties and placing themselves within striking distance of the Ottoman front line. The French contingent at Helles occupied the right (eastern side) of the line along the Dardanelles shore and astride the Kereves Spur. They were confronted by some of the strongest Ottoman defences, dominated by four redoubts. On 31 May, they managed to capture one of the redoubts but repeated attempts to take Haricot Redoubt failed making any advance on that front without overwhelming artillery support a hazardous proposition. The artillery situation at Helles, as at Anzac Cove, remained perilous. The British had only 78 guns and howitzers and were still short of ammunition. When the battleship HMS Triumph was sunk on 25 May and another battleship—HMS Majestic—sunk on 27 May, both torpedoed, the situation worsened as the naval gunfire support was reduced. Those ships that remained in support could only fire while steaming at 12 kn (14 mph; 22 km/h), which did nothing to aid their accuracy. Hunter-Weston's previous battle plans lacked subtlety or sense, and he had been unerring in his failure. For the latest attempt on Krithia, some elements of refinement had begun to appear in the plans. For one, General Sir Ian Hamilton, the commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, insisted that the objectives should be limited to an advance of 800 yd (730 m). This was to be made in two steps: the first step was to capture the Turkish trenches; the second was to advance a further 500 yd (460 m) and establish a new trench line. The Third Battle of Krithia 第三次クリチアの戦い
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In the face of immense losses, Faik Paşa had stopped first the counterattack on the morning of 30 June. In spite of strong and direct urging from Liman Paşa (Otto Liman von Sanders) and pressure to continue the counter-attack, he wanted to rest his badly decimated troops for a day. Hesitation of Faik Paşa unnerved Weber Paşa who was in command of the front there. He contemplated pulling back behind the ever strategic Alçı Tepe as a last resort. This would have given over complete victory to the Allies. He had to be strongly dissuaded by Liman Paşa. Finally, the Ottoman 1st Division led by Lieutenant Colonel (Kaymakam) Cafer Tayyar Bey commenced another counterattack at 18:00 on 2 July. Again, though they reached within 30m of the British trenches, the losses were unbearable. Men were melting away in front of rows of machine guns. Attack continued whole night. Eventually Faik Paşa ordered them to dig in and take defensive posture. Liman Paşa immediately released him and assigned Mehmet Ali Paşa in his place. As soon as the 3. Division which had just crossed the Narrows and arrived at the lines around midnight, Mehmet Ali Paşa ordered them to attack 3:45 am. Liman Paşa agreed to delay the attack for 24 hours only after a Major Eggert on the staff of Mehmet Ali Paşa personally appealed to him. Meanwhile, the Allies had observed the preparation for the attack from the air and made their own preparations. On 5 July the last major attack of this battle commenced but met with a very strong wall of fire the Allies put up. The dead were mounting again in front of the British trenches. Mehmet Ali Paşa staff were of the opinion that the Allied advance was already halted and there was no need for these heavy losses. Mehmet Ali Paşa, in fear of a reaction from Liman Paşa, who was in turn intimidated by Enver Paşa hesitated. Again, Major Eggert intervened and Liman Paşa yielded. Finally the slaughter was stopped. This was the bloodiest episode in the entire campaign. After the counter-attacks ceased, the front line stabilised and remained largely static for the rest of the Gallipoli campaign although both sides engaged in a vigorous mining war around the ravine. Hunter-Weston had one final fling at Helles. Once the two remaining brigades of the 52nd Division had landed (the 155th and 157th Brigades) he planned a new attack for 12 July in the centre of the line east of the Krithia Road and along Achi Baba Nullah (also known as Kanlı Dere and Bloody Valley) where the Royal Naval Division had spent most of its time at Helles and suffered so badly during the third battle of Krithia. It was expected that due to heavy Ottoman losses in the previous battle, morale would be low. The plan was for one brigade to attack in the morning and the other to attack in the afternoon so that the full weight of artillery support could be lent to each brigade. The 155th Brigade would attack at 7.35 am and the 157th at 4.50 pm.
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Despite the casualties, Aylmer could not afford to spend much time waiting for the arrival of the second division of reinforcements still working its way upriver to the front. Every advance he made, put him further from his supply base at Basra, and closer to the Ottoman logistical hub at Baghdad. Although considered a British victory (albeit a costly one), the Ottoman forces had achieved their goal in delaying the Tigris Corps. They had bloodied Aylmer's forces, using up time which the Kut garrison believed it did not have and reinforcements which were hard for the British and Indian governments to replace.
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Aylmer therefore devised a plan whereby his force would cross the Tigris for a straightforward attack upon the Turk-held Dujaila Redoubt, at the extreme outer edge of Es Sinn, which held some 25,000 experienced troops, many of whom had fought at Gallipoli as well as along the Tigris. Aylmer was nevertheless keen to await further reinforcement from Gallipoli. He was however over-ruled by Lake, who was wary of delaying while the floods increased in strength, and instructed to launch an attack no later than 15 March 1916. Indian troops prayingThus Aylmer ordered the bulk of his two divisions - approximately 35,000 men and 62 guns - to march overnight preparatory to storming Dujaila Redoubt while 6,500 were left behind in front of Hanna. Meanwhile Townshend was to separately attack Turk forces from behind. Originally scheduled to begin on 6 March the attack was postponed until 8 March on account of heavy rainfall. General Kemball led the main advance at 10am; but by noon he was stopped around 700 metres short of the Redoubt.
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The key to whether the Kut garrison would be able to hold out was food. After early attempts to storm the town failed, the Ottoman forces investing Kut opted to starve the defenders into submission. Townshend had ordered some of his forces to break out and regroup downriver where the remnants of I.E.F. "D" were beginning to gather. However, even by decreasing the number of mouths to feed, the food problem was more complex than simply the amount available. As the siege began to drag on, Townshend sent word to Nixon that his food supply would only last until 15 January 1916. The Kut garrison was made up of the 6th (Poona) Division. Unlike a typical British division, or even an Ottoman one, Indian Army divisions had a complex make up. Battalions would be made up of companies from the various Indian ethnic and religious groups. Each group had its own dietary requirements. Hindus, for example, would never touch meat from a cow or even allow their food to be cooked in pots which had cooked cow meat. Sikhs, while allowing meat to be eaten, could not eat any animals slaughtered in accordance with a ritual, such as halal. Muslim troops required food prepared in accordance with halal. Finally, there were the British troops, whose diet was decided by Whitehall. Along the North-West Frontier, where Indian Army units traditionally were assigned, the mixed dietary needs were manageable. But in Mesopotamia, at the end of a long and poorly developed supply line, the problem was significantly more difficult. At the start of the siege, in December 1915, Townshend reported he had enough food to feed the sepoys of his division for 54 days.
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Colonel Nureddin had over 55 days to prepare his defenses, and his forces prepared them well. He deployed his forces in an L shaped formation. The 38th Division occupied the long part of the L. The new and fresh 45th Division held most vulnerable part of the line, the small leg of the L on the left, with one regiment up in the front line trenches and two in reserve. There were 12 strong points along the first trench line, and a complete second line of trenches to fall back into. In general reserve was the veteran 51st Division. The 35th was across the river.The Ottoman artillery was centrally located where it could support his left flank or the central part of his line.The artillery was ordered to fire first on the British gunboats, and then shift fire to support the Ottoman reserves.
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