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  • カナダ軍は、戦闘力を高めるために手榴弾やライフル榴弾、機関銃の部隊を編成しました。
  • 上級士官には模型や地図が使用され、戦場の地形や敵の塹壕の詳細を示しました。
  • 部隊の指導者が負傷または死亡する可能性を考慮し、兵士たちは隣や上の階級の仕事も学びました。
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The short pamphlet noted the importance of dedicated hand grenade, rifle grenade and machine gun sections in suppressing enemy strong points with an appropriate level of fire to permit other military units to advance. Coupled with the observations and suggestions made by Currie in the report he submitted in January 1917 following the Verdun lectures, the Canadian Corps instilled the tactical change with vigour. The corps instilled the tactical doctrine for small units by assigning objectives down to the platoon level. Assaulting infantry battalions used hills behind the lines as full-scale model representations of the battlefield. Taped lines demarcated German trench lines while officers on horseback carried flags to represent the advancing front of the artillery barrage. Recognizing that the men in leadership positions were likely to be wounded or killed, soldiers learned the jobs of those beside and above them. At the British First Army headquarters, a large-scale plasticine model of the Vimy sector was constructed and used to show commissioned and senior non-commissioned officers the topographical features of the battlefield and details of the German trench system. In addition, upwards of 40,000 topographical trench maps were printed and distributed to ensure that even platoon sergeants and section commanders possessed a wider awareness of the battlefield.

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  • Nakay702
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＞The short pamphlet noted the importance of dedicated hand grenade, rifle grenade and machine gun sections in suppressing enemy strong points with an appropriate level of fire to permit other military units to advance. Coupled with the observations and suggestions made by Currie in the report he submitted in January 1917 following the Verdun lectures, the Canadian Corps instilled the tactical change with vigour. ⇒その短い小冊子は、他の部隊（攻撃波）の進軍を可能にするために、砲火の適切なレベルで敵の強力な地点を抑える際（の使用）に割り当てる手榴弾や銃榴弾、機関銃班の重要性を指摘していた。ヴェルダン講義の後、1917年1月に提出した報告でカリーによって観察と提案とが連結されて、カナダ軍団にはこの戦術変化が力強く浸透していった。 ＞The corps instilled the tactical doctrine for small units by assigning objectives down to the platoon level. Assaulting infantry battalions used hills behind the lines as full-scale model representations of the battlefield. Taped lines demarcated German trench lines while officers on horseback carried flags to represent the advancing front of the artillery barrage. ⇒軍団は、小隊レベルに（独自の）目的を割り当てることによって、小さな部隊に戦術的な教義を浸透させた。歩兵大隊を襲撃する（演習の）ときは、戦場を全景表示する典型場面として前線背後の丘を利用した。テープを張った線でドイツ軍の塹壕戦線を区画表示し、一方砲撃の集中砲火が進む前線を表すために、馬に乗った将校らが旗を持って動いた。 ＞Recognizing that the men in leadership positions were likely to be wounded or killed, soldiers learned the jobs of those beside and above them. At the British First Army headquarters, a large-scale plasticine model of the Vimy sector was constructed and used to show commissioned and senior non-commissioned officers the topographical features of the battlefield and details of the German trench system. In addition, upwards of 40,000 topographical trench maps were printed and distributed to ensure that even platoon sergeants and section commanders possessed a wider awareness of the battlefield. ⇒指導層の陣地にいる兵士が負傷したり死亡したりする傾向があることが認識されたので、兵士らはその傍や頭上に存在する仕事（に対処すべきこと）を学んだ。英国第1方面軍の本部では、ヴィミー地区の大規模なプラスティシン（＝可塑的）モデルが創られて、任官将校および無任所上級下士官が戦場の地形上の特徴とドイツ軍の塹壕システムの詳細を示す指標として用いられた。その上、少なくとも40,000枚の地形上の塹壕マップが印刷されて、より広い戦場認識の所有を確実にするために、二等曹長や部隊長にまで配布された。

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