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  • The plan called for units to leapfrog over one another, as the advance progressed, to maintain momentum during the attack.
  • The experience of the Battle of the Somme led the German command to conclude that the policy of rigidly defending a trench position line was no longer effective against the firepower that the Entente armies had accumulated.
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英文翻訳をお願いします。

The plan called for units to leapfrog over one another, as the advance progressed, to maintain momentum during the attack. The initial wave would capture and consolidate the Black Line and then push forward to the Red Line. The barrage would pause, to enable reserve units to move up, and then move forward with the units pushing beyond the Red Line to the Blue Line. Once the corps secured the Blue Line, advancing units would once again leapfrog established ones and capture the Brown Line. Conducted properly, the plan would leave the German forces little time to exit the security of their deep dugouts and defend their positions against the infantry advance. If the corps maintained its schedule, the troops would advance as much as 3,700 m (4,000 yd) and have the majority of the ridge under control by 1:00 pm of the first day.The experience of the Battle of the Somme led the German command to conclude that the policy of rigidly defending a trench position line was no longer effective against the firepower that the Entente armies had accumulated. Ludendorff published a new defensive doctrine in December 1916, in which deeper defences were to be built, within which the garrison would have room to manoeuvre, rather than rigidly holding successive lines of trenches. Along Vimy Ridge, the German forces spent two years constructing fortifications designed for rigid defence.

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>The plan called for units to leapfrog over one another, as the advance progressed, to maintain momentum during the attack. The initial wave would capture and consolidate the Black Line and then push forward to the Red Line. The barrage would pause, to enable reserve units to move up, and then move forward with the units pushing beyond the Red Line to the Blue Line. ⇒この計画では、攻撃の間に勢力を維持するために、前進が進むに従って部隊がお互いに馬飛びしていくことが必要であった。最初の波は「黒い線」を攻略して強化し、それから「赤い線」に突き進む。予備軍が前線へ出ることを可能にするために、集中砲火を一時休止して、それから「赤い線」を越えて「青い線」に押し進むものとした。 >Once the corps secured the Blue Line, advancing units would once again leapfrog established ones and capture the Brown Line. Conducted properly, the plan would leave the German forces little time to exit the security of their deep dugouts and defend their positions against the infantry advance. ⇒軍団がひとたび「青い線」を確保したら、先進部隊は再度確定したものを越えて、「茶色い線」を捕らえる。これがきちんと実行されれば、本計画はドイツ軍団に深い待避壕の安全施設を飛び出して、歩兵連隊の進軍から彼らの陣地を守る時間をほとんど与えないだろう。 >If the corps maintained its schedule, the troops would advance as much as 3,700 m (4,000 yd) and have the majority of the ridge under control by 1:00 pm of the first day.The experience of the Battle of the Somme led the German command to conclude that the policy of rigidly defending a trench position line was no longer effective against the firepower that the Entente armies had accumulated. ⇒軍団が予定(行程)を維持するならば、軍隊は3,700m(4,000ヤード)くらいは進んで、第1日目の午後1時までには、尾根の大部分を支配下に置けるだろう。「ソンムの戦い」の経験は、ドイツ運司令部に塹壕陣地の戦線を厳しく守る方針が協商国軍の集積(砲火)した火力に対してもはや効果的ではなかった、と結論させた。 >Ludendorff published a new defensive doctrine in December 1916, in which deeper defences were to be built, within which the garrison would have room to manoeuvre, rather than rigidly holding successive lines of trenches. Along Vimy Ridge, the German forces spent two years constructing fortifications designed for rigid defence. ⇒ルーデンドルフは、1916年12月に新しい防御の教義を発表して、より深い防衛力を構築することにした。すなわち、守備駐屯軍は塹壕の連続した戦線を厳しく維持することよりもむしろ、機動作戦行動をとるための空間を持つものとしたのである。ヴィミー・リッジに沿って、ドイツ軍団は、堅い防御のために設計された防備施設を造ることに2年を費やした。

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