カナダ軍、モント・ソレルとトール・トップに対する攻撃を計画
- カナダ軍は、モント・ソレルとトール・トップに対する攻撃を計画しました。
- 攻撃を予期させるため、6月9日から12日まで4回の激しい砲撃を行いました。
- 特にカナダ軍の側面には注意が払われ、横射撃が予想される場所に砲撃が集中しました。
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Byng ordered 1st Canadian Division commander Major-General Arthur Currie to organize a careful attack against the German positions at Mont Sorrel and Tor Top. Due to the casualties suffered during the unsuccessful counterattack of 3 June, Currie regrouped his stronger battalions into two composite brigades. Four intense bombardments of thirty minutes each were carried out between 9 and 12 June in an effort to deceive the Germans into expecting immediate attacks, which did not transpire. For ten hours on 12 June all the German positions between Hill 60 and Sanctuary Wood were shelled unremittingly. Particular attention was given to the Canadian Corps flanks, from which enfilade machine-gun fire might be expected.
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＞Byng ordered 1st Canadian Division commander Major-General Arthur Currie to organize a careful attack against the German positions at Mont Sorrel and Tor Top. Due to the casualties suffered during the unsuccessful counterattack of 3 June, Currie regrouped his stronger battalions into two composite brigades. ⇒ビングは、カナダ軍第1師団の指揮官アーサー・カリー少将にソレル山とトル・トップのドイツ軍の陣地への慎重な攻撃を手配するよう命令した。6月3日の不首尾だった反撃の間に被った犠牲のゆえに、カリーはより強い大隊を2個旅団の合成軍に再編成した。 ＞Four intense bombardments of thirty minutes each were carried out between 9 and 12 June in an effort to deceive the Germans into expecting immediate attacks, which did not transpire. For ten hours on 12 June all the German positions between Hill 60 and Sanctuary Wood were shelled unremittingly. Particular attention was given to the Canadian Corps flanks, from which enfilade machine-gun fire might be expected. ⇒6月9日－12日の間、ドイツ軍を欺いて即時の攻撃を予想させるために、それぞれ30分ずつ4回の激しい爆撃が実行されたが、そういうことにはならなかった（思惑ははずれた）。6月12日には、ヒル60とサンクチュアリー・ウッド（聖域の森）の間にあるすべてのドイツ軍陣地が、10時間絶え間なく砲撃された。カナダ軍団の側面に特別の注意が向けられたので、そこから機関銃の縦射砲火が予想されるかもしれない（状況になった）。
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However, German forces were still able to capture Mont Sorrel and Hill 61. After advancing up to 1,100 metres (1,200 yd), the XIII Corps troops dug in. Although the road to Ypres was open and undefended, no German officer took the initiative to exceed instructions and capitalize on the success experienced by the German forces. Lieutenant-General Byng assembled a hastily organized counterattack in the early hours of 3 June. Owing to the 3rd Canadian Division’s heavy losses, two brigades of the 1st Canadian Division were temporarily placed under the control of Brigadier-General Hoare Nairne, who had assumed control of 3rd Canadian Division. The counterattack was scheduled to begin at 2:00 am on 3 June 1916.
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Low cloud and rain obstructed air observation of the bombardment, which soon fell behind schedule; on 25 June aircraft of the four British armies on the Western Front, attacked the German kite balloons opposite, four were shot down by rockets and one bombed, three of the balloons being in the Fourth Army area. Next day, three more balloons were shot down opposite the Fourth Army. During German artillery retaliation against the Anglo-French bombardment, 102 German artillery positions were plotted and a Fokker was shot down near Courcelette.
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The operation was intended to engage as many German formations as possible and to prevent them from reinforcing the Ypres sector during the Third Battle of Ypres. Command of the Canadian Corps had only recently changed. A month earlier, Canadian Corps commander Julian Byng was promoted to General and replaced General Edmund Allenby as commander of the Third Army. Arthur Currie, the 1st Canadian Division commander, was promoted to Lieutenant-General and assumed command of the Canadian Corps. Currie regarded control of either Hill 70 or Sallaumines Hill as tactically more important than control of the city of Lens. Merely to occupy the city while the Germans held the high ground, would place the attackers in an unfavourably lower and more exposed position than the ones they occupied. At a conference of corps commanders, Currie persuaded the First Army commander General Henry Horne to make Hill 70, not Lens, the main objective of the limited offensive. Controlling Hill 70 would provide excellent observation over the German lines, in preparation for more offensives. Currie believed the Germans would attempt to counter-attack if Hill 70 were captured, largely because of its observational importance. Nevertheless, Currie believed that the advantageous observational position of Hill 70 would permit well directed artillery to effectively deal with any counter-attacks. The plan was therefore to occupy the high ground quickly, establish defensive positions and utilize combined small arms and artillery fire to repel expected counter-attacks and inflict as many casualties as possible. In an attempt to further deceive the Germans, minor operations were conducted in an effort to suggest a forthcoming attack by the British First Army south of La Bassée Canal. This included an attack by the 9th Canadian Brigade against units of the German 36th Reserve Division at Mericourt Trench and a British First Army poison gas attack north of Loos, both in late July 1917. Bad weather led to the postponement of the attack on Hill 70 from late July until mid-August.
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The preliminary operation intended for 2 August, was delayed by rain until 10 August and the general offensive was postponed from 4–16 August. The 20th (Light) Division had been in XIV Corps reserve, for the opening attack on 31 July and replaced the 38th (Welsh) Division on 5 August. The 7th Battalion of the Somerset Light Infantry took over captured German trenches behind the front line on 5 August, which had been turned into the British reserve line and lost three men to shellfire while waiting for dark. On arrival at the support line 500 yd (460 m) forward and the front line another 500 yd (460 m) beyond, the battalion found that the front line was several shell hole posts with muddy bottoms, strung along the Steenbeek from the Langemarck road to the Ypres–Staden railway. British artillery was engaged in destructive bombardments of the German positions opposite and German artillery fire was aimed at the British infantry concentrating for the next attack. After heavy rain all night, the battalion spent 6 August soaked through and had 20 casualties, two men being killed. On 7 August, there were 35 casualties, twelve being killed before the battalion was relieved until 14 August. Training began for the next attack and planning began using trench maps and aerial photographs. Each company formed three platoons, two for the advance, with two rifle sections in the lead and the Lewis-gun sections behind and the third platoon to mop up. Training now emphasised the need for units not held up by German resistance, to "hug" the creeping barrage and form offensive flanks, to assist troops who had been halted by the German defenders, by providing enfilade fire and enveloping German positions, which were to be left and mopped-up by reserve platoons. Every known German position was allocated to a unit of the approximately 470 men left in the battalion, to reduce the risk of German positions going unnoticed and firing at the leading troops from behind. While the Somersets were out of the line, the 10th and 11th battalions of the Rifle Brigade edged forward about 100 yd (91 m) beyond the Steenbeek, which cost the 10th Battalion 215 casualties.
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Most German casualties had been incurred during the Nivelle Offensive and were greater than any earlier Entente attack, against 274,000 French casualties for the same period. The French armies lost 96,125 casualties by 25 April and were also struck by a collapse of the medical services on the Aisne front, c. 60,000 casualties being stranded close to the battlefield for several days; German losses have been estimated at 83,000 for the same period. A wave of mutinies broke out in the French armies, which eventually affected 54 divisions. Between 16 April and 15 May the mutinies were isolated but then spread, with 46 incidents recorded by 31 May. From 1–6 June violent resistance increased, possibly six people being killed by mutineers, which threatened the battleworthiness of the French armies, before order slowly returned by the end of June. The French strategy of breakthrough and decisive battle had failed disastrously and for the rest of 1917, the French armies resorted to a strategy of "healing and defence".
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The cost of the Nivelle Offensive in casualties and loss of morale were great but German losses were also high and the tactical success of the offensive in capturing elaborately fortified positions and defeating counter-attacks, reduced German morale. The German had been forced from three of the strongest positions on the Western Front and had failed to recapture them. Vimy Ridge, the Scarpe Heights, the caverns, spurs and plateau of the Chemin des Dames and the Moronvilliers massif had been occupied for more than two years, carefully surveyed by German engineers and fortified to make them impregnable. In six weeks all were lost and the Germans were left clinging to the eastern or northern edges of the ridges of the summits, having lost the western or southern sides. The French tactic of assault brutal et continu suited the German defensive dispositions, since much of the new construction had taken place on reverse slopes. The speed of attack and the depth of the French objectives meant that there was no time to establish artillery observation posts overlooking the Ailette valley, in the areas where French infantry had reached the ridge. The tunnels and caves under the ridge nullified the destructive effect of the French artillery, which was also inhibited by poor weather, which reduced observation and by German air superiority, which made French artillery-observation aircraft even less effective.
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Each German regiment held a zone approximately 1,000 metres (1,100 yd) wide as far back as the rear area. When the Canadian Corps attacked, each German company faced two or more battalions of approximately 1,000 men each. Reserve divisions were kept approximately 24 kilometres (15 mi) back instead of assembling close behind the second line according the defence-in-depth theory. The Canadian Corps' divisional artillery formations, totalling eight field brigades and two heavy artillery groups, were insufficient for the task at hand and were consequently reinforced with outside formations. Four heavy artillery groups, nine artillery field brigades, three divisional artillery groups and the artillery complement of the British 5th Division was attached to the Canadian Corps. In addition, ten heavy artillery groups of the flanking I and XVII Corps were assigned tasks in support of the Canadian Corps. The artillery batteries of I Corps were particularly important because they enfiladed German gun positions behind Vimy Ridge. In total, the British made available to the Canadian Corps twenty-four brigade artillery groups consisting of four hundred and eighty 18 pounder field guns, one hundred thirty-eight 4.5 inch howitzers, ninety-six 2 inch trench mortars, twenty-four 9.45 inch mortars, supported by 245 corps-level siege guns and heavy mortars.
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The Franco-British attack on 9 May had been on a front of 16 mi (25 km) and in June three supporting attacks were planned by the French Second, Sixth and Seventh armies, along with an attack by the British near Zillebeke in Flanders. The preliminary bombardment was due to begin on 13 June and XXI Corps was to attack from the Lorette Spur towards Bois de Givenchy, XX Corps was to complete the capture of Neuville and the Labyrnthe and XXIII Corps was shifted slightly north to attack Souchez, Château Carleul, Côte 119 and Givenchy-en-Gohelle. IX Corps was moved from the northern boundary of the Tenth Army and placed between XXXIII Corps and XX Corps to take Vimy Ridge. During minor attacks in early June, the IX Corps divisions had gained little success and in one attack the infantry went to ground and refused to continue, which if repeated would leave the XXXIII Corps vulnerable to another advance into a salient. The artillery preparation was carefully observed from the front line and IX Corps troops were issued flares to signal to the artillery, who reported a highly accurate bombardment, particularly on the 5 Chemins crossroads and a derelict mill, which were the principal German defensive works opposite. On 15 June the commander of the 17th Division on the right of the IX Corps, wrote to General Curé, the corps commander, that preparations were incomplete and had not conformed to Note 5779, leaving the jumping-off trenches 200–300 metres (220–330 yd) from the German front line, rather than the 160 yd (150 m) or fewer laid down and that the infantry were already exhausted. In the rest of the Tenth Army the situation was the same, with infantry being set to hours of digging under German counter-bombardments. It was also discovering that the accuracy of French artillery-fire, was not sufficient make it effective. An attack on 13 June, by a regiment of the 70th Division on the sugar refinery, captured a small length of the German front trench, where they were bombarded by French artillery. An attack on 14 June took another short length of trench but the regiment had to be relieved by part of the 13th Division during the night of 15/16 June. Reports from the IX and XX corps on the southern flank, described accurate French artillery fire and XXI Corps on the Lorette Spur had a commanding view of German defences. Maistre the corps commander, had made artillery observation a specialist role for trained men, who kept close to the infantry to ensure efficient liaison. It was soon discovered that the Germans had put barbed wire 55 yd (50 m) in front of the front line, rather than just in front and special bombardments were fired to cut the wire, after which patrols went forward to check the results, despite German counter-bombardments. On the 43rd Division front, it was discovered that field artillery was only shifting the barbed wire around and not damaging cheveaux de frise but modern 155mm guns were used in time to create several gaps in the wire.
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Although this battle was a failure, the British learned important lessons about the need for close liaison between tanks, infantry, and artillery, which they would later apply in the Battle of Cambrai (1917). Round Bullecourt, 11 April – 16 June First attack on Bullecourt (10–11 April 1917)South of Arras, the plan called for two divisions, the British 62nd Division and the Australian 4th Division to attack either side of the village of Bullecourt and push the Germans out of their fortified positions and into the reserve trenches. The attack was initially scheduled for the morning of 10 April, but the tanks intended for the assault were delayed by bad weather and the attack was postponed for 24 hours. The order to delay did not reach all units in time, and two battalions of the West Yorkshire Regiment attacked and were driven back with significant losses. Despite protests from the Australian commanders, the attack was resumed on the morning of 11 April; mechanical failures meant that only 11 tanks were able to advance in support, and the limited artillery barrage left much of the barbed wire in front of the German trenches uncut.
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The German Second Army, which was holding the sector north of the Somme, had observed preparations for an offensive since the end of February 1916. Short of resources due to operations at Verdun, the Germans could only mount local operations in an effort to divert British resources from the Somme. On 28 May 1916, in an abrupt change of command, Lieutenant-General Edwin Alderson was appointed to the largely ceremonial post of Inspector General of Canadian Forces in England and was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Julian Byng as commander of the Canadian Corps. Byng inspected the Canadian Corps positions and noted that the Canadian troops were overlooked by German positions and under constant danger of enemy fire. He assigned 3rd Canadian Division commander, Major-General Malcolm Mercer to draw up a plan to overrun the more dangerous German positions in a local attack.
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