German Strategy: Offensive against France, Defensive against Russia
- German strategy prioritized offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891.
- German planning focused on numerical inferiority, mobilization and concentration speed, and the power of modern weapons.
- Alfred von Schlieffen devised a plan to bypass French fortifications by attacking the northern flank via Belgium.
- ベストアンサー
英文を日本語訳して下さい。
German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906, devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications with an offensive on the northern flank, which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899, such a manoeuvre was intended to pass swiftly through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.
- lwano_aoi
- お礼率83% (45/54)
- 英語
- 回答数2
- ありがとう数1
- みんなの回答 （2）
- 専門家の回答
質問者が選んだベストアンサー
＞German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. ⇒ドイツ軍は戦略として、1891年以降フランスに対しては攻撃作戦を、ロシアに対しては防衛を優先した。ドイツ軍の計画は、数的劣勢、移動と集結の速度、および近代兵器の膨大な増加の影響などによって決定づけられた。特にフランス軍とロシア軍が、ドイツとの前線で防備を現代化したあとは、ドイツ軍にとって正面からの攻撃は高コストになって長引きがちとなり、限定的な戦果しかあげられない状況に至った。 ＞Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906, devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications with an offensive on the northern flank, which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899, such a manoeuvre was intended to pass swiftly through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. ⇒1891–1906年の、ドイツ帝国総司令官（ドイツ語：Oberste Heeresleitung OHL参謀統帥）アルフレッド・フォン・シュリーフェンは、フランス軍の防備前線を避け、地域の数的優勢があって迅速かつ決定的な勝利を得られそうな北部側面を攻撃する計画を考案した。1898–1899年、迅速にアントワープ・ナミュール間のベルギーを通り抜けて、北からパリを脅かすような作戦行動を企てたのである。 ＞Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). ⇒1906年、青年ヘルムート・フォン・モルトケがシュリーフェンの跡を継いだが、フランスがドイツの推測どおりになるかどうか定かでなかった。モルトケは、布陣と集結の計画を勘案して、「ヴェステア」（西部戦線軍）での動員が予定されている約1,700,000人の兵士から数個師団を、フランス前線に対峙する左翼に適宜追加することによって、中央部への突撃攻撃、または両側面からの包囲攻撃をやりくりすることにした。 ＞The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border. ⇒ドイツ軍の主要部隊はベルギーを通って進軍し、フランス南部を攻撃するものとすれば、フランス軍は左翼側で包囲されて、ミューズ、エーン、ソンム、オアーズ、マルヌ、セーヌに推し戻され、中部フランスに撤退することはできなくなるだろう。フランス軍は大打撃を受けるか、北からの作戦行動によって、中央部またはロレーヌの共通境界線におけるドイツ軍勝利の条件ができるはずである。
その他の回答 (1)
- kuronekofan
- ベストアンサー率56% (229/402)
ドイツの戦略は、１８９１年以来フランスに対しては攻撃作戦重視、ロシアに対しては防衛重視をとった。ドイツの作戦は、数の劣勢、動員の速度や集結、近代兵器性能の爆発的な向上などで決定づけられた。 正面攻撃は費用過多で長引き、戦果は小さいと導かれていた。特に、フランスやロシアがドイツ国境ぞいの要塞設備を近代化してからはそうである。 アルフレッド・フォン・シュリーフェンは、１８９１年～１９０６年、ドイツ帝国参謀本部（独：Oberste Heeresleitung 通称 "OHL") の本部長であった。フランスの国境ぞいの要塞への攻撃を避け、北の側面から攻撃して数で優位に立ち早期に勝利を決定付けることを発案した。 １８９８年～９９年、アントワープとナミューの間を通ってベルギーを素早く通過し、北からパリを脅かすよう、計画が策定された。 ヘルムス・フォン・モルトケ（小）は、１９０６年にシュリーフェン（の計画）を完成させたが、フランスがドイツの前提に合っているかは不確かなことだった。 モルトケは展開と集結の計画を調整し、中央部での攻撃と両側面からの包囲攻撃を準備した。修正案として、フランスの前線とは反対に左側面に師団を追加した。総勢１７０万人が「Westheer 」（西部方面軍）として動員されることになっていた。 ドイツ軍の大部分はフランス南部を攻撃するため、まだベルギーの通過途中にあった。フランス軍は左手を包囲されて、ミューゼ、エーヌ、ソンム、オアース、マーネ、シーネ川へと押し戻され、フランス中央部への撤退を余儀なくされた。フランス軍は、北からの野望によって全滅するのか、ロレーヌあるいは中央部に勝利の望みを見出せるのか、その境界線上にあった。
関連するQ&A
- 日本語訳して下さい 。
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men which were expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium to attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on their left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine rivers, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated by the manoeuvre from the north or it would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 英文翻訳をお願いします。
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. German strategy would need to become more opportunistic and Moltke modified German plans to make them less rigid to enable this, making the offensives of 1914 the opening moves of what was expected to be a long war with no certainty of victory. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men expected to be mobilised in the Westheer (western army). The main German force would still advance through Belgium and attack southwards into France and the French armies would be enveloped on the left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated or the manoeuvre from the north would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 英文翻訳をお願いします。
German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung "OHL") from 1891–1906 devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications, with an offensive on the northern flank which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899 such a manoeuvre was intended to rapidly pass through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and was less certain that the French would conform to German assumptions. Moltke adapted the deployment and concentration plan, to accommodate an attack in the centre or an enveloping attack from both flanks as variants to the plan, by adding divisions to the left flank opposite the French frontier, from the c. 1,700,000 men expected to be mobilised in the Westheer ("western army"). The main German force would still advance through Belgium and attack southwards into France, the French armies would be enveloped on the left and pressed back over the Meuse, Aisne, Somme, Oise, Marne and Seine, unable to withdraw into central France. The French would either be annihilated or the manoeuvre from the north would create conditions for victory in the centre or in Lorraine on the common border.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 日本語訳をお願いいたします。
From his assessment of French defensive capability Schlieffen concluded that the German army would need at least 48.5 corps to succeed with an attack on France by way of Belgium, but Moltke planned to attack through Belgium with just 34 corps at his disposal in the west. The Schlieffen plan [sic] amounts to a critique of German strategy in 1914 since it clearly predicted the failure of Moltke’s underpowered invasion of France. [...] Moltke followed the trajectory of the Schlieffen plan, but only up to the point where it was painfully obvious that he would have needed the army of the Schlieffen plan to proceed any further along these lines.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 英文を日本語訳して下さい。
The actions of the Hohenzollern Redoubt took place on the Western Front in World War I from 13 to 19 October 1915, at the Hohenzollern Redoubt (Hohenzollernwerk) near Auchy-les-Mines in France. In the aftermath of the Battle of Loos (25 September – 8 October 1915), the 9th (Scottish) Division captured the strongpoint and then lost it to a German counter-attack. The British attack on 13 October failed and resulted in 3,643 casualties, mostly in the first few minutes. In the History of the Great War, James Edmonds wrote that "The fighting [from 13 to 14 October] had not improved the general situation in any way and had brought nothing but useless slaughter of infantry".In the summer of 1915 the German armies continued the strengthening of front trenches, communication trenches and strong-points ordered by Chief of the General Staff General Erich von Falkenhayn, who on 25 January had also ordered the building of more defensive lines behind the front trench. Crown Prince Rupprecht the Sixth Army commander and some Western Front generals had objected to this policy, as an invitation to German troops to retreat rather than fight. After the experience of the Battle of Festubert, where Allied artillery had proved capable of destroying a great width of front trench, opposition had been abandoned and the work carried on as quickly as possible. In early May Falkenhayn had also ordered that a second defensive position be built 2,000–3,000 yd (1.1–1.7 mi; 1.8–2.7 km) behind the whole of the Western Front, to force an attacker to pause to move artillery forward into range. Plans to exploit the Franco-British superiority in numbers on the Western Front, while one third of the German army was on the Russian Front were agreed at a Conference by Joffre and French at Chantilly on 14 September. The British New Armies had begun to arrive, the number of heavy guns had increased since the offensives of May and June and by concentrating resources at the points of attack an even greater numerical superiority could be obtained over the Germans. An unprecedented preliminary bombardment of the German defences would be possible and make attacks by the greater number of Allied infantry decisive. Simultaneous offensives would be mounted from Champagne and Artois towards Namur, the principal attack being made in Champagne. The attack by the French Tenth Army on Vimy Ridge in May and June had failed, which left the German Sixth Army in control of the high ground below which the French were to have assembled a mass of artillery and infantry. It was agreed that in Artois a Franco-British offensive would be mounted towards Douai, by the French Tenth and the British First armies, co-ordinated by General Foch on a front of 20 miles (32 km) between Arras and La Bassée canal.[3] The British First Army was to attack between Grenay and La Bassée canal on a 6-mile (9.7 km) front, with six divisions and three in reserve. The Cavalry Corps and Indian Cavalry Corps were to be held ready to exploit a German collapse. The Franco-British armies were to attack towards Tournai, Valenciennes and Le Quesnoy and subsidiary attacks were to be made by the rest of the Franco-British armies to pin down German reserves.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 以下の英文を訳して下さい。
Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung OHL) from 1891–1906 devised a number of plans that called for winning a decisive battle against the French army in Germany, Belgium or France as the war-situation required. Aufmarsch I West was a contingency plan for a Franco-German war, in which France (due to fewer numbers) would be on the defensive and Germany would attack by invading Belgium between Antwerp and Namur and then advancing south to breach the Verdun–Marne–Paris defensive area. German forces would then hold there until rail-supply could be restored and sufficient stocks of ammunition and food built up, in preparation for a second offensive operation. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger succeeded Schlieffen in 1906 and became convinced that an isolated Franco-German war was impossible and that Italian and Austro-Hungarian forces would not be available to defend the Franco-German border as originally planned. Under Moltke, Aufmarsch I was retired but in 1914 he attempted to apply the offensive strategy of Aufmarsch I to the deployment plan Aufmarsch II and the two-front war it anticipated,
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 英文を日本語訳して下さい。
On 5 August, Joffre ordered an offensive by the VII Corps, on the right flank of the First Army, to begin on 7 August towards Mulhouse. The capture of the 2nd Army order of battle on 7 August, convinced Joffre that the strength of the German forces on the flanks had left the centre weak and vulnerable to an offensive towards Neufchâteau and Arlon. On 8 August, Joffre issued General Instruction No. 1, containing his strategic intent, which was to destroy the German army rather than capture ground. The offensive into Alsace and that by the First and Second armies into Lorraine, would pin down German forces and attract reinforcements, as the main offensive further north drove in the German centre and outflanked the German forces in Belgium from the south. Joffre expected that the attack into the German centre would meet little resistance. The First and Second armies would advance south of the German fortified area from Metz–Thionville, with the Fourth Reserve Group guarding the northern flank near Hirson, to watch the Chimay Gap and deflect a German attack from the north or east. The strategy assumed that the main German force would be deployed around Luxembourg and from Metz–Thionville, with smaller forces in Belgium. On 9 August, an intelligence report had one German active corps near Freiburg close to the Swiss border, three near Strasbourg, four in Luxembourg to the north of Thionville and six from Liège in Belgium, towards the north end of Luxembourg, which left five corps un-located. The French general staff inferred that they were between Metz-Thionville and Luxembourg, ready to advance towards Sedan or Mézières.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 英文を日本語訳して下さい。
The Battle of Mulhouse or Mülhausen, also called the Battle of Alsace (French: Bataille d'Alsace), which began on August 7, 1914, was the opening attack of World War I by the French army against Germany. The battle was part of a French attempt to recover the province of Alsace, which France ceded to the newly formed German Empire following France's defeat by Prussia and other independent German states in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The French occupied Mulhouse on 8 August and were then forced out by German counter-attacks on 10 August. The French retired to Belfort, where General Bonneau the VII Corps commander and the 8th Cavalry division commander were sacked. Events further north led to the German XIV and XV corps being moved away from Belfort and a second French offensive by the French VII Corps, reinforced and renamed the Army of Alsace under General Paul Pau, began on 14 August.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 日本語訳をお願いいたします。
German strategy had given priority to offensive operations against France and a defensive posture against Russia since 1891. German planning was determined by numerical inferiority, the speed of mobilisation and concentration and the effect of the vast increase of the power of modern weapons. Frontal attacks were expected to be costly and protracted, leading to limited success, particularly after the French and Russians modernised their fortifications on the frontiers with Germany. Alfred von Schlieffen Chief of the Imperial German General Staff (Oberste Heeresleitung OHL) from 1891–1906 devised a plan to evade the French frontier fortifications, with an offensive on the northern flank which would have a local numerical superiority and obtain rapidly a decisive victory. By 1898–1899 such a manoeuvre was intended to rapidly pass through Belgium, between Antwerp and Namur and threaten Paris from the north.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
- 英文を日本語訳して下さい。
. It was fought by the Fifth Army (the Reserve Army had been renamed on 30 October) under the command of Lieutenant-General Hubert Gough, against the German 1st Army (General Fritz von Below). The intent of the British attack was to fulfil complementary objectives. Political discontent in London would be muted by a big victory, as would doubts of British commitment by its allies; British loyalty to the Chantilly strategy of 1915 would be seen to be upheld and the capture of Beaumont Hamel and Serre would go some way to redeem the failure of 1 July and obtain ground on which the British would have a tactical advantage.
- ベストアンサー
- 英語
お礼
回答ありがとうございました。