Three Objects of Interest in the Study of Science

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  • The study of the human hand as a mechanism has an interest apart from comparisons with other animals.
  • The study of psychological faculties in any given animal has an interest apart from comparisons with other animals.
  • The comparison of bodily members and psychical faculties throughout the animal series has a distinct interest.
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和訳お願い致します。

Now each of the three objects which I have named affords in its pursuit many and varied points of interest, which are quite distinct from any interest thaUmay be felt in the attain ment of the ultimate end — Classification, Thus, for example, the study of the human hand as a mechanism has an interest apart from all considerations touching the comparison of ita structure with that of the corresponding member in other animals ; and, similarly, the study of the psychological facul ties in any given animal has an interest apart from all con siderations touching their comparison with the corresponding faculties in other animals. Again, just as the comparison of separate bodily members throughout the animal series has an interest apart from any question concerning the classification of animal bodies to which such comparison may ultimately lead, so the study of separate psychical faculties throughout the animal series (including, of course, mankind) has an interest quite distinct from any question concerning the classification of animal minds to which such comparison may ultimately lead. Lastly, around and outside all the objects of these sciences as such, there lies the broad expanse of General Thought, into which these sciences, in all their stages, tbrow out branches of inference. It is needless to say that of late years the interest with which the unpre cedented growth of these branches is watched has become so universal and intense, that it may be said largely to have absorbed the more exclusive sources of interest which I have enumerated.

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  • Nakay702
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回答No.1

以下のとおりお答えします。 なお、原文の誤植とおぼしきところはカッコ内のようにみなして訳しました:thaUmay (=that may)、attain ment (=attainment)、ita (=its)、facul ties (=faculties)、con siderations (=considerations)、tbrow (=throw)、unpre cedented (=unprecedented)。 さて、私が指定した3つの目的の各々は、その追求の途上に多くの様々な興味点を派生します。それは、最終目的の達成―「大分類」で感じられるであろういかなる興味ともまったく異なるものです。したがって、例えば、メカニズムとしての人間の手に関する研究は、他の動物中の対応する四肢のそれとの構造比較に触れるすべての考察とはまた別の興味を持ちます。また、同様に、所定の動物中の心理学的機能に関する研究は、他の動物中の対応する機能との比較に触れるすべての観察とはまた別の興味を抱くのです。 再び、ちょうど動物シリーズの全体にわたる個別の肉体的四肢の比較は、それが最終的に結びつくかもしれない動物体の分類に関する任意の問題とは別の興味を持つように、動物シリーズ(もちろん、人類を含んで)の全体にわたる個別の心霊的機能に関する研究は、そのような比較が最終的に結びつくかもしれない動物の心の分類に関する、いかなる問題ともまったく異なる興味を抱きます。 最後に、そのような科学のすべての目的の周辺や外部には「一般思考」の広い拡張が横たわっており、これらの科学が、そのすべての段階の中で、その(一般思考の)中へ推論の先枝を伸ばします。言うまでもないことですが、近年これらの先枝の、先例のない成長の見られる興味が極めて普遍的・集約的なものになってきましので、それは私が列挙した興味の排他的な源泉を吸収した結果だと大々的に言われ得るかもしれません。 以上、ご回答まで。

mangifera
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